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HENRY T. ROWELL

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, JAMES H. OLIVER  
JAMES W. POULTNEY, JOHN H. YOUNG  
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

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BENJAMIN D. MERITT

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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## THE CORRECTOR OF THE CODEX OF CICERO'S *DE REPUBLICA*.\*

The corrector of the famous Ciceronian palimpsest, according to a hypothesis recently advanced in this journal by Mr. G. V. Sumner, was "not a mere scribe, but a man of antiquarian interests, whose corrections were those of a reader trying to makes sense of the corrupt text before him."<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, in the chapter on the *comitia centuriata* (II, 22, 39-40), Sumner proposes the elimination of most of the additions made by the corrector and the insertion of some changes of his own which would, he holds, produce an intelligible account of the Servian assembly. In applying his hypothesis to the chapter Sumner does not mention the fact that he is following a long series of constitutional historians and philologists, beginning with Niebuhr, whose emendations Cardinal Mai quoted but did not accept in the edition of the *De Republica*, published in Stuttgart in 1822, the year of the first Roman editions.<sup>2</sup> This chapter was the basis of the suspicion with which the corrector was long regarded.<sup>3</sup>

\* I wish to express my gratitude to my colleague Professor Berthe Marti for advice and encouragement in the preparation of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> "Cicero on the Comitia Centuriata," *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), pp. 136-56; for the quotation see p. 146, where the alternate suggestion is made that the corrector may have used a manuscript with corrections made earlier by "some possessor of antiquarian knowledge."

<sup>2</sup> Niebuhr's views on the passage are reflected in his correspondence and in his *Römische Geschichte*, I<sup>4</sup> (1933), note, pp. 472 f., where he declares that the "dummes und verwegenes Ändern" of the corrector contributed to the "gräuliche Corruption" of the passage.

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, *Rhein. Mus.*, VIII (1853), with articles by Friedrich

The failure of scholars to examine all the corrections before condemning the corrector was a result of Mai's failure to note fully the changes and additions in the codex, many of which appear without comment in Mai's editions of 1822 and later, and also in the editions of other scholars. The codex was not made available for examination until several years after Mai's death in 1854. The first published collation, the work of a young Dutchman, G. N. Du Rieu, appeared in 1860 with a strong defense of the corrector.<sup>4</sup> The task of investigating the corrections as a whole was suggested by August Reifferscheid to his student Abraham Strelitz. Strelitz's excellent dissertation, published in 1874,<sup>5</sup> disposed of the suggestion that the corrector was an antiquarian inventor. His view that the corrections were based on excellent manuscript authority was accepted by the great Ciceronian scholar C. F. W. Mueller in his Teubner text of 1878.<sup>6</sup> Later, confirmatory evidence was presented by Carl Pfaff and particularly by Konrat Ziegler in his five successive Teubner editions.<sup>7</sup> In the dim writing of the corrector, even more obscured by the cleaning of the parchment than the original text was, Ziegler has been able to find a number of additional

Ritschl, pp. 308-20, Ludwig Lange, pp. 616-23, and E. Huschke, pp. 404-15. The two former scholars condemn the corrector, while Huschke defends him, but makes emendations. Orelli (see his text of Cicero, IV, 1 [1828], p. 450, the commentary on *R. P.*, II, 39) shared Mai's confidence in the corrector.

<sup>4</sup> *Schedae Vaticanae* (Lugdunum Batavorum, 1860). The edition of Carl Halm in the Orelli-Baiter text of Cicero, IV (1862), was the first to take account of Du Rieu's work and also of an examination of some pages of the palimpsest made by Detlefsen. See p. 759 and his critical apparatus. But Halm was decidedly arbitrary in accepting and rejecting the work of the corrector.

<sup>5</sup> *De antiquo Ciceronis de republica librorum emendatore* (Breslau, 1874). For a summary of discussions of II, 39-40, see pp. 59-76.

<sup>6</sup> *Ciceronis opera*, IV, 2, *adnotatio critica*, p. xxiv, with criticisms in succeeding pages of the attitude of Halm and Baiter toward the corrector.

<sup>7</sup> C. Pfaff, *De diversis manibus quibus Ciceronis de republica libri in codice Vaticano correcti sunt* (Heidelberg, 1885). The author depends in part on the collation of August Mau. Pfaff's identification of two separate correctors of the codex is doubted by Ziegler, 5th ed., pp. xxvii f., who finds only one sure example of a late correction. Ziegler's first edition appeared in 1915, the later ones in 1929, 1955, 1958, and (5th) 1960. On the corrector, see the 5th edition, pp. xxiii-xxxi and the article cited below, n. 8.



corrections, some of which confirm emendations made by scholars in the text. The corrector's orthography, for instance in the change of *senatus* to *saenatus*, may, Ziegler concedes, be his own, but the relation of his changes to the accepted text of the *De Republica* is shown by the fact that in seven passages the corrections are reflected in *testimonia* from Nonius, Servius, and St. Augustine.<sup>8</sup> The conclusions of Strelitz, Pfaff, and Ziegler can be tested in A. W. Van Buren's careful collation<sup>9</sup> and, with more difficulty, in the Vatican reproduction of the codex.<sup>10</sup>

The manuscript used by the corrector, in the view of Strelitz, Pfaff, Ziegler, A. C. Clark,<sup>11</sup> and Cardinal Mercati, was the manuscript copied by the scribe; the corrections, Mercati suggested, may have been made, soon after the codex was copied at Bobbio, by a man whose duty it was to examine the work of the less careful and more ignorant scribes.<sup>12</sup> The corrector's use of the scribe's manuscript is particularly clear in the filling out of omissions, some of which occur in the middle of sentences or even of words. Instances where a different word is substituted for one that made sense are explained by Ziegler and Clark on the theory that the manuscript had alternate readings.

On the character of the archetype there has been some difference of opinion. Strelitz noted omissions, some of them explained by *homoeoteleuton*, and also repetitions of about 30 letters, and suggested that this was the measure of one or perhaps of two lines. Pfaff made a longer list, particularly of repetitions, noting that some of them were explained by *homoeoarcton*, and estimated that there were about 35 letters to the line. That

<sup>8</sup> The passages are I, 41, 59, 60; II, 9, 17, 19, 26. See Ziegler, *Hermes*, LI (1916), pp. 266 f.

<sup>9</sup> *Supplementary Papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Rome*, II (1908), pp. 84-262.

<sup>10</sup> *M. Tullii Ciceronis De Republica libri e codice rescripto Vaticano Latino 5757 phototypice expressi* (Vatican, 1934), two vol., the first containing *Prolegomena* by Cardinal Giovanni Mercati.

<sup>11</sup> *The Descent of Manuscripts* (Oxford, 1918), pp. 124-38.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 10, above), pp. 200-3; see p. 202 for the passage summarized, a statement quoted with approval by Ziegler, 5th ed., p. xxvii. L. Castiglioni in the *praefatio* to his text (Turin, 1st ed. 1936; 2nd, 1947) criticizes the orthography and some changes of the corrector and leaves open the question whether he was using the manuscript of the scribe. But Castiglioni accepts all the corrections listed under A and B below.

estimate is accepted by Ziegler in his second (1929) and subsequent editions,<sup>13</sup> but he does not collect the pertinent passages, all of which appear, sometimes with new readings, in his excellent critical apparatus.

As a result of a careful study of omissions and repetitions, Clark reached a different conclusion on the character of the archetype. Publishing in 1918 without access to Ziegler's first edition, and apparently without knowing the work of Strelitz and Pfaff, Clark tried to show that the archetype, like the palimpsest, was in double columns, with a similar average of slightly more than ten letters to the line, but with nineteen or twenty instead of fifteen lines in each column. A repetition of 197 letters (see B 6, below), in Clark's view, was the measure of a column of the archetype.<sup>14</sup> Recently Otto Skutsch has proposed insertions based on the assumption that there were nine to eleven letters in the line of the archetype.<sup>15</sup>

Thus the evidence for the character of the manuscript used by the corrector was unknown to Clark and Skutsch, as well as to Sumner. It has also been unknown to various editors of the *De Republica*. I cite, for example, the statement of C. W. Keyes that there is "great disagreement in regard to the comparative value of the first and second hands."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 5th ed., p. xxix, with citation of Pfaff's long note, *op. cit.* (n. 7, above), p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Clark, *op. cit.* (n. 11, above), pp. 135 f. Clark holds (p. 52) that at least two examples of similar omissions are required as a basis for conclusions on the nature of the archetype, and he finds another example of the omission of 197 letters in II, 20, but here the scribe, who wrote *mortalitate* for *mortali*, could not have repeated more than four letters. The example is not convincing.

<sup>15</sup> *Philol.*, CIII (1959), pp. 140-4. The passages are I, 37 and II, 39 (on the centuriate assembly). Skutsch's suggestion on the number of letters in the line of the archetype is based on Ziegler's rather misleading comment on Clark's theory (5th ed., p. xxix; Skutsch quotes the 3rd ed.). See also K. Büchner's objections to Skutsch, with no reference to the evidence on the manuscript the corrector used, *Philol.*, CIV (1960), pp. 298-309, with Skutsch's reply, *ibid.*, pp. 309 f. Cf. n. 23, below.

<sup>16</sup> Loeb text (1928, reprinted 1943, 1948), p. 9, n. 1, with references to Ziegler's first edition and to Galbiati's *praefatio* to Pascal's text (Turin, 1916). See n. 12, above, for Castiglioni, who is quoted with approval by Ferrero in his text and commentary (Florence, 1953, reprinted 1957), p. 4. But Ferrero's criticisms of the corrector are much more severe

The really decisive evidence is provided by the omissions and repetitions, lists of which are buried in the dissertations of Strelitz and Pfaff and are presented under a misleading arrangement in Clark's important book. The collection of material presented below owes much to these scholars and also to Ziegler, whose readings I have, in general, followed.<sup>17</sup> The numbered omissions and repetitions indicate lines of 28 to 40 letters. The pertinent passages are in italics (with Roman type for preceding and succeeding words which often explain the scribe's error. References to the *De Republica* are followed in each case by the page number of the codex and by the number of letters omitted or repeated.

A. Omissions supplied by the corrector

- 1) I, 31, p. 182 (33): *quaerit quo modo duo soles visi sunt non quaerit cur*
- 2) I, 43, p. 106 (29): *similitudo quaedam servitutis si Athenienses quib. dā temporibus*
- 3) I, 60, p. 265 (29): *ducebat adque eam consilio sedari volebat adde avaritiam*. Ziegler was the first to read *que* and *ad* in the insertion.
- 4) I, 61, p. 268 (35): *quippe vilico quid domi pluresne praesunt negotis tuis immo vero unus*. The reading of the preceding words, altered by the corrector, is *quippe vili tuis*, with *tuis* inserted from the line omitted.
- 5) II, 28, p. 70 (39 or ca. 29): *Numam Pythagoraene ipsius discipulum aut certe Pythagoreum fuisse saepe enim hoc*. Here the page has only fourteen instead of the usual fifteen lines, and the corrector has made his insertion in two lines below. If Ziegler is right that the last line is erased, the addition is about 29 letters.
- 6) II, 31, p. 217 (28-30): *creavit isq. de imperio suo exemplo Pompili populum consuluit*. Here the letters preceding the omission are

than Castiglioni's. In spite of doubts about the corrector, Keyes and Ferrero put in their texts, usually without a word about the corrector, all the passages listed under A below.

<sup>17</sup> Strelitz, *op. cit.*, p. 67, cites seven omissions and two repetitions. He asks whether it is likely that the corrector would have tried to make his additions credible by introducing *homoeoteleuton* in II, 39. Pfaff, *op. cit.*, p. 5, n., lists additional repetitions, pointing out *homoeoarcton* in several instances. Clark cites most of the passages, also noting explanations for omissions and repetitions, usually of three lines, in accord with his estimate of about ten letters to the line. (He also notes shorter omissions and repetitions which would represent one or two lines, but there are few of these.) Ziegler's readings have led to the addition of A 3 to the omissions and, in several instances, to a different estimate of the number of letters omitted or repeated.

CRAEUIPILIPO. *Is* or *isq.* may have followed *creavit* in the line, but the scribe's eye dropped down to the end of the next line.

7) II, 39, p. 108 (ca. 33): *centurias habeat quibus e cent. quattor centuriis* tot enim relicuae. This is Ziegler's reading for the *quib.* and *centuri* of Van Buren. Ziegler and Du Rieu also read *tot* at the end of the insertion, but the word appears in the next line of the codex.

8) II, 45, p. 255 (29): *et cum metueret ipse poenam sceleris sui summā metui se volebat*

9) II, 58, pp. 8, 191 (34): *ut contra consulare imperium tr.pl. sic illi contra vim regiam constituti.* The reading of the scribe is *consularem*.

The only other omission longer than two words is a passage of 50 letters where a series of geographical names ending *-am* were left out (II, 9, p. 228).

B. Repetitions cancelled by the original scribe or by the corrector

1) I, 60, p. 266 (36): *probas igitur animum ita adfectum nihil vero inquit magis ergo non probares.* The repetition is explained by the familiar word *profectum*.

2) II, 5, pp. 290, 157 (39): *copiisq. facillimum ut in agrum Rutilorum Aboriginumq. procederet.* For the second *q.* in the scribe's first version *-ve* appears at the end of the line, perhaps a sign of a double reading in the archetype.

3) II, 27, pp. 88, 69 (29): *nam quae perdiscenda quaeq. observanda essent multa constituit*

4) II, 51, p. 189 (30): *totum genus hoc regiae civitatis everterit sit huic oppositus*

5) II, 70, p. 9 (40): *falsum illud esse sine iniuria non posse set hoc verissimum esse sine summa iustitia*

6) I, 49, p. 170 (197 letters, apparently six lines). The passage begins and ends *societas civium*. There is a lacuna in the text after 74 letters of the repetition, but the passage was probably repeated in its entirety. See Clark's discussion, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

7) I, 64, p. 150 (57, two lines?): *mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris si regum similitudo permansisset* sed vides

The next three examples are repetitions of portions of lines which seem to be accounted for by lines of about 35 letters in the archetype.

8) I, 52, p. 117: *nulla cupiditate*, 15 letters, repeated after 67 letters (two lines) in the form *in ulla cupiditate*

9) I, 27, p. 140, repetition of 18 letters following a line of 35 letters: *numquā se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret numquam se plus agere* numquam minus solū. The repetition of *numquam*, if it was at the beginning of a line, would explain the scribe's mistake.

10) II, 60, pp. 130, 41, insertion, apparently from the next line, of 15 letters before a line of 35 letters: *annis post res multis dicendis ea XX ex eo quod L. Papirius P. Pinarius censores multis dicendis.*

There are a number of shorter repetitions with a maximum of 22 letters, but only one other example of more than 40 letters: I, 11, p. 85 (49), explained by the recurrence of *necessitate*.

The average number of letters in all the lines omitted and repeated is about 32.5 and approximately 33 in the long passage under B 6. The length is similar to that of the Ciceronian lines in Asconius' citations (34.2 letters to the line) and slightly less than the standard hexameter line on which the ancient scribe's pay seems to have been based.<sup>18</sup> The variation in the length of the lines, which average longer in the repetitions than in the omissions, may be partly explained by the compressed space available to the corrector and perhaps by a tendency on the part of the scribe to expand on his model. Another factor may have been that, like the codex, the archetype was written by more than one scribe. Of the two scribes whose hands Ziegler was the first to distinguish in the codex, Scribe A averages about ten letters to the line, Scribe B about eleven.<sup>19</sup>

All these omissions and repetitions, as Ziegler has pointed out, come from the work of Scribe A, the copyist of six sevenths of the codex. Scribe B was, in general, more careful. In the sections of the codex attributed to him, most of the surviving portion of Book III and one sheet of Book V, I find no omission longer than one word.

*Homoeoteleuton* accounts for six of the nine omissions—A 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9. *Homoeoarcton* explains six of the ten repetitions—B 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 (only of the initial letter in the first two cases). There are other explanations for the errors in A 4 and 6 and B 1. Of the 21 omissions and repetitions longer than 22 letters, 19 indicate that the scribe omitted or repeated an entire line of his model.

This evidence for the archetype of the codex proves that Mai was right in resisting the strictures of the great Niebuhr and in

<sup>18</sup> See Birt, *Antikes Buchwesen* (Berlin, 1882), p. 199. For the normal number of letters in the estimates of lines, see Dziatzko, *s. v.* "Buch," *R.-E.*, col. 954 and the bibliography cited by Weinberger, *s. v.* "Stichometrie." Pfaff and Ziegler (see his *praefatio*, p. xxix, "ex more antiquo") recognize the relationship of these lines to the standard Ciceronian line.

<sup>19</sup> On the two copyists, see the *praefatio*, pp. xv-xxiii and Mercati, *op. cit.* (in n. 10, above), pp. 196-200, with additional evidence for the two scribes.

keeping the readings of the corrector in the chapter on the centuriate assembly (II, 22, 39-40). The corrections here show the character of the archetype. The change from *liticinibus* to *cornicinibus* (39) suggests that there were variant readings in the original.<sup>20</sup> The long insertion of about thirty-three letters represents the omission, because of *homoeoteleuton*, of a line of the archetype. The text must be dealt with as an ancient version of what Cicero wrote.<sup>21</sup> Now that the *Tabula Hebana* has provided confirmation for Mommsen's seemingly fantastic suggestions on the method of counting votes, there is, as Tibiletti was the first to show, no longer any reason to doubt that the text is right in showing the same number of votes (193) in the reformed assembly that existed in the Servian organization.<sup>22</sup> Cicero, whose introductory remarks would, if we had them, perhaps explain his curious procedure, speaks first of the Servian and then of the reformed assembly (39), and then returns (40) to the Servian organization. In the *illarum sex et nonaginta centuriarum* of the latter section Cicero makes a slip, forgetting that this remainder belonged not to the Servian but to the reformed assembly.<sup>23</sup> It is a slip that I think anyone who has

<sup>20</sup> Sumner, *op. cit.* (in n. 1, above), p. 138, accepts the corrector here, favoring, as I do, the reading *liticinibus cornicinibus*. He also accepts the correction in § 40 of *mille centum* to *quingentos*, which depends on the D which no one except Mai has been able to see in the codex.

<sup>21</sup> Since Strelitz's work was published, the authority of the corrector has been much more widely recognized by constitutional historians than by editors (see n. 16, above) of the *De Republica*. See, for instance, Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, III (Leipzig, 1887), p. 274, n. 4, and Fraccaro in the paper cited in n. 23.

<sup>22</sup> *Athenaeum*, XXVII (1949), pp. 210-45. The results have been widely accepted. E. S. Staveley, *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 1-33 (see also *Historia*, V [1956], pp. 112-19), takes 193 to be the total number of votes in both assemblies but rejects Mommsen's suggestions on the methods of counting the votes.

<sup>23</sup> This is the explanation of Fraccaro, *Studi Bonfanti*, I (Pavia, 1929), pp. 109-13 (reprinted *Opuscula*, II [Pavia, 1957], pp. 176-81). Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 139, n. 3, misunderstands the arguments of Fraccaro which are directed primarily against De Sanctis and, more particularly, Klebs, whose attribution of crass ignorance to Cicero Fraccaro is unable to countenance. While agreeing with Mommsen's view in general, Fraccaro does not think that Cicero treated the Servian and the reformed assembly as equivalent and would not supply *curavit*, with Servius as subject, to explain the tenses of *excluderetur* and *valeret*. Instead he interprets



tried to explain to students the intricacies of the centuriate assembly could pardon. But one would have expected Cicero himself or Atticus, who read Cicero's works with great care, to catch the error. Perhaps it was caught, and perhaps, like other corrections noted in the letters to Atticus,<sup>24</sup> this one failed to find its way into the text tradition of a published work.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

these tenses from the point of view of the men who created the reform and cites as parallels Cicero, *Leg.*, III, 27 and *Mil.* 11. See also *evenirent*, *Fin.*, II, 34, with notes of Madvig and Reid. But the subjunctives remain difficult, and it is possible that in the tradition of the archetype something like *evenit ut* has fallen out of the text. Skutsch and Büchner, in their arguments on these subjunctives (see n. 15, above), show no familiarity with the discussions of the centuriate assembly.

<sup>24</sup> Atticus' correction of Phliuntios to Phliasios in *R. P.*, II, 8 (*Att.*, VI, 6, 2, 3) does not appear in the codex. The name of L. Corfidius, which Cicero asked Atticus to have removed from the *Pro Ligario* (33, see *Att.*, XIII, 44, 3), remains in the manuscripts. On the other hand, the correction of Eupolis to Aristophanes in *Orator*, 29 (*Att.*, XII, 6A), has been made and *sustinere*, which, at Atticus' suggestion, Cicero had changed to *inhibere*, has, in accord with Cicero's request (*Att.*, XII, 21, 3), been restored to *Academica*, II, 94. See, for such changes, Ziegler, *Hermes*, L<sup>VI</sup> (1931), pp. 268-70.

## THE ARROW AND THE AXE-HEADS IN THE *ODYSSEY*.

In an article entitled "A Layman's Delight in the *Odyssey*," in *Greece and Rome*, March, 1958, Sir Evelyn Howell referred to "the riddle of the axe-heads." It is a riddle, and there should be an answer to it, as there are answers to other riddles in the *Odyssey*. Whether the poet is drawing from earlier epic sources for the tale, or describing something he had seen for himself, his account of the matter should make sense. This has been felt instinctively even by those who look upon his geography as entirely poetical and unrealistic.

The main references we shall have to consider for the solution of this riddle are as follows:

In XIX, 572-8 we hear from Penelope that Odysseus, in the days of his youth, used to set up a row of axes (*πελέκεας*) "like keel-blocks" (*δρυνόχους ὥς*) "in line with one another" (*ἐξείης*); and then "standing well away" put an arrow "through" the axes, twelve of them in all.

In XIX, 587, as again in XXI, 97, 114, and 127 we read that the arrow must pass "through the iron" (*διοῖσ τεύσαι τε σιδήρον*).

In XXI, 120 f. Telemachus sets up the axes, "digging one long trench for all of them," straightening them to a line, and firming the earth around them.

In XXI, 419 f. Odysseus "straight from the stool on which he sat" let fly his arrow so that the bronze-tipped shaft "missed not" (*οὐκ ἤμβροτε*) the first "στελειή" (*πρώτης στελειῆς*) "of all the axes" (*πελέκεων πάντων*), but sped straight through them all and out at the other end.

In V, 234 f. the *πέλεκυς* (there of bronze, not of iron) is described (also in a ship-building context) as being a great axe "sharpened on both sides"—i. e. a double-headed axe with straight handle, like the ordinary woodman's axe as used in Canada today.

The handle of olive wood, in V, 236 is *στελειόν*, neuter.

Three main explanations for the setting up of a row of axes, or axe-heads, as a test of skill in archery, have been offered, and one of these must be chosen. They are as follows:

(A) The feminine word *στειλειή* in XXI, 422 is taken to mean the straight wooden handle of the double-headed axe, as does the neuter word *στειλειόν* in V, 236. In order to justify the thrice repeated statement that the arrow passes "through the iron," a double axe-head is imagined so excessively crescent-shaped that the upper portions of its two blades *almost* meet, and *nearly* form a circle of metal above the handle, which is of course planted vertically in the ground.<sup>1</sup>

The objections to this are as follows:

(1) An axe so excessively crescent-shaped is unexampled and highly improbable as a practical tool.

(2) Even if such an axe was used, and even if there were no other difficulties, it would not in fact sufficiently justify the expression "through the iron."

(3) The shot at short range, indoors, would be a somewhat simple one.

(4) There is no point in Telemachus' digging "one long trench" for all the axes (XXI, 120-1). A hole in the presumably hard earth would have to be made for each, and the handle driven pretty deep into the ground, in order to keep the axe-heads steady and aligned.

(5) There is no good reason for the change of gender from *στειλειόν* in V, 236 to *στειλειή* in XXI, 422—a minor point in itself, perhaps, but not unimportant in combination with other things.

(6) Most decisive of all, the words *οὐκ ἤμβροτε* "missed not," in XXI, 421, are taken to mean "almost grazed" or "just missed" the "top" or "tip" of the "wooden handle" (*πρώτης στειλειῆς*) "in the case of all the axes" (*πελέκεων πάντων*). This surely cannot be accepted as a legitimate use of language.

(7) Alternatively, therefore, but not less improbably, Butcher and Lang take the meaning of the words to be "missed not all the axes, starting from the first axe-handle"—a very awkward use of the "ablative" genitive (*πρώτης στειλειῆς*), and as a whole an impossibly clumsy sentence.

<sup>1</sup> For illustrations of this and other suggested types of axe-head cf. Monro, p. 176; Butcher and Lang, p. 419; Merry, *Homer's Odyssey XIII-XXIV*, Frontispiece.

(B) The word *στειλειή* is taken to mean the wooden handle as above, but in place of the crescent-shaped double axe-head an instrument is visualized, with one blade only, made of open-work instead of solid metal, in order to justify the expression "through the iron."

Butcher and Lang, p. 420, say hopefully: "Probably if we could see the weapon with which Homer was familiar the puzzle would instantly disappear." But it would still be necessary either to take *οὐκ ἤμβροτε* to mean "just missed" so that *πρώτης στειλειῆς* would now have to mean the "side" or "edge" of the handle; or we should still have to have recourse to Butcher and Lang's very improbable alternative.

(C) The third explanation is that the word *στειλειή* means not the wooden handle but the hole for the handle in the iron of the double axe-head, the feminine gender being appropriate for the socket as being receptive of the handle. (For this usage see Stanford, *Odyssey of Homer*, on XIX, 572 or indeed any English dictionary *s. v.* "female," *mechanical*.) Telemachus in this case sets up the axe-heads along the centre of his trench (XXI, 118 f.), one blade firmly in the ground, with the handle-holes all exactly in line with one another, so that the marksman may see, and his arrow pass, "through the iron" of all twelve of them (Fig. 1).

To this explanation the only possible objection—but one which, so far as I know, has been regarded as insuperable (see L. S. J., *s. v.* *στειλειή*)—is that, even without Telemachus' trench, the handle-holes would be only two or three inches above ground-level, so that it would be impossible for Odysseus to send an arrow through them, from a standing, or sitting, or indeed any other position.

The objection, however, is not insuperable. But prior to further discussion of it, the comparison between the axes and *δρύοχοι*, or keel-blocks, requires consideration. There is rather more in it than meets the eye; and it does much, I think, to suggest that the poet had a real picture in his mind and knew very well what he was talking about.

In no circumstances can a number of axes, either with handles or without, look, in themselves, like a series of structures of heavy wooden blocks laid regularly on top of one another. The whole point of Penelope's comparison, therefore, lies in the words

ἴσταςχ' ἐξείης. Odysseus set up the axe-heads "like keel-blocks" only in so far as they were set up at short intervals, dead in line and with their handle-holes registering exactly with one another.




Fig. 1.

A. Perspective view of axe-heads set up in deep trench to afford some measure of safety to spectators.

B. Sectional view of axe-heads perfectly aligned as in A. A target or back-stop to be imagined at end.

C. Sectional view of axe-heads set up, alternatively, in shallower trench intended only to break hard surface of trodden earth.

Note. Telemachus' very swift setting up of the axes is intended to be taken *cum grano salis* (*Od.*, XXI, 122-3).

None of the editors or translators I have come across appears to make this point clear, or to have considered carefully what δρύοχοι in this context were and what keel-blocks are and how

they are set up. So Merry, *op. cit.* on XIX, 572, says that the axes "*resembled a row of δρόχοι, which seem to be trestles or blocks with a central notch, on which the keel of a ship was laid*" (my italics); but he seems to have no idea why or how they did resemble it. Stanford on p. 339 of his edition says that the axe-heads "*were perhaps propped up so as to give the general effect of a ship's keel, as described in 574.*" A. S. Way translates "*like the ribs of a galley arw*"—which is nonsense; T. E. Shaw, "*like an alley of oaken bilge-blocks*"—which is pretentious nonsense.<sup>2</sup>

The method of laying the keel of a ship (the δρῦς in the Odyssean phrase, the *tree* that was the beginning and the backbone of the ship) upon structures of short oblong timbers, piled fore and aft on top of one another, at short intervals, so that they may be trued up and adjusted to support (ἔχειν) the whole length of the keel, has no secrets about it, and will not have changed in principle (as ship-builders are aware) from the days of the *Argo* to those of the *Queen Mary*. A description of the process will be found, for example, in A. C. Hardy, *From Slip to Sea* (Glasgow, 1935).

If there were any doubt as to the exact meaning of δρόχοι in the Greek of *Od.*, XIX, Penelope's comparison of the axes with them would clear it up. The only way of aligning the apertures of the twelve axes in the *Odyssey* would be by *visual sighting*. The only way of aligning a row of ship-builders' "blocks," "trestles," or "stocks," and levelling, or truing, them exactly with one another—especially on the inclined plane on which a ship is usually built to facilitate the launching process—is, and always has been, by *visual sighting*, "sighting through," to use the shipwright's term. A description of sights made of wood and the method of using them in conjunction with a lamp, in recent times, will be found in the book referred to, pp. 45-6.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> My italics. Bilge-blocks form neither an "alley" (which is not required for the axes), nor a single straight row (which is required). Bilge-blocks are set up on either side of the straight line of keel-blocks, well away from it, and following, sometimes quite irregularly, the curves of the hull as it takes shape. Nor is there any reason why they should be of oak.

<sup>3</sup> It may be remarked that it would have been quite feasible in Odyssean times to lay cast-iron axe-heads at intervals on the top of a row of keel-blocks and to use the central handle-holes as a series of ring-sights



We can now return to the third explanation (C, above). The conclusion that the *στειλαι* were the sockets or handle-holes in the iron of the axe-heads is inevitable, inasmuch as the objections against their meaning the wooden handles themselves are insuperable. Here for once we can agree with Stanford. The riddle to be solved then is narrowed down to this: "How could Odysseus in XXI, 419 f. put an arrow through the holes of the axe-heads 'straight from the stool on which he sat,' if they were only a few inches above ground level?" The answer is, of course, that he could not possibly do so—if the floor of the *megaron* was all upon one level. It follows, therefore, if the story is to make sense at all, that the floor was *not* all upon one level. Some portion of it, either by reason of the natural conformation of the ground, or artificially for some conventional reason, must have been at least some three feet higher than the portion where Odysseus sat and shot his arrow through the axes. That is the only possible answer to the riddle that makes sense; and it is at least consistent with the stage directions in the poem.

Before studying these, however, one point remains to be disposed of. It has been suggested (and Stanford at the end of his note on XIX, 572 f. seems to regard it as a possibility) that the axe-heads were somehow arranged in juxtaposition with one another so that the handle-holes formed a "continuous pipe," through which, even if lying close to ground-level, an arrow discharged from a higher level might find its way, provided that it entered the first and foremost handle-hole. It is hardly necessary to say that this is quite out of the question. Apart from the fact that it is not in the least in harmony with the simile of the keel-blocks, or the description of Telemachus' trench, and even if it were possible to arrange the handle-holes of twelve axe-heads to form a "continuous pipe," an arrow would infallibly be broken and arrested by the iron, unless it passed through the "pipe" on an absolutely straight trajectory.

for levelling purposes (a system of wedges being used, then as now, for final adjustments). This does not affect the present problem directly; but the idea of using a row of axe-heads as a test of skill in archery might have thus originated, and the poet might very well have seen it practised. The handle-holes, if used for either of these two purposes, will, I imagine, have been somewhat larger and rounder than the narrow elliptical types to which we are now accustomed—more like those in the modern pick- or mattock-head in fact.

Let us now reconstruct events with the aid of a plan (Fig. 2) based on the poem itself. After the episode of the hound Argos *outside* the house of Odysseus (XVII, 264-323), Eumaeus enters the house, by the way of the αἶλη, and goes "straight to the *megaron*" where the suitors sat and feasted (324 f.). At Telemachus' beckoning he picks up a settle from where the carver sat or stood (331) (2 on Fig. 2), takes it up to Telemachus' table (6 on Fig. 2), and sits beside him.

Close behind Eumaeus (336 f.) Odysseus enters and, as befits a mere beggar, sits humbly on an οἶδός of ash-wood (1 on plan) *inside* the doors (A) of the *megaron* (339), "leaning against a pillar of cypress-wood." It is to be noticed, first, that this οἶδός, *inside the doors*, furnished also as it is with pillars (340) and seats (339, 466; XVIII, 10, 17, 32), is not really a threshold in our sense of the word, but a ceremonial porch or *vestibulum* of some sort (see L. S. J., s. v. πρόθυρον); secondly that it is at no great distance from where Telemachus and the suitors were sitting at their banquet. For Telemachus sends food by Eumaeus to Odysseus, and a message bidding him go round begging of the suitors (XVII, 345 f.). This he does, going round ἐνδέξια (365)—i. e. from left to right of them, as looked at from the *prodomos* (down below according to my hypothesis). After being struck with the footstool by Antinous, he returns to the οἶδός of ash-wood (466), resumes his seat, and exchanges words with the suitors from it (468 f., 477 f.). It must therefore have been quite close to them.

And yet, between this wooden οἶδός and that portion of the hall where the suitors sat at table there is another οἶδός, the great οἶδός of stone (XX, 258, XXII, 2, XXIII, 88). From this it is evident that the *megaron* is divided into two portions. There is a forecourt or πρόδομος, beginning at the ash-wood οἶδός, inside the doors, where the food was prepared (no doubt) and from which it was served. There the carver cut up the meat for the suitors in appropriate portions (XVII, 331), and there probably the fire mentioned in XVIII, 44 was burning, with the blood-puddings cooking before it. The portion of the *megaron* where the suitors sat (the portion beginning with the great οἶδός of stone) was at a higher level, according to my hypothesis, and as is borne out by, or is at least consistent with, the directions given us by the poet. It was not, however, a separate compart-




Fig. 2.

- A. Folding doors to courtyard.
- B. Folding doors to women's apartments and interior of the house.
- C. The *ὑποθήκη*.
- D. *ῥῶγες*.
- 1. *οὐδός* of ash-wood.
- 2. Carver.
- 3. *οὐδός* of stone.
- 4. Seat of Odysseus.
- 5. The row of axe-heads in trench.
- 6. Seat of Telemachus.
- 7. Leiodes.
- 8. Antinous.
- 9. Phemius.
- 10. A fire-place.

ment from the lower portion of the hall. This is shown quite clearly from what has already been said, and from the fact that in XX, 257 f. Telemachus, according to plan (κέρδεα νομῶν), puts a stool and a small table for Odysseus "beside the threshold of stone, inside the *megaron*" (ἐντὸς εἰσταθείος μεγάρον)—i. e. not just at its entrance, as in XVII, 339. Now if the floor where the suitors sat was indeed three feet higher than the floor of the *prodomos*, the οὐδός of stone also, leading to it, must have been at least three feet higher at its summit, and must obviously have consisted partly of steps leading up from the floor below, though, quite naturally, they do not happen to be mentioned. In XXII, 127 however we have the phrase ἀκρότατον δὲ παρ' οὐδόν—"beside the highest portion" of this οὐδός. If it had a highest portion, it must also have had a lower and a lowest portion—i. e. steps, in all natural probability.

Odysseus' seat then will have been at 4, down below, beside the steps which formed the lower portion of the great οὐδός of stone. In XXI, 118 f. Telemachus digs his trench for the axe-heads (5), making it terminate immediately above the spot where he has put Odysseus (at 4). For in XXI, 419 f. Odysseus, after having fondled the bow, strung it, and made it "sing like a swallow" (411), sets an arrow on the string, and, without rising from his seat (420), swings to the right direction and lets fly his arrow up the trench and through the handle-holes of all twelve axes: "The bronze-tipped shaft missed not the foremost handle-hole of all the axes but sped straight through them all and out beyond" (421-3).

Then, sure enough, in XXII, 2 he "leaps up onto the great threshold," and puts his second arrow through Antinous' throat.

It has been objected (in private discussion) against the foregoing argument that ἄλλο δ' ἐπὶ μέγαν οὐδόν in XXII, 2 proves nothing, inasmuch as the words could be used of a long jump as well as for a high jump. And so they could of course if the sense demanded. The point is, however, that the hypothesis of the differing floor levels is the only one that can possibly make sense of the story of the axe-heads; and that the words in question are at least consistent with that hypothesis. The hypothesis, moreover, sheds light on other problems of the battle in the *megaron* and the fetching of the arms. These matters, therefore, in so far as they substantiate the hypothesis

of the differing floor levels, have also a bearing on the argument concerning the axe-heads.

In the matter of geographical detail in the *Odyssey* we know where we stand. That detail, for the most part, is still to be seen and studied.<sup>4</sup> Architectural detail is another matter. The degree to which the poet is realistic or otherwise in that cannot be exactly decided. My diagram, however, has been constructed, as simply as possible, from the stage-directions in the poem, on the assumption that he must have had some real architectural lay-out in view, if only in his mind's eye.

(1) The folding doors, A, from courtyard into *megaron* speak for themselves. Enough also has been said about the "threshold" of ash-wood at 1 to indicate that it is of a conventional nature, with the details of which we are by no means familiar. The same will apply to the great threshold of stone at 3. The carver, 2, has been placed reasonably close to the threshold of stone at 3, as the servitors must have passed up and down its steps in order to wait upon the banqueters (cf. XVII, 331-2).

(2) The folding doors, B, and their position in relation to the οἶδος of stone at 3, are also very important.

(a) They are the main doors to the interior of the house, and of course to the women's quarters. Through them, therefore, Penelope enters at XXI, 63 f., coming from the store-room with the bow, and with her maids carrying the axe-heads. Later on, when the bloodshed is over and the hall cleaned up, she comes down from her upper chamber (XXIII, 85), enters the *megaron* again by doorway B, walks up the steps of the stone threshold (88) and joins Odysseus sitting in the light of a fire at 10 by the opposite wall (90).

(b) Doorway B, moreover, and the stone threshold must be close to one another. For at XXI, 124 Telemachus takes up his stand "by the threshold" (Butcher and Lang)—i. e. down below, according to my hypothesis, by the steps. He nearly succeeds in stringing the bow, but at a sign from Odysseus desists and puts it down, "leaning it against the polished well-wrought doorway" (136 f.)—i. e. beside doorway B—and returns to his seat at 6.

(c) Antinous, whom for dramatic reasons I place up-stage

<sup>4</sup> See my *Reality and Allegory in the Odyssey* (Amsterdam, 1959).

centre at 8, then says, at 140 f., that the suitors are to try to string the bow, taking it in turn from left to right—*ἐπιδέξια* this time (141), as looked at from his point of view. Leiodes therefore, the first man to try, is placed at 7, the closest of them all to the stone threshold and, as it happens, to the bow, which is leaning against doorway B where Telemachus has left it. He sits, we are told, "beside the great mixing-bowl" (XXI, 145, the natural place for which is close to the threshold of stone), sitting "*μυχοίτατος αἰέν*," which I take to mean "tucked away in a corner," so to speak, the farthest away to the right of all the suitors, looked at from down below, as they sit, roughly in a semicircle, around the trench, 5, containing the twelve axe-heads. Leiodes, according to hypothesis, goes down the steps, takes up the bow, takes his stand beside the *οἶδος* (149), as Telemachus had done, fails to string the bow and replaces it where Telemachus had placed it, against doorway B (163-4) for the next man on his right to try.

(d) In XXI, 235 f. Odysseus tells Eumaeus to bid the women bar the doors (at B) and to stay at their work beyond them, whatever they may hear; Philoetius is to fasten the gates of the outer court or *αἶλή*. These orders are carried out at 381 f. *Doorway B remains barred and bolted, on the far side, throughout the fighting.* For in XXII, 393 f. Telemachus rattles the door and calls on Eurycleia to open it and come in.

(e) At XXII, 89 f. Amphinomus charges straight at Odysseus, trying to drive him away from the doors *εἰ πῶς οἱ εἴξειε θύρων*. These again will be the doors at B. (Those at A, however, barred presumably by Philoetius after bolting the outer gates of the *αἶλή* [XXI, 388-9], may be included.)

(f) The doorway, the pillar, and the wall, struck by stray shots from the suitors (XXII, 257-9 and again at 274 f.), will most naturally mean the *doors* at B together with the *pillar*, where Odysseus leant his bow at XXII, 120, "against the shining *wall-face*," i. e. between doorways B and C.

(3) It will be clear by now why 3, 4, 5, and 6 are placed where they are on Fig. 2. The threshold of stone (3) must be reasonably close to the carver (2) and to the doorway B. A central position for the trench and the axe-heads (5) is in any case desirable. The suitors will be sitting round it in a great semicircle. It will not have been cut through the stonework



of the great threshold, obviously. It *must* terminate immediately above Odysseus' stool 4, by the threshold of stone (XX, 258), since Odysseus puts his arrow through the axe-heads "straight from the stool whereon he sat" (XXI, 420).

Telemachus' seat (6) must of course be on the higher floor-level; and it must be close to where Odysseus sat (cf. XXI, 129-39). For Odysseus, having shot his arrow through the axes, and spoken to Telemachus (XXI, 423 f.), gives him a nod at 431. Telemachus puts on his helmet, slings on the sword he had taken off at 119, and stands up *by his chair*, close to his father's stool (ἀγχι αὐτοῦ—433), but not "beside him," as the translators say. For then, and not till then, Odysseus leaps *up* (see above) onto the great threshold (XXII, 2), and standing there, now with Telemachus on approximately the same level, commences the slaughter of the suitors.

The function of the trench also now becomes intelligible. Apart from giving softer ground and a straight runway for the axe-heads, it provides, with the earth banked up on either side of it, a measure of safety for the spectators, in case of a deflected shot, and a back-stop for the arrow in the case of a successful one.

L. G. POCKOCK.

CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND.

## TIBERIUS GRACCHUS: THE OPPOSITION VIEW.

The ancient writers of the history of the second century B. C. emphasized, somewhat exaggeratedly, no doubt, that the conflict which ended in the death of Tiberius Gracchus was the first violent civil conflict in the history of the Roman Republic. Certainly the assassination of Tiberius was the first important civil outbreak in many years.<sup>1</sup> It seems difficult, therefore, to try to explain why, after so long a period of relatively peaceful politics, the senatorial opponents of Tiberius should have become so disturbed by his program that, led by Scipio Nasica, the *pontifex maximus*, they resorted to crude violence. The answer has usually been thought a simple one. However, it is not so simple as it seems, and it is not to be deduced entirely from the specific proposals of Tiberius. In large part, the answer must be sought in the political and intellectual climate which had developed among the Roman *nobilitas*.

This paper is an attempt to reconstruct, in a necessarily limited way, the picture which Tiberius Gracchus evoked in the minds of his opponents, what so frightened them that they were willing to kill to stop it. The quick answer, the usual answer, is that his major opponents had been hurt economically through the operation of his agrarian law. He had confiscated public land which they held in order to distribute it to the poor. Nothing, it is remarked, hurts like a stab in the pocketbook. But here is by no means a full answer. If this were the *casus belli*, then the murder should have come months earlier when the agrarian law was first proposed or immediately upon passage, in order to prevent its going into operation. Instead, it is seen that neither before nor after Tiberius' death was any effort made specifically to undo the recovery and redistribution of land already accomplished. In fact, the land commission was re-organized and permitted to continue its work for at least three

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 20. The long period of peaceful civil affairs is generally accepted by historians. Tenney Frank says, "History can show no parallel to Rome's first four republican centuries of progressive political reform accomplished without violence in primary assemblies" (*Aspects of Social Behavior in Ancient Rome* [Cambridge, Mass., 1932], p. 107).

or four years after Tiberius' death.<sup>2</sup> The direct economic motive, then, while no doubt strong, was not the precipitating factor. The nobles feared some future action; they suspected that Tiberius aimed for some sort of complete overturn; and their apprehensions drove them to violence.

Before they were driven so far, it should again be emphasized, the opponents of Tiberius had been willing to put up with a good deal from him. Modern historians have usually presented Tiberius as a political maverick with a novel program, but initially, at least, he was not so regarded by his contemporaries. An investigation of his family and political background—usually overlooked—will demonstrate why he was not at first stamped a revolutionary. His agrarian proposal, though thought unwise and even somewhat radical, was hardly a complete surprise, for it was not altogether unlike some measures previously undertaken by the political faction to which Tiberius belonged. This fact and this faction deserve closer attention than they have received in the past.

The important work in unravelling the family-political groupings in Rome of the late third and early second century B. C. done by Friedrich Münzer and others is useful to this phase of the problem.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, Münzer's work does not treat adequately the Gracchan period, and there is no definitive work for these years. But it is quite clear that in the 140's and 130's B. C. there were two major political factions in Rome: the

<sup>2</sup> At least until 129 B. C., when certain judicial functions of the commission apparently were given over to one of the consuls. See Appian, *Civil Wars*, I, 19. The work of the commission is dealt with at length by J. Carcopino, in *Autour des Gracques* (Paris, 1928), pp. 125 ff. Plutarch's view (*Ti. Gracchus*, 22) was that the continued work of the commission was a mere sop to the people.

<sup>3</sup> Münzer's chief work is *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart, 1920). Also valuable are many biographical articles by the same author in the Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Earlier works on which Münzer depended include W. Drumann and P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Uebergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, 6 vols. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1899-1929), and M. Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (Leipzig, 1912). Those who wish to avoid the badly written and poorly organized book of Münzer will find much of the same material, revised and better treated in H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220-150 B. C.* (Oxford, 1951).

Claudians and the Scipionians. A group important earlier, the Fabians, had declined and been absorbed by the others. The Metelli were in process of forming yet another family-political alliance which was to be important for some decades after the Gracchi. It is also clear that Tiberius Gracchus belonged to the Claudian group—in spite of the ancestry of his mother, a daughter of Scipio Africanus. The elder Gracchus was an opponent of Scipio Africanus in his lifetime<sup>4</sup> and married Cornelia only after Africanus' death. An incident which occurred in his second consulship (163 B. C.) illustrates his continued partisanship against the Scipionians: when he held the elections for 162, two Scipionians were elected, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and C. Marcius Figulus; several weeks later, when Nasica was already en route to his new province, Gracchus suddenly "remembered" he had not taken the auspices. He annulled the elections, which were held again, and two other persons were elected.<sup>5</sup> The tribune of 133 was supported by his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, a leader of the Claudian faction, and opposed by his relative by marriage and adoption, Scipio Aemilianus, leader of the opposing Scipionic faction.<sup>6</sup>

On at least three or four occasions earlier in the second century the Claudian faction, in a colonization program somewhat unlike preceding ones which had established numerous military colonies, settled many Romans on publicly owned land, mostly in the *Ager Gallicus* (Umbria), in the *Ager Calletranus* (Etruria), and in the Po valley.<sup>7</sup> Members of the Sempronian family had partici-

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 1.

<sup>5</sup> See the references in T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, I (New York, 1951), p. 442.

<sup>6</sup> Factional politics in the program of Gracchus have been recognized. Konrad Bilz has remarked, "Like all Roman political crises, the work of [Ti.] Gracchus was also a crisis and a struggle between the separate parties," in his "Die Politik des Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus," *Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft*, VII (1936), p. 66. See also Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Livy, XXXIX, 44, 10-11 and 55, 7-9. It is particularly interesting that Polybius, whose work betrays something of a bias against the Claudians and for the Scipionians, pointed to one such colonization program (in II, 21) and pronounced it "the first step in the demoralization of the people." If this was a late addition to his history (see note 23), there was for him a direct link between these earlier schemes and the legislation of Tiberius Gracchus.

pated in the settlement of the *Ager Gallicus*, and Tiberius Gracchus' father had been involved in one such colonization program, serving on the commission which founded a citizen colony at Saturnia in Etruria.<sup>8</sup> The tendency of Roman sons to follow in their fathers' footsteps is relevant to this investigation. It was no accident that Tiberius served as quaestor in Spain and Gaius in Sardinia, in both instances provinces where their father had earlier served also. These colonization schemes had served a useful purpose. But they also, no doubt, benefited the Claudian faction. And although little used of late, any similar plan would be recognized by the Scipionians as a familiar political tactic. So when Tiberius Gracchus brought forward his land law, supported by the Claudians, he appeared to his opponents not a revolutionary but simply another Claudian opportunist, perhaps stung by the disaster of his quaestorship<sup>9</sup> and so a little more radical than the usual Claudian. However, in view of the combination of depression and shortage of grain with consequent high prices that then plagued the city,<sup>10</sup> the extent of his proposals could not have been very astonishing.

The land law was strongly opposed by the Scipionians and others, but the Claudians as has been said were in support of the measure. After its passage Appius Claudius himself, along with the Gracchus brothers, served on the commission of three for redistributing the land. In his early months in office, then, Tiberius seemed to fit very nearly the usual family and faction pattern. The work of the tribune up to this point—and especially the deposition of his colleague Octavius—was resented, to be sure, but there was as yet no talk of violence. We must look further to find what actions of his most disturbed his enemies, and why they disturbed them.

What really infuriated Tiberius' opponents, it appears, were

<sup>8</sup> Livy, XXXIX, 55, 9. For the work of the earlier Sempronii see Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 113; Strabo, V, 227; Velleius, I, 14, 7.

<sup>9</sup> At any rate Tiberius' opponents later so explained his motives. (Tiberius was with Hostilius Mancinus in 137 B. C. before Numantia in Spain when Roman forces were humiliatingly defeated and forced to draw up a treaty later rejected as disgraceful by the Senate.) See Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 5-7; Velleius, II, 2, 1; Cicero, *Brutus*, 103; Florus, II, 2, 2.

<sup>10</sup> See the author's article, "The Urban Side of the Gracchan Economic Crisis," *A. H. R.*, LXIII (1958), pp. 890 ff.

those measures of his which were constitutionally significant. A listing of these measures, with some indication of constitutional implications, is pertinent.

1. It has been mentioned that Tiberius pushed through a kind of recall election of the tribune, Octavius, who opposed his agrarian law. It is easy to overlook the implication of this measure. The Roman constitution was set up along dual lines. The major officials, elected by the *comitia centuriata*, were by tradition responsible to the Senate, which generally controlled their election, and were expected both to guide this body (at least the consuls were) and to follow its decrees. The tribunes, on the other hand, with their great obstructive power, were elected in the *comitia tributa* (or the *concilium plebis*), and as the Gracchi showed, were potentially capable of exercising great legislative power in that assembly, completely aside from the curule officials and the Senate. The potentiality in this essentially divided system was toward a chaotic struggle such as did finally develop in the first century B. C. The aristocrats in general were aware of the need for one of these antithetical branches of government to dominate the other. The famed balance of the constitution was largely a fiction and a practical impossibility. The nobles therefore had weakened the tribunate by exerting great effort to see that one or more of the tribunes was sympathetic to their aims. They had been able to do this for at least a century and a half and also, consequently, they had maintained a stable government and a fairly continuous policy. In recent decades, they had also made a tremendous personal profit out of the arrangement, which gave their chief members juicy governorships and other military commands. To put into the hands of the *concilium plebis* the potential power to set up a panel of tribunes, all of whom might support one popular champion, was to destroy the system that existed and to insure the kind of disastrous competition that later destroyed the Republic.

2. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly dispose of the treasury of Attalus, King of Pergamum who died in 133 B. C., willing his kingdom to Rome. The money he wished to use to make his agrarian scheme of resettlement operable. This challenged the traditional control of the purse by the Senate, for



the whole process of appropriating, spending, and minting of coins was controlled by the nobles, chiefly through the quaestors and other officials. It should be remembered that direct taxation in Italy had ceased in 167 B. C. so that the provinces were now the chief source of revenue for the Roman state. Tiberius' plan not only threatened one of the major powers of the Senate; it also introduced what was for Rome a novel idea for the expenditure of public money, direct spending on a large scale for the benefit of lower-class citizens.

3. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly should settle the affairs of the new province, Pergamum (later Asia), thereby threatening Senatorial control of the provinces.<sup>11</sup> The term "province," of course, still denoted primarily a military post, and it may be doubted that Tiberius was challenging the general authority of the provincial governors. In a new province, the Senate ordinarily sent a commission to help the provincial governor draw up the city charters and otherwise regularize affairs and the Senate then ratified the arrangements. But if the tribes could control arrangements in a new province, the tribunes might also claim further, regular powers. Expansion into empire had increased the importance of financial and political control of the provinces, and these powers would become yet more important in the future. Perhaps it is not incidental to Tiberius' interest in Asia that his father had had extensive diplomatic service in that area.<sup>12</sup>

4. Contrary to constitutional precedent, Tiberius proposed to succeed himself in office. He had already cast the tribune in the role of leader of the state and not merely guardian of the rights of plebeians; now this new role bade fair to become permanent.<sup>13</sup>

5. According to Plutarch,<sup>14</sup> Tiberius also used the obstructive

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that Carcopino rejects the whole of Tiberius' reported dealings regarding Pergamum, on what seems to the author inadequate data in view of the strong literary evidence. He also doubts other reports of Tiberius' excesses in office; see *Autour des Gracques*, pp. 17 ff., 34 ff., *passim*.

<sup>12</sup> In 165 B. C. and again in 162-161. See Polybius, XXX, 7-8; 27; XXXI, 1, 3, 15, 19, 32, and 33.

<sup>13</sup> See H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (London, 1959), pp. 29 f.

<sup>14</sup> *Ti. Gracchus*, 10, 5-6. Plutarch's chronology is obviously faulty

powers of the tribune in an arbitrary and probably novel fashion, halting all public business and threatening quaestors and praetors who disobeyed him.

It is universally conceded that Tiberius was high-minded and idealistic, interested chiefly in doing something for his poverty-stricken compatriots. But it must be conceded on the other hand that these were very sweeping precedents which he was establishing and that he was introducing them in ways that to his aristocratic opposition at least must have seemed "unconstitutional," to use a modern term. By the middle of his tribunician year Tiberius' opponents began to view him as a demagogic revolutionary.<sup>15</sup>

That Tiberius' opponents were much perturbed over these constitutional threats is clearly attested in the ancient writers. According to Plutarch, who dismissed the charge as mere rationalization, it was alleged "that Tiberius was introducing a re-distribution of land for the confusion of the body politic [*τῆς πολιτείας*], and was stirring up a general revolution."<sup>16</sup> Again, Plutarch records the "greatest" of the accusations against Tiberius was that he "deposed his colleague from the tribuneship and canvassed for a second tribuneship himself."<sup>17</sup> Both charges are of an essentially constitutional nature. The timing of the final move against Tiberius seems significant. The Senate had been convened and Tiberius' opponents were demanding of the Claudian consul Mucius Scaevola that he take action against Tiberius in his extraordinary effort to be re-elected. Just then,

here and it is likely that these acts of Tiberius occurred during the campaign for re-election.

<sup>15</sup> Guided by idealism, Tiberius initiated measures which ultimately harmed all the aristocratic groups, even the Claudians. The division of Roman politicians into *populares* and *optimates*, with the decreased importance of the older factional groups, was a consequence. See the discussion in L. R. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley, 1949), ch. 1. Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 11 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Ti. Gracchus*, 9, 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Agis and Cleomenes and the Gracchi Compared*, 5, 1. It was Cicero's opinion that the deposition of Octavius was what ruined Tiberius: *De Legibus*, III, 10. The language of the Livian Epitome (58) regarding this incident is especially interesting: "Gracchus then went so insane [*in eum furorem exarsit*] as to remove from office . . . his colleague M. Octavius . . ." (Loeb tr.).

the event which fired the aristocratic opposition to action—if Plutarch may be trusted in such details—was a false report that Tiberius was demanding a crown—that is to say, tyrannical authority. In Plutarch's words, "Nasica demanded that the consul should come to the rescue of the state and put down the tyrant."<sup>18</sup> When Scaevola gave only limited assurance, Nasica accused the consul of betraying the state and called on the senators to support "the laws" and follow him. He and a crowd of supporters seized sticks, stones, and pieces of wooden benches (would they not have been better armed if the attack had been previously planned?) and, routing Tiberius' supporters, killed him and 300 others.

Is there any evidence suggesting what type of revolutionary Tiberius' opponents saw in the young tribune? Can it be determined more exactly what sort of pattern was now conjured up in their minds? In any intellectual field such as the study of constitutional history, the Romans were turning increasingly to the Greek experience. And for the Roman of the Gracchan period the chief interpreter of the Greek political experience was certainly Polybius. This author had recently completed his history. His flattering opinion of Rome and the Roman constitution surely made his work popular and widely read among the Roman upper classes, and this probability applies especially to the major faction in opposition to Tiberius, that is, the Scipionians. It is well known that Polybius was very close to Scipio Aemilianus, living in his home after he was brought to Rome as a hostage about 167 B. C., tutoring him, and later no doubt taking an important part in the so-called "Scipionic Circle." Some notice of Polybius' view of Greek constitutional development as set down in his Roman history is therefore likely to be fruitful to the purpose of this study.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Ti. Gracchus*, 19, 2-3. Note also the report of Plutarch (*ibid.*, 17, 4) that Blossius was concerned that Tiberius should not give the impression that he was aiming at tyranny. See also Florus, II, 2, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Most of Polybius' constitutional ideas are found in Book VI of his history, but there are scattered references elsewhere. As Polybius was an enemy of the social and economic revolution both in Greece and Rome, so Plutarch's major source for the period of Cleomenes, the contemporary historian Phylarchus, was a friend of the revolution. See the discussion by W. W. Tarn, "The Social Question in the Third Century," in J. B. Bury and others, *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 139. For a

The son of an important official in the Achaean League, Polybius made a hero of Aratus, a major leader of that League after the middle of the third century B. C. who strongly opposed absolutist forms of government, and who was the major opponent of Cleomenes of Sparta, the revolutionary and somewhat tyrannical social and economic reformer. Polybius disliked Cleomenes, his predecessor Agis, and his later more brutal imitator, Nabis. He was a strong admirer of the mixed constitution of the traditional—if perhaps also partly fictional—Spartan variety, and he felt that Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis, in their attempts at reform, had accelerated Sparta's decline. From his knowledge of Greek history, or more precisely, from his knowledge of the ideas of Aristotle and other Greek political theorists, with modifications suggested by experience, Polybius concluded that constitutional development everywhere follows a certain pattern, passing through three stages, each of which tends to deteriorate: monarchy is first and declines to tyranny, followed by aristocracy, which degenerates into oligarchy; then democracy arises, which in turn slips into mob rule and the chaotic end of the cycle.<sup>20</sup>

Mixed, balanced constitutions, like those of Sparta and of Rome with their elements of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, Polybius much admired, and felt them to be much more stable than the simpler varieties. Nevertheless, he felt that the same step-by-step deterioration would eventually destroy a mixed constitution as well as the others, for like most historians who have postulated cyclical systems, he made almost universal application of his rules. The decline would come more slowly to such a constitution; the popular assembly would tend to demand an undue share of power, so altering the political balance and, true to the cycle, producing at last mob rule.

Polybius' comparison of the complex constitutions of Rome and of Sparta was a close one. After distinguishing external and internal causes for the deterioration of such a constitution, he wrote:

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recent excellent treatment of Polybius' constitutional ideas generally see K. von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* (New York, 1954).

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, VI, 5-9.

When a commonwealth . . . has arrived at a high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant; and that rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity will become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with being the authors, when they become convinced they are being cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed with flattery by others from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy; but, in fact, it will become the worst of all governments, mob rule.<sup>21</sup>

This was Polybius' view of the decline of Sparta: it was, as well, his prediction for the future of Rome. These points are emphasized and reemphasized by Polybius throughout his whole work, which is strongly pragmatic and moralistic. It should be kept in mind that Polybius had set out to explain why, in so short a time, Rome had been able to dominate the Mediterranean world. His answer, in brief, was—her superior constitution. The erosion of it was obviously a crucial matter. Polybius remarked "The chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution. . . ." <sup>22</sup>

The Romans, then, were forewarned of attempts by the popular organs of government to encroach on the powers of the monarchical magistrates or the aristocratic Senate. They were alerted to watch for lower-class dissatisfaction with their political privileges and with their economic position as well, in a time of growing extravagance of the richer classes. Indeed, Polybius so well described the Roman situation in the Gracchan period that it seems possible that he may have introduced new material into this section of his history after Tiberius Gracchus' death.<sup>23</sup> But

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, VI, 57 (translation of E. S. Schuckburgh).

<sup>22</sup> VI, 2, 10.

<sup>23</sup> See von Fritz's discussion of the composition of the history, *op. cit.*,

the Roman *nobiles* did not require a Polybius to persuade them to be jealous of their prerogatives. Also, the specific comparison between Roman and Spartan experience was a natural one which thinking Romans had no doubt already considered. Moreover, it may be taken for granted that the comparison of Agis and Cleomenes of Sparta with Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus was not original with Plutarch. In the case of Sparta, Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis had made themselves actually tyrants; their programs had included schemes of land redistribution and debt-cancellation; and their methods were extra-constitutional. Any Roman student of Greek history would therefore have equated with economic revolution the establishment of tyranny. Further, the Romans had learned their lesson also from practical experience. They, too, had fought Nabis, under Flamininus in 195 B. C. When social revolution infiltrated the Greek leagues generally, they dissolved them (after 146 B. C.) and put the propertied classes in control in the cities.<sup>24</sup> As Cleomenes had his Stoic adviser, so Tiberius had his, Blossius of Cumae;<sup>25</sup>

pp. 31 ff. Also see C. O. Brink and F. W. Walbank, "The Constitution of the Sixth Book of Polybius," *C. Q.*, N. S. IV (1954), pp. 97-122; also F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I (Oxford, 1957), pp. 101 ff., 292 ff., 636. Walbank thinks it unlikely that Polybius added much at a later date. However, it seems necessary to choose between (a) astounding prescience on Polybius' part, or (b) some minor late additions, of which (b) seems more acceptable.

<sup>24</sup> See the collection of material relating to Roman contacts with Greek revolutionary movements and leaders in M. Cary, *The Legacy of Alexander; A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B. C.* (New York, 1932), pp. 192 ff. and 204 f.

<sup>25</sup> It has been plausibly suggested that Blossius' ideas were not necessarily Stoic: D. R. Dudley, "Blossius of Cumae," *J. R. S.*, XXXI (1941), pp. 94 ff. And it is true, no doubt, as G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith have said (in the introduction to Cicero's *On the Commonwealth* [Columbus, Ohio, 1929], p. 23), "The political importance of Stoicism lay precisely in the reaction of the ethical and religious principles upon political thinking, not in a specific theory of the state." It will be remembered that the Scipionic group had its own Stoic, Panaetius—who, however, admired Rome and adapted Stoic ideas to the Roman political and social climate. Still, the Stoics' egalitarianism seems to have led many of them toward theoretical communism, as it appears was the case with Cleomenes' adviser Sphaerus (see Cary, *op. cit.*, p. 156); and both Zeno and Iambulus seem to have constructed a sort of communal utopia (see the discussion in Tarn, *loc. cit.*, p. 131, p. 17). However, surely



if Tiberius at first limited his land redistribution to *ager publicus* and did not follow the Greeks in demanding debt-cancellation, who knew what was to come next?

The opponents of Gracchus, then, saw in him the image of the Spartan tyrants in the setting sketched by the pen of Polybius. It is not new, of course, to say that these enemies of Tiberius Gracchus thought him to be aiming at tyranny. The historians in the ancient period mention that he was called a tyrant; both Plutarch and Cicero so quoted Nasica.<sup>26</sup> But modern writers ordinarily have not believed that anyone really thought that Tiberius was aiming at tyranny. They have followed Plutarch, who, though he mentioned the objections to Tiberius of a constitutional nature, dismissed them as mere pretexts. Nevertheless, in view of the knowledge and experience of Scipio Nasica and others of the Gracchan opposition, in the light of which, naturally, they interpreted Tiberius' actions, it appears extremely likely that Nasica and the rest were actually convinced he was aiming at demagogic tyranny. These nobles feared that the deterioration predicted by Polybius was upon them. Admitted that these men saw what they wanted to see, that is, what best served their own interests, there is yet no good reason to doubt that the murderers genuinely thought they had saved the state by killing a would-be tyrant—perhaps a well-intentioned tyrant, like Cleomenes of Sparta—but a tyrant nonetheless, whose actions were bound to result in the ruin of the Republic. A Nabis might follow in due time.<sup>27</sup>

HENRY C. BOREN.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Cleomenes was chiefly influenced by the romanticized, partly fictional accounts of the Lycurgan constitution of early Sparta.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 19, 3; Cicero, *De Re Publica*, VI, 8; the latter is a rather indirect quotation in Macrobius, *Commentary*, IV, 2.

<sup>27</sup> Neither E. Badian's excellent book, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), nor the article of H. H. Scullard, "Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics," *J. R. S.*, L (1960), pp. 59-74, came to the attention of the author until after this article was in finished form. The former extends the views expressed here of the importance to Tiberius Gracchus of his father's eastern diplomatic connections, and the latter agrees that Scipio's opposition to Tiberius was based primarily on constitutional grounds.

## A NEW MEANING FOR ΝΑΥΣ IN THE CATALOGUE.

Scholarly opinion concerning the Catalogue of Ships has tended to settle upon the view that it is a traditional list of military contingents originally fitted to a context of Aulis harbor, and only awkwardly recast upon the Trojan plain.<sup>1</sup> Most recently D. L. Page has reminded us of this hypothesis: "Nobody seems to care if the passage introduced to describe the forces arrayed for battle at the present moment actually describes something wholly different—the assembling of armies at a Greek harbour ten years ago."<sup>2</sup> Page, however, introduces another consideration when he remarks that *nobody seems to care*. We may speculate whether such a situation is ever true in first-rate literature. Certainly in the *Iliad* there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the poet cared no little about the Catalogue; clearly he was at great pains to motivate it. The whole of the second book that precedes may be said to perform this function. There are the suspenseful specifics of an army's morale crumbling and needing restoration; there is the elaborate stage direction of Nestor (II, 362-3), which has no further relevance than to herald the Catalogue. And finally the bard brilliantly illuminates the audience's imagination by a description of the muster in straight narrative and in simile that will serve to hold the dramatic moment for them over the hundreds of lines of essentially undramatic verse.

The notion that Aulis harbor was the original locale comes from the repeated references to the number of ships involved in the war. While, on the one hand, it is true that drawing attention to ships is ill-suited to a scene of an army mustering upon a plain, this is, on the other hand, the information least

<sup>1</sup> The literature is naturally vast: for this view see T. W. Allen, *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships* (Oxford, 1921), p. 171; C. M. Bowra, *Tradition and Design in the Iliad* (Oxford, 1950), p. 70; F. Jacoby, "Die Einschaltung des Schiffskatalogs in die Ilias," *Berl. Sitzb.* (Berlin, 1932); V. Burr, ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ, *Klio*, Beiheft XLIX (Leipzig, 1944), pp. 114 f.; H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 53 ff.; G. Jachmann, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog und die Ilias* (Westphalia, 1958), pp. 218-41.

<sup>2</sup> D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 124.

real (I mean in terms of the specific numbers which the bard employs),<sup>3</sup> and least necessary for the scene, which, if it had caused him the slightest embarrassment, could have been so neatly omitted. But a re-examination of the verbs connected with the word 'ship' suggests an altogether different sense for that word which removes any difficulty in interpreting the dramatic context of the Catalogue.

The following quotations show the language in which the bard gives the ship complement of each area's contingent:

1. τοῖς δ' ἄμα τεσσαράκοντα μέλαινα νῆες ἔποντο  
(524, 534, 545, 556, 568, 630, 637, 644,  
652, 710, 737, 747, 759).
2. τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχόωντο  
(516, 602, 680, 733).
3. τῶν μὲν πεντήκοντα νέες κίον, ἐν δὲ ἐκάστη  
κοῦροι Βοιωτῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι βαῖνον  
(509-10).
4. Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας  
(557, 654, 671, 748).
5. τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων  
(576, 586, 609, 713, 718).
6. τῶν αὖ τέσσαρες ἀρχοὶ ἔσαν, δέκα δ' ἀνδρὶ ἐκάστῳ  
νῆες ἔποντο θοαί, πολέες δ' ἔμβαινον Ἑπείοι  
(618-19).
7. τῶν αὖ πεντήκοντα νεῶν ἦν ἀρχὸς Ἀχιλλεύς  
(685).

The numbers indicate the lines which are parallel except that they will differ, of course, in the name and often in the number of ships as well. The most common formula (1) employs the imperfect tense of the verb *ἔπαισθαι*. We are here concerned with two of its meanings; first, the physical act of following after another object. In this sense its application to inanimate objects is quite limited, because it implies conscious action, and in every case in the *Iliad*<sup>4</sup> suggests something other than what

<sup>3</sup> The neatness of the numbers and their formulaic repetition can only suggest that they were meant to give the merest fictional notion of size. Notice that Odysseus after the wastage of time and storm and the death of men still has a contingent of twelve (*Od.*, IX, 159: *νῆες μὲν μοι ἔποντο δυνάδεκα . . .*), which was the number of *Il.*, II, 637. The formulaic nature of number in Homer may be studied in P. Waltz, "L'exagération numérique dans Homère," *Rev. Études Homériques*, III (1933), pp. 1-38.

<sup>4</sup> See, e. g., III, 143, 376; IV, 430; XII, 398; XVI, 504. The expression

we would have to assume here, namely a convoy of ships all following the leader's ship. Again it can mean to follow along in the train of someone, in the sense of to obey their direction, not so much in the matter of specific commands, but simply to go along under their leadership.<sup>5</sup> This second meaning of *ἔπεσθαι* takes it outside of any particular moment of time in the story of the Trojan War. The ships followed along after their leaders; it is an historic fact, and the imperfect loses its special force.<sup>6</sup> That *ἔπεσθαι* bears this meaning in the formula is made more likely by the occurrence of the same expression at XI, 227 f., and most specifically at IX, 43 f., where . . . *νῆες δέ τοι ἄγχι θαλάσσης/ ἐστᾶσ' αἷ τοι ἔποντο Μυκῆνῃθεν μάλα πολλαί* indicates that *ἔποντο* is an historic fact, although the imperfect is used.

But the frequency in the *Iliad* of the expression *λαοὶ εἰποντο* (the people were following along after their leaders) suggests that *ἔπεσθαι* always implies movement.<sup>7</sup> This feeling is reinforced in the Catalogue itself by lines 542, 577-8, 675, and 749. In each case the people instead of the ships are introduced. At 542 *Ἀβαντες ἔποντο θοοί* and only a few lines later (545) *μέλαινα νῆες ἔποντο*. The description of the Abantes in the lines between suggests the battlefield, not a convoy on the seas. At 578 when Agamemnon is mentioned (*ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νόροπα χαλκόν, κ. τ. λ.*), the *ἐν*, 'among them,' i. e. *οἱ λαοί*, with the following description suggests again the battlefield.

The phrase *νῆες ἔποντο* either reports an historic fact, or it is describing movement actually taking place in the narrative moment. Demonstrations of the rigid and mechanical nature of the formulaic phrase raise the important question of whether

*νέφος εἶπετο πεζῶν* (IV, 274; XXIII, 133) is metaphorical like the usage in the Catalogue, and the animate element is transferred. Cf. Bowra, *Tradition*, pp. 115 f.

<sup>5</sup> See, e. g., V, 551; XXIII, 297; XXIV, 400. L. R. Palmer, "Mycenaean Greek Texts from Pylos," *Trans. Philosophical Soc.* (1954), p. 51, discusses Linear B *e-qc-ta*, *heq<sup>w</sup> etas* equaling *ἐπέρης*, which seems to mean 'companion' or 'follower.'

<sup>6</sup> W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*<sup>2</sup> (Boston, 1900), pp. 16 f. (§§ 56-7). An historic fact by its very nature ought to be complete.

<sup>7</sup> Lines XIII, 690 and XV, 559 juxtapose forms of *ἄρχειν* and *ἔπεσθαι* exactly in the manner of the Catalogue (indeed the former line is part of a minor catalogue) and clearly in the physical sense.

it can carry more than one meaning. In this particular instance the verb occurs seventeen times between lines 524 and 762, having as its subject almost always νῆες, a few times λαοί or its equivalent. Its frequency and formulaic nature make it most likely that the meaning is consistent, and the strong sense of movement which the verbs in the equivalent formulae call to mind implies movement here, and so a metaphorical meaning for the word 'ships.'

The verb στιχᾶσθαι is sometimes substituted for ἔπεισθαι (see ship number formula 2).<sup>8</sup> An uncommon verb, it is found in the *Iliad* only in the third person plural of the imperfect.<sup>9</sup> Elsewhere<sup>10</sup> it is used only of animate objects, so that even more than ἔπεισθαι it is unusual when associated with the word ship. The word means 'to march along in ranks.' Obviously this is awkward with νῆες, so that the usual practice is to alter the meaning and so in the context to understand 'to sail along in rows.' It is difficult to understand why this verb suggests to so many students of the Catalogue that the scene is in reality at Aulis. For the ships must have been beached there just as at Troy, and this verb clearly emphasizes movement. If that feature of it were to be obscured in order to highlight the conception of ranks or rows, then the verb is equally valid for either beach. Most obviously again it suggests voyaging on the high seas.

It is unlikely that it, like ἔπεισθαι, could represent the historic fact, since it is a much more vivid verb. It specifically points to place and manner of action, so that it strongly represents motion. Why should the bard employ an imagistic verb, such as στιχᾶσθαι, which draws attention to the action unless the action is paramount? Although στιχᾶσθαι occurs only in formulae involving the number thirty we may exclude as remote the possibility that this is the solution of a metrical dilemma. Much more likely in view of the fact that στιχᾶσθαι portrays mass movement on foot, something to which this book in its narrative

<sup>8</sup> In the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod* note the interesting and relevant juxtaposition of these two verbs in a variant of the Catalogue entry for Diomedes, *Certamen*, 299-300 (O. C. T., V, p. 237).

<sup>9</sup> P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* (Paris, 1948-53), I, pp. 358 f.

<sup>10</sup> II, 92; III, 266, 341; IV, 432; XVIII, 577.

and every simile is largely devoted, is that here again the word 'ships' is used metaphorically.

The first contingent mentioned by the bard has a more elaborate kind of description of its ship complement (see ship number formula 3). The verb *κίον* is generally recognized as being aorist in Homer.<sup>11</sup> Other than in this instance it refers in the *Iliad* only to the movement of animate beings.<sup>12</sup> *κίον* is made more specific by the clause including the phrase *βαίνειν ἐν νηί*. This phrase occurs in the Catalogue also at 610-11, at 619, and at 719-20 (in the pluperfect). The usual translation is 'were embarking.' Thus *ἐν* with the dative is understood as "a pregnant construction of verbs of motion, *into* implying both *motion to* and subsequent *position in* a place."<sup>13</sup> If one examines the instances of *βαίνειν ἐν νηί* or *ἐμβαίνειν ἐν νηί* in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it becomes clear that there is never a necessity to translate the construction as 'to embark.'<sup>14</sup> It is undoubtedly this expression which suggests more than any other the scene at Aulis except lines 719-20, where the perfect tense appears and so bears another implication.<sup>15</sup>

If it is to mean 'embark' then we must understand the two lines 509-10 as an historic fact similar to the possible interpretation of *ἔποντο*, or as an absolutely conflicting statement which refers to another setting. But what exactly could the two lines mean? First there must be some clarification of where the poet is in his mind's eye. This is essential to any description, and at this point we may hypothesize three places: at Aulis, at Troy,

<sup>11</sup> Chantraine, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 392 f.

<sup>12</sup> Except for the mules of XXIII, 115, always to human beings.

<sup>13</sup> *L. S. J.*, p. 552; however, observe the following remark *ibid.*: "this construction occurs later with verbs of coming or going," which would be the case with *βαίνω*.

<sup>14</sup> *Il.*, II, 351; XII, 16; *Od.*, I, 210-11; II, 18, 27; III, 131; IV, 181, 656; XIII, 317. At *Il.*, I, 311 *ἐν* means 'then' or 'among them'; *Od.*, IV, 653 *ἐν* means 'among them' although cf. W. W. Merry and J. Riddell, *Homer's Odyssey*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1886), note on IV, 653. *Od.*, IV, 656 in point of view of time must not mean 'to embark.' *L. S. J.*, p. 302, s. v. *βαίνω* A, I, 1, *ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινεν* 'was going on board ship,' *Od.*, XI, 534; but *ἐν δὲ ἐκάστῃ [νηί] . . . ἐκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι βαῖνον* 'were on board,' *Il.*, II, 510.

<sup>15</sup> *L. S. J.*, p. 302, s. v. *βαίνω* A, I, 2, gives the perfect meaning as 'to stand or be in place'; perhaps *ἐμβαίνειν* could also bear that meaning in the perfect. Cf., however, *L. S. J.*, p. 538, where *Il.*, II, 720 is cited as an example of the meaning 'to embark on a ship.'



or on poetic high, a detached place of objectivity. κίον cannot mean 'went' to Troy (at Aulis) because the embarkation would already have occurred. κίον cannot mean 'came' to Troy (at Troy) or went to Troy (on poetic high) because the idea of embarkation would then be meaningless in terms of the time sequence. κίον does not likely mean 'came' to Aulis (at Aulis) or 'went' to Aulis (on poetic high) with the subsequent embarkation, because this being the Boeotian fleet, and Aulis presumably the main port of Boeotia, there is no reason for the ships to arrive; they would already have been there. Perhaps this logic represents the sort of insistence on likelihood which is opposed to the Homeric manner of representation. At any rate, the idea of embarkation makes the whole thing difficult; since there is no reason to translate the phrase in that fashion it is better to do otherwise.

If the sentence is translated "of these people fifty ships went, in each of which went along one hundred twenty warriors," then perhaps this is simply the historic fact which makes no demands on the moment being described. It is interesting, however, that κίειν elsewhere describes the animate movement, and βαίνειν essentially refers to movement on foot. These together with ἔπεσθαι and στιχᾶσθαι are not really appropriate to the action of ships, or those aboard, and strongly suggest that the bard has the present army activity clearly in mind.

Elsewhere in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the verbs commonly associated in formulae with νέες or νῆες are rarely ones of intransitive motion; most frequently forms of φέρω or verbs of like meaning. In addition note ἤλυθον (e.g., *Il.*, XIII, 174) and περώσιν (e.g., *Od.*, V, 176), and then a verb with almost the same connotation as the Catalogue verbs, πέμπωσι (*Od.*, VIII, 556). None is in a metrical position similar to the positions of the verbs in the Catalogue. The over-all impression one gains is that a ship in motion is thought of generally in terms of its function of carrying things over the water.

The construction τῶν . . . νέες of line 509 occurs many places elsewhere in the Catalogue (see ship number formulae 5, 6, 7, and some of the parallels of 4). τῶν is either possessive genitive or partitive genitive. It seems unlikely, in view of the relationship between the epic leaders and their followers that in these many instances the meaning is 'the ships of these people were commanded by,' especially in the fuller expressions of 534-5 and

654 where the name of the people is given. Rather it is to be translated as "of these people there came fifty ships," or as in 654, "Tlepolemos was leader of nine ships of Rhodians."<sup>16</sup> Note here the absence of the definite article, similar to 535, suggesting a *commodity in quantity*. In this view the word 'ship' would mean most particularly a measurement; there would be no signification of the actual vessels. It would be similar to our present expression, to wit, "about five cars of people came," or "there were ten tables of us at bridge." Similar to but not the same as metonymy, it is an easier way of conveying size, easier to think of and easier for the hearer to digest than great numbers would be; it is, of course, also more imaginative.

An immediate objection to this sort of identification is the presence of the epithets *γλαφυρός*, *μέλας* or *μέλαινα*, etc., which direct the hearer's attention to the physical object 'ship.' But these are so traditional that it is doubtful whether they would cast any impression on the hearers. The epithets, in that they are generic, have nothing to do with the specific instance.

The verbs of leadership in the Catalogue help to reinforce belief in a term of measurement. Consider the lines devoted to the greater Ajax (ship number formula 4), which have suffered strong criticism from many sides. Whether it is an interpolation or not is beside the point at this moment; it, together with the passages identified as similar to it, represents another formula for indicating the number of ships. I am assuming that whoever composed the two lines (557-8) was sufficiently versed in the Greek language to be able to know whether he was making sense. At first glance line 557 seems to depict a scene at sea: "Ajax was leading out from Salamis twelve ships." The *ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος* especially points up the motion. However the repetition of *ἄγω* indicates another meaning altogether. Line 558:

στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἔν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες

because of the context of the Catalogue would indicate that the bard is describing in detail that which he had generally mentioned at 476:

ὥς τοὺς ἡγεμόνες διεκόσμεον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.

*ἄγων* has no expressed object; the natural inference is to carry over *νῆας* from the line before. In so doing, the literal meaning

<sup>16</sup> So W. Leaf, *Iliad*<sup>2</sup> (London, 1900), note on II, 575.

of ship has to be abandoned, something like the notion of shiploads or ship's companies must be imagined. ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος then would become an expression of place of origin.<sup>17</sup> If nothing else, the two lines make clear that whoever wrote them was not under the impression that the Catalogue was describing a scene at Aulis. He would not have created the obvious time sequence in the repeated ἄγειν—ἄγων.

This formula elsewhere is immediately bound up in the people of the contingent:

1. 654 ἐννέα νῆας ἄγειν Ῥοδίων ἀγερώχων
2. 671-5 . . . ἄγε τρεῖς νῆας . . . παῦρος δέ οἱ εἶπετο λαός
3. 748 . . . ἦγε δῶν καὶ εἴκοσι νῆας  
τῷ δ' Ἐννίηνες ἔποντο μενεπτόλεμοί τε Περαιβοί

Here again, although the vivid phrase ἄγε νῆας suggests the actual sailing, and hence the historical fact, the introduction of the people continues as elsewhere to cast the attention on them, and so reconstruct the muster scene, which the bard has indicated he is describing.

Other references to the number of ships involve the verb ἄρχω or the noun ἀρχός, which implies the abstract qualities of leadership and is in no way as concrete and immediate as ἄγω. Each time this formula is used (see ship number formulae 5, 6, 7) ships seem to be a quantitative measurement:<sup>18</sup> τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε, he commanded one hundred ships of these people (shipfuls, or shiploads of these people). It is also interesting to note that in the *Iliad* ἄρχειν when used in the sense of commanding or ruling is always outside the Catalogue used in connection with human beings. Only in these passages are inanimate objects, ships, used as objects of ἄρχειν.

What sort of metaphorical use might we then assume for 'ship'? I suggest that it be 'shipload' or 'ship-unit,' the latter being an actual political or military division.

Nestor prepares for the Catalogue by suggesting (362) that there be a muster κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας. He later urges the plan again (437 f.):

<sup>17</sup> As *Od.*, XV, 425: ἐκ μὲν Σιδῶνος . . . εὐχομαι εἶναι.

<sup>18</sup> Schol. A on II, 576 disagrees and has the meaning as τούτων τῶν πόλεων ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχεν, but one cannot always make the cities into the logical antecedent of τῶν, when in every case the point of our attention is to the people in οἷ, and this relative pronoun must have an antecedent which can only be the following τῶν.

ἀλλ' ἄγε κήρυκες μὲν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων  
λαὸν κηρύσσοντες ἀγειρόντων κατὰ νῆας.

The final phrase of the Greek is generally rendered "let them gather the folk throughout the ships." Since, however, the forces gather together upon the plain (465), and are there arranged (476), this translation is perhaps wrong. It is possible that *κατὰ φύλα*, *κατὰ φρήτρας* and *κατὰ νῆας* are all of a piece in implication. Most reasonably the ships of each region or people were manned and sent out from the important towns of the region individually, or, at any rate, when the army was called up in each area it was no doubt arranged *κατὰ φύλα*, *κατὰ φρήτρας* and on that basis was assigned to the ships of that area; each ship's company would be a part of a *φρήτρη*. Thus the consequent emphasis upon ships by the bard, and the absence of any further mention of the *φύλα* or *φρήτραι* would be realistic in terms of the muster, and would imply nothing about the present use of the ships.<sup>19</sup>

It is conceivable that we have here the reflection of a practice similar to the Athenian *naucraria*, whose origins are obscure, but may have been in the very early period. Hignett<sup>20</sup> calls attention to a lexicographer's comment on a place name: "a region of Attica . . . also a *naukraria*." This Athenian unit seems to combine the elements of locale, population group, and something nautical (perhaps even an outfitted ship) in the same way that my reading of the Catalogue does.<sup>21</sup> It would be the logical way to administer an overseas army who were crew and fighters at once. Nestor's remark *κατὰ νῆας* at 438, together with such expressions as *πολέες δ' ἔμβαϊνον Ἑπείοι* would refer to this unit in which the men grouped; and the reading of the Catalogue of Ships becomes much more intelligible.

CHARLES ROWAN BEYE.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

<sup>19</sup> Note also the change from brotherhoods and clans to ships is completed by the bard's final line of invocation, i. e. 493, *ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆας τε προπάσας*.

<sup>20</sup> C. Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> W. M. Calder III has reminded me of a Thucydidean usage of *ναῦς* which may mean 'shipload,' namely VIII, 29, 1 *πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ* to which the Schol. says (p. 412, 9-10 Hude) *ἀντὶ τοῦ τοῖς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ*.

## THE SERVIAN CORPUS AND THE SCHOLIA OF PSEUDO-PROBUS.

The present study<sup>1</sup> is a comparison of the scholia of the Servian corpus with the notes of the Vergilian commentary which bears the name of Valerius Probus.<sup>2</sup> Its purpose is to discover whether they are in any way related, and if so to determine the nature of the relationship. This investigation is limited to the notes in the two commentaries.

As one compares individual notes of the two commentaries, it is immediately seen that they often contain the same information. There are, of course, the usual identifications and simple paraphrases, the commonplace explanations and interpretations, which we must consider the public property of Vergilian exegesis. To conclude a relationship between these notes of common material, we must have in addition some indication of singularity, some clue that it is the same note appearing in both commentaries. There are no word-for-word repetitions and consequently no simple copying on the part of either author. Any

<sup>1</sup> This article is largely an abridgement of a doctoral dissertation presented to The Johns Hopkins University in 1958, entitled *The Relation of the Pseudo-Proban Commentary on Vergil to the Scholia of the Servian Corpus*.

<sup>2</sup> The problem of authorship of the "Proban" commentary, whether it does or does not go back, wholly or in part, to the work of Valerius Probus, is not directly involved here. Lest use of the terms "Probus" or "Pseudo-Probus" misdirect the attention of the reader, the commentary is referred to simply as P. For convenience the normal practice is employed of referring to the shorter, or Vulgate Servius, as S; and the additional material first published in Daniel's 1600 edition as D. The term "Servian" is to be understood as including the entire corpus, both S and D, and does not mean "of Servius." The Harvard edition of Servius (vol. II [Lancaster, Pa., 1946]) is at present available only for *Aen.* I and II, and the single citation from these books in the present article is printed according to the system of that edition, i. e., material of D alone printed on the left, from S alone on the right, material found in both S and D across the full width of the page. All other citations are from the edition of Thilo and Hagen (Leipzig, 1881-1902) and according to their arrangement (D in italics; parts in Roman type from Servius proper). The text of P is found in vol. III, fasc. II of the latter edition.

evidence of common origin must come from the notes themselves and their placement with the particular Vergilian passage at which they occur. The following seven cases are chosen as containing such evidence, and as being both typical and cogent.

(1) *Georg.*, I, 10. In P:

ET VOS, AGRESTUM PRAESENTIA NUMINA FAUNI . . . Existimatur autem fuisse Faunus rex Aboriginum, qui cives suos mitiorem vitam docuerit ritu ferarum viventes, et primus loca certis numinibus et aedificia quaedam lucosque sacraverit, a quo et fana sunt dicta. . . .

P identifies Faunus, and credits him with consecration to specific gods of places and buildings, called, for him, *fana*.

The S note does not discuss *Fauni*, but the D supplement advances three etymologies. The first two are of *Faunus* and *fauni*. The third D attributes to Cincius and Cassius:

. . . Cincius et Cassius aiunt ab Euandro Faunum deum appellatum ideoque aedes sacras 'faunas' primo appellatas, postea fana dicta, et ex eo, qui futura praecinerent fanaticos dici.

P and this third section of the D note are clearly presenting the same information. D gives it in a somewhat fuller form, with the intermediate stage of *faunae*, and the further development of *fanatici*. That they are presenting *the same note* is shown by their very usage of the etymology of *fana* in this place. In both notes it is a detail unnecessary to, and independent of, exegesis of the passage. It is inserted, legitimately enough, for the sake of etymological completeness, but the appearance of this same fortuitous detail, under the same lemma,<sup>3</sup> shows that this section in the two notes represents one original notation.

(2) At *Georg.*, I, 67-8, P has:

AT SI NON FUERIT TELLUS FOECUNDA, SUB  
IPSUM ARCTURUM TENUI SAT ERIT SUSPEN-  
DERE SULCO. Arcturus est stella in cauda maioris ursae,  
quam Graeci Helicen vocant, quae Latine Septentrio vocatur,

<sup>3</sup> There are etymologies of *faunus* in the Servian notes on *Aen.*, VII, 47; 81; VIII, 314; *Ecl.*, VI, 27. In none of these instances is this detail included. The P commentary does not contain other etymological discussion of *faunus*.



dicta a cauda et ursa: ἄρκτος enim Graece ursa dicitur, cauda οὐρά, cuius ortu hiems incipit.

Neither the S nor D notes on this line comment on the etymology of Arcturus. There is, however, at the beginning of the note on *Aen.*, I, 744, the following in S:

ARCTURUM stella est post caudam maioris ursae, posita in signo bootae; unde "arcturus" dicta est, quasi ἄρκτου οὐρά. . . .

This derivation of Arcturus is found nowhere else, except Isidore, *Or.*, III, 71, 9, which Avery has shown is directly copied from the Servian note.<sup>4</sup>

(3) In the note on *Ecl.*, VII, 61, P gives two derivations of *Alcides*:

POPULUS ALCIDAE. Alcides Hercules ab Alcaeo monte (avo E) sive ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς id est fortitudine. . . .

There is no S note for this line, and the D note is devoted entirely to the myth connecting the poplar with Hercules. However, included in the note on *Aen.*, VI, 392, is the following etymology in S:

. . . sane Alciden volunt quidam ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς dictum, id est a virtute: quod non procedit, quia a prima aetate hoc nomen habuit ab Alcaeo, patre Amphitryonis. et scimus agnomina ab accidentibus dari.

We find here, then, both the etymologies suggested by P, with S rejecting the second and receiving with approval the first. Even though S presents the derivation ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς as incorrect, the etymological sections of these notes are the same, and the etymology ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς is, to be sure, striking. It is found nowhere else.

(4) At the beginning of the first Georgic, Vergil invokes the rustic deities whose provinces will be treated in the four books. Addressing Liber and Ceres, he writes (*Georg.*, I, 7-9):

Liber et alma Ceres, vestro si munere tellus  
Chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit arista,  
Poculaque inventis Acheloia miscuit uvis. . . .

<sup>4</sup>W. T. Avery, "Isidore (*Orig.* III, 71, 9) and Servius (*In Aen.* I, 744)," *C. P.*, LXIX (1954), p. 104.

P gives the following interpretation at line 9:

POCULAQUE INVENTIS ACHELOIA MISCUIT  
UVIS. Aetolus pastor Staphylus, cum Oenei capellas in  
pabulum deduceret, notavit unam praecipue secedentem a  
grege, laetio(que) ceteris recipientem se serius in prae-  
sepia. Cuius rei ut causam cognosceret, secutus est eam  
clam et in remota stirpe animadvertit uvam edentem,  
pomum iis temporibus incognitum, et sustulit regique per-  
tulit Oeneo, qui expresso humore delectatus, cum eum vetus-  
tate cognosceret mitescere, Libero patri posuit excepto a se  
hospitio. Cuius rei cultum cum demonstraret Liber, ut  
perpetua inventorum esset gloria, constituit, ut ab Oeneo  
*oīvos* appellaretur vinum, a Staphylo uva *σταφυλή*. Achelous  
est autem flumen Aetoliae. Ita quantum ad Acheloum perti-  
net, aqua intellegi poterit, quem ideo potissimum nominavit,  
quod primus in Graeciam videtur fluxisse. Uva autem  
significat vinum.

The S notation is, in part:

CHAONIAM P. G. M. A. Epiroticam, a loco, in quo abun-  
dant glandes, quibus antea homines vescebantur. Et modo  
speciem pro genere posuit; non enim aut in Epiro tantum  
glandes fuerunt, aut de solo Acheloo homines potare con-  
sueverant. Sane 'Acheloia' non praeter rationem dixit: nam,  
sicut Orpheus docet, generaliter aquam veteres Acheloum  
vocabant. Sed quia specialiter quidam fluvius Achelous  
dicitur, aut species est pro genere, aut secundum antiqui-  
tatem est locutus. . . .

The D note corresponding to that of P begins with a myth-  
ological account of the creation of the river Achelous, and  
continues:

. . . Circa hunc (fluvium) Staphylus, Oenei pastor, cum  
animadvertisset ex capellis unam esse pinguissimam, intel-  
lexit id pabuli ubertate fieri. Secutus itaque eandem cum  
vidisset uvis vesci, admiratus et novitatem et dulcedinem,  
decerptum fructum pertulit regi. Qui cum liquorem expres-  
sisset, a suo nomine appellavit *oīvon*, ab inventore *σταφυλήν*. . . .

D maintains this etymological course and proceeds with a far-  
fetched derivation of *κεράσαι* from *κέρας*, the horn of Achelous  
broken in his fight with Hercules, concluding with a somewhat  
expanded and, in parts, differently worded expression of the two  
explanations given by S: *species pro genere* and *secundum  
antiquitatem*.

All three commentators clearly agree in these last two notations. In the "Staphylus" story, P and D are the same. The D note is fuller; it contains some background material on the origin of the river, and includes an additional etymology, along with the justification for it. P has a few details, in the telling of the story, not found in D. Still, the material of the P and D notes is the same. Can the two notes be said to be identical? As regards the Vergilian passage, the explanations that Achelous was considered the oldest river, or that it was not uncommon for "Achelous" to be used for water in general, are surely the most attractive. They have their precedents.<sup>5</sup> Even the connection of the Achelous with the discovery of the grape is found, in Hyginus,<sup>6</sup> where we read that a certain Cerasus mixed wine with the waters of the Achelous, and that therefore to mix wine is *κεράσαι* in Greek. But Hyginus also is probably thinking of Achelous as the most ancient of rivers, as Rose remarks in his note to Hyginus' passage.<sup>7</sup>

Aetiological tales of this sort, relying heavily on etymologies, are not startling, but the justification for including this one here is slight. D says that Staphylus happened to be feeding his goats by this river when he noticed that one was unusually fat, observed the animal's feeding habits, and discovered the grape. P requires the reader to draw his own conclusion from mention that Staphylus was an Aetolian with later mention of Achelous as a river in Aetolia. Without the word *inventis* of the Vergilian line there would be no excuse for the story to be given here. Clearly a commentator has taken an aetiological myth of the discovery of the vine to explain *inventis . . . uvis*, and grafted upon the myth a specific geographical setting to connect it with *poculaque . . . Acheloia*. But this could be done only for this line. It would indeed be large coincidence for two independent commentators to do exactly this in precisely the same way. It cannot be original in both commentaries.

(5) There are several notes in both commentaries dealing with the creation of horses and the origin of riding. Comparison

<sup>5</sup> Eur., *Andr.* 166, *Bacch.* 165; Macrob., V, 18, who also quotes Ephorus and Aristophanes.

<sup>6</sup> *Fab.* CCLXXIV, p. 166 (Rose).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

of them all is interesting,<sup>8</sup> but the comment on *Georg.*, III, 113-15 is particularly noteworthy. In P we have:

... Lapithae ergo primi existimantur equitasse, et, ut Palaephatus in libro Ἀπίστων ait, eius gentis utique [et hei pro hi diphthongus est Graeca] ii, qui in Nephele castello morentur. Ex qua causa Centauri nebulae filii creduntur, et Ixion iis mercedem promisit, si furentem taurorum gregem occidissent, quorum velocitate equorum cum impetus effugerent et ipsos telis conficerent, ἀπὸ τοῦ κεντεῖν, quod est figere, καὶ ταύρον Centauri dicti sunt. Existimati sunt bifformes, quia primi equitare coeperunt.

Servian material corresponding to this P note is found on line 115:

FRENA PELETHRONII LAPITHAE G. D. Pelethronium oppidum est Thessaliae, ubi primum domandorum equorum repertus est usus. nam cum quidam Thessalus rex, bubus oestro exagitatis, satellites suos ed eos revocandos ire iussisset illique cursu non sufficerent, ascenderunt equos et eorum velocitate boves secuti, eos stimulis ad tecta revocarunt. sed hi visi, aut cum irent velociter, aut cum eorum equi circa flumen Peneon potarent capitibus inclinatis, locum fabulae dederunt, ut Centauri esse crederentur, qui dicti sunt Centauri ἀπὸ τοῦ κεντῆν τοὺς ταύρους. alii dicunt Centaurorum fabulam esse confictam ad exprimentam humanae vitae velocitatem, quia equum constat esse velocissimum. . . .

Explaining Vergil's *Lapithae*, P states that they were Thesalians said to have been the first to ride horseback, and cites the Περὶ Ἀπίστων of Palaephatus for the story given. Comparing the P version with what is actually found in the text of Palaephatus as we have it,<sup>9</sup> we see that P is a good abbreviation, and that many of the main details are included in the P version. The conspicuous difference is that our text of Palaephatus represents the Lapiths as inhabitants of Larissa and subjects of Ixion, and the "bull-goaders" as a people who lived nearby. Palaephatus gives credit of the discovery of riding to these imaginative cowboys, who were subsequently called *centauri*.

The S note on line 115 is beyond any question using the same material as Palaephatus and P, although S has tried to make it

<sup>8</sup> *Georg.*, I, 12 f.; 18; III, 122.

<sup>9</sup> N. Festa, *Mythographi Graeci* (Leipzig, 1902), III, fasc. II, pp. 2-5.

more plausible by inserting remarks on the speed of their riding and suggesting that the mistake might have been made while the horses were inclining their heads to drink water.<sup>10</sup> However, S understands the Lapiths to be subjects of the unnamed *Thessalus rex*, and the riders to be the king's own men, *satellites suos*, and not a neighboring people. The S version is the same as that of P, but omits certain details preserved in P and Palaephatus, details such as the name of Ixion, the name of Nephele, which is important in the other two, the tactics of shooting at the bulls while retreating, and, very important, the source of the story. P has given both author and title.

Although S does not cite Palaephatus as his source, there can be no doubt that both S and P are reproducing the same material, ultimately material of Palaephatus, whether either the author of P or that of the D scholium had actually seen a copy of the *Περὶ Ἀπίστον*. But can an identity in the two notes be proved? Such an identity is revealed by the very fact that both commentaries use this explanation here at all: the *lemma* is *Lapithae*; why tell an elaborate story about their famous enemies? Vergil is consciously recognizing the Lapiths; he makes no mention of their uncouth rivals. The rather ridiculous rationalization of the belief in centaurs has nothing at all to do with the thought of Vergil here, and explains nothing. It could not even be said that both commentators happened to introduce mention of centaurs to illustrate the use of horses for riding, since centaurs are part horse themselves and would not be thought of as "riding." Only the Palaephatus rationalization of the tradition of centaurs, that they were actually men riding horses, could connect riding with centaurs at all. Have both annotators by chance chosen the same indirect way of appealing to the same source to disagree with Vergil and insist that the Lapiths did not, after all, discover riding?

But, it might be said, by making these *centauri* subjects of the king of the Lapiths, therefore Lapiths themselves, the com-

<sup>10</sup> In the first part of the P note, dealing with Erichthonius, P and S on line 113 have the same account, including the same derivation of the name. Likewise in their explanations of *Pelethronii*, P is fuller, submitting an exact geographical designation, whereas S is general. D has two additional and distinct interpretations. For material which they both preserve, S and P are the same.

mentators have retained for them the honor of the discovery. In this case, either they have both consciously distorted the Palaephatus account to fit this passage, or they have made, in remarkable coincidence, the same mistake. Palaephatus is quite clear in stating that the *centauri* were a separate group from the Lapiths, and goes further to state that they later became so insolent as to carry off the wives of the Lapiths to their own country, which began the great war between centaurs and Lapiths. That both P and S give the same distorted (or mistaken) version of a rationalization of the story, to explain a passage in Vergil for which their explanation is not appropriate, goes far beyond probable coincidence and makes quite clear that the notes are of common origin.

(6) On *Ecl.*, IX, 47, we have in P:

DIONAEI CAESARIS. Sive eadem Venus sive mater Veneris est: divum Iulium significat, cuius capiti in statua stella addita est.

In the Servian scholia we find:

DAPHNI QUID ANTIQUOS S. S. O. ECCE DIONAEI PROCESSIT CAESARIS ASTRUM cum Augustus Caesar ludos funebres patri celebraret, die medio stella apparuit. ille eam esse confirmavit parentis *sui*: unde sunt versus isti compositi . . . *Baebius Macer circa horam octavam stellam amplissimam, quasi lemniscis, radius coronatam, ortam dicit. quam quidam ad inlustrandam gloriam Caesaris iuvenis pertinere existimabant, ipse animam patris sui esse voluit eique in Capitolio statuam, super caput auream stellam habentem, posuit: inscriptum in basi fuit 'Caesari emitheo' . . .*

D proceeds here along different lines.

S explains Vergil's *processit Caesaris astrum* as referring to the star which appeared at Julius' funeral. The first sentence of D is supplement to the S note, restored by the compiler. D then goes on with the interpretation that Vergil means Octavian by "the star of Caesar," and states that Octavian had a golden star mounted over Caesar's statue to remind the people of the apotheosis of the divine Caesar and to suggest that his spirit was present in the person of his heir. This, D implies, is what Vergil means. The S note gives us information about



the star which appeared; the D addition discusses Vergil's purpose in mentioning the star.

The detail of the golden star over Caesar's statue, not found in Servius, enriches the D interpretation. If Vergil means by "the star of Caesar" his successor Octavian, the detail of the star on the statue shows that Octavian also was anxious to keep current the association made by Vergil in the passage discussed. It is, so to speak, a precedent for Vergil's allusion.

Comparing this with P, we see that aside from the identification of *Dionaeus*, the P note says nothing but "He means the divine Julius. A star was added to the head on his statue." This is meaningless. Certainly a metal star over the head of Caesar's statue could not be taken as beneficial to farmers in any way. It is Octavian who is the farmer's savior, as the D note points out. D includes the detail as illustration of his interpretation, and as such it is valuable. But P has only the detail and it, alone, is not even applicable in explanation of the passage. If we take the notes to be the same, and the P note to be an abbreviated version of the note as it is presented by D, this problem is resolved.

(7) *Georg.*, IV, 211. The P note:

AUT MEDUS HYDASPES: flumen Indiae, sed Vergilius Mediae dixit flumen Hydaspem. Hi Medi duce Alexandro Porum, regem Indorum, et ipsam Indiam subegerunt.

In the Servian scholia we have:

MEDUS HYDASPES fluvius Mediae . . . MEDUS HYDASPES civitas Medorum. et aliter: apud omnes satis constat Hydaspem flumen Indiae esse, non Mediae; sed potest videri poeta Hydaspem Medum dixisse iure belli, quod Medi duce Alexandro vicerint Porum Indorum regem, et eum in suam redegerint potestatem. oritur Hydaspes ex Caucaso et miscetur Indo.

The S note mistakenly locates the Hydaspes, and goes on to relate the reverence felt by the Medes for their rulers to that of the bees for their "king." The first D notice incorrectly makes it a Median state. A contrary explanation follows, that the Hydaspes is unquestionably in India, and that Vergil may have called it "Median" because Medes were serving in Alexander's

army when he conquered Porus, king of "India." It is a clever way out of the problem,<sup>11</sup> but it is most unlikely that two separate commentators would have hit upon this far-fetched idea independently.

It has been demonstrated above that in many instances the notes of P and the Servian corpus give the same material and in such a way as to indicate that it is the same note which is reflected in both commentaries. Before attempting to determine the nature of the actual relationship between the commentaries, we must first point out that this relationship is only partial. In some instances the same Vergilian passage occasions a different treatment.<sup>12</sup> There are different interpretations of the same material.<sup>13</sup> And there are in parallel notes contradicting answers to the same question.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, we have seen that P contains notations identical with notes found both in S and in D; there can consequently be no possibility of P being related to the shorter commentary published by Servius. Hence our investigation will be to determine the dependency and relationship of P with the original commentary from which Servius excerpted his material. The D scholia represent material added at a later time to the text of Servius to replace material which Servius had not chosen to use, thereby reconstituting, in great measure, the substance of the original commentary.<sup>15</sup> The current theory that the author of this original commentary was Aelius Donatus is widely accepted and variously substantiated.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The last sentence of D probably explains the Vergilian expression. If Vergil thought with D that Hydaspes rose in the Caucasus, he would consequently have imagined it as flowing through the territory of the Medes on its way to juncture with the Indus. On the confusion of "Caucasus" with the Hindu Kush, see M. Cary and E. H. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers* (London, 1929), pp. 196 f.

<sup>12</sup> E. g., *Ecl.*, IV, 58; *Georg.*, I, 16; 20; 73-6; II, 425; III, 146-9; 408.

<sup>13</sup> E. g., *Georg.*, I, 212; 336 f.; III, 25; 382; IV, 462.

<sup>14</sup> E. g., *Georg.*, II, 64; 437; 448; IV, 387.

<sup>15</sup> That there was some abbreviation on the part of the compiler has been established by J. J. H. Savage, "The Scholia in the Virgil of Tours, *Bernensis* 165," *H. S. C. P.*, XXXVI (1925), pp. 91-164; "The Manuscripts of the Commentary of Servius Danielis on Virgil," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIII (1932), pp. 77-102. See especially the résumé on p. 78 of the latter article.

<sup>16</sup> This thesis was initially suggested independently and almost simultaneously by K. Barwick, "Zur Serviusfrage," *Phil.*, LXX (1911), pp.

Could the Donatian commentary have been the source, or rather one of the sources (since the dependency is only partial), of the P commentary? It was much used; did the author of P draw on it? Considering this hypothesis, we would expect a substantial number of notes in the two commentaries to explain Vergil in much the same way, although it would, of course, be too much to ask that they furnish us in every note direct evidence that the two commentaries were related. Investigation fulfills the expectation. There are, in addition to notes having some suggestion or evidence of relationship, many notes which contain fundamentally the same interpretation. However, in these notes there are many details in P which do not appear in S or D, details which the author of P could not have found in Donatus, had that been his source.<sup>17</sup> To explain this situation, it could be assumed that in such cases the author or compiler of P either added some details of his own, augmenting the material of his source, or that he chose to use some other source quite similar to the note of Donatus, possibly even itself derived from Donatus' note.

Let us test, then, a potential explanation unlikely because of the great element of coincidence involved: that the Donatian

106 ff.; F. Lammert, "De Hieronymo Donati Discipulo," *Comm. phil. Len.*, IX, 2 (1912); and E. K. Rand, "Is Donatus's Commentary on Virgil Lost?," *C. Q.*, X (1916), pp. 162 ff. Cf. F. Lammert, *Bursian's Jahresberichte*, CCXXXI, 2 (1931), pp. 85-92.

<sup>17</sup> *Georg.*, I, 47 is a good example. Cf. also *Georg.*, I, 12; 36-9; 138; II, 87; 89; 197 f.; 380-4; 481 f.; III, 38; 122; 312; IV, 231. Probably the best example is the P note on *Ecl.*, VI, 31, which contains several major points as well as many details not found in the corresponding Servian note or anywhere else in the Servian corpus. The several instances of the P material appearing at various places in the Servian scholia have been pointed out by Thilo ("über Probus Commentar zu Vergils Bucolica und Georgica," *Neue Jahrb.*, CXLIX [1894], pp. 421-32). For those elements of the P note not found in the Servian notes, Thilo inferred that the authors of both P and the S and D notes were using some source other than the "original discussion," also inferred by Thilo. This conclusion of Thilo's was based on a comparison involving this note alone. Since this study has revealed other cases of P and the Servian notes containing the same material, with P sometimes giving the fuller note, sometimes S or D, Thilo's conjecture is greatly weakened. For a substantial refutation of other arguments used by Thilo, see R. S. Conway, *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 37 ff.

commentary was P's source only for those notes which offer us internal evidence that the P and Servian notes are the same. Yet even in these notes there are details in P not found in its Servian counterpart. In (5) above, the two commentaries contain the same note, seen not only in that they preserve the same material in detail, but also in that their common explanation has very slight justification. P, however, introduces Liber into the story as a main character, central to his note. In the D note Oeneus names both wine and grape. In (6) the Servian account fails to preserve details supplied by P, the name of the king of the "Lapiths," Ixion, and the name of the town Nephele, on which a derivation is based in P. The method used in attacking the bulls is found in P, not in S. Most important, P mentions the author of the tale and title of the work in which it was to be found. The P note is certainly fuller and more detailed, and the details missing in S are authentic elements in the Palaephatus story, and pivotal in the development of it. This eliminates even the chance that P might have himself added these elements to the story.

Another indication that Donatus was not the source of P is seen in some of the *variorum* annotations of the Servian corpus. Often an opinion given is attributed to a source that is named; more often the transition is marked by an impersonal introductory notice such as *alii dicunt*, *quidam volunt*, or *alii exponunt*. In many instances the note in P is found in S or D introduced by such a phrase.<sup>18</sup> In several of these instances, had P been using the Donatian commentary, he would have chosen a portion of the greater note to which less importance was attached, and neglected or omitted parts to which his "source" attached greater importance. It would be extremely difficult to attempt to analyze the taste or criteria of selection of the author of P; but it would still be agreed that were P using Donatus as his source, we should expect him to pay some heed to that portion of the note treated with most favor and in most detail, rather than pass over it in favor of one briefly alluded to, apparently, for the purpose of completeness.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> E. g., *Ecl.*, IV, 34; VI, 42; 61; 78; VII, 61; IX, 47; *Georg.*, I, 12; 47; 60-3; and there are many others.

<sup>19</sup> E. g., the notes to *Ecl.*, IV, 34. The material in P is found to be a small portion of the more complete note of D. If D had been the source,

Whereas it might seem irregular that one extracting material and interpretations from a greater body of commentary would neglect the more important elements in favor of the less important, it would be much more unlikely that such an author, gathering information from a source reliable for its judgment and completeness, would take information which the source had pronounced incorrect, especially when the source gave reason for the rejection and sponsored one or more acceptable explanations of the problem. In (3) above, P repeats both derivations given by S, even though one was actively supported by S and the other definitely stated incorrect. The notes to *Georg.*, I, 18 furnish a better example. D refers the reader to his discussion at line 12. At the beginning of that note D recognized two possible readings, *fudit aquam* and *fudit equum*, and chose *equum*, giving reasons for his preference. The P note on line 18 could not have been included in D, since D has committed himself to the reading *equum*. Further, if the D note in its original form had been P's source, P would have been giving a note based on a reading which the "source" discouraged.<sup>20</sup>

Some other explanation of the relationship of P with the Servian scholia must be found. The Servian author has clearly consulted and included in his great *variorum* commentary the work of many previous commentators. A possible solution to our problem could be that the P commentary was one of these sources used by Donatus. Such a thesis would explain the occurrence of the same material in the two commentaries. It would explain the notes which are not related: in those instances Donatus had not chosen to use the P material. Where the P and Servian notes contradict, Donatus disagreed with the view expressed in P, but recognized it to refute it. However, even if our assumption were that the author of the Servian scholia had drawn on P only in those notes which offer indication of identity, there are still in those notes several instances of the Servian note containing information and details not found in the corresponding P note.

In (5) above, D adds to the story preserved in P an additional P would have passed up the major part of the note, as well as the standard etymology, to choose for his note a lesser element.

<sup>20</sup> See also the notes on *Georg.*, III, 46-9; 345; 27 on *victoris . . . Quirini*.

etymology, which is supported by extension of the story to include subsequent events connecting Achelous and Hercules. The notes of P and D are the same in detail, but D has an additional element. In (1), the derivation of *fana* from *Faunus* is found in P and in D, but D preserves as well an intermediate stage of the derivation, *faunae*, and the further derivation of *fanaticus* from *fana*. There is no mention of Evander in P. (7) above showed that the whole matter of the P note on *Ecl.*, IX, 47 corresponds to what is in D a detail used to enrich the D derivation, and there is consequently in D much not preserved in P. It was seen that the P note makes no sense at all unless it is compared with the parallel D note and recognized as the same note much abbreviated. This abbreviation made by P is the clue to the exact relationship of P and the Servian corpus.

Many students of the scholia which bear the name of Probus have concluded that they are abbreviated extracts of a greater commentary. They explain the "silly and useless" notes as interpolations.<sup>21</sup> If the two commentaries are related, but neither is in descent from the other, then they must be related through a common source. This mutual source we will call P'.<sup>22</sup> For Donatus this P' commentary was one of the many works consulted. We submit that the "Proban" commentary as we have it contains a stratum, at least, of scholia descending from P', in some cases much abbreviated. In the case of those P notes which show no relationship with parallel Servian notes, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether they represent P'

<sup>21</sup> O. Jahn, *Auli Persii Flacci Satirarum Liber* (Leipzig, 1843), *Proleg.*, pp. cxlvii-clii, accepted by Reifferscheid, *C. Suetoni Tranquilli Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1860), p. 398; Ribbeck, *Prolegomena Critica ad P. Vergili Maronis Opera Maiora* (Leipzig, 1866), pp. 163-5; F. Marx, *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1904), *Proleg.*, pp. lxxii-lxxv; I. Aistermann, *De M. Valerio Probo Berytio* (Bonn, 1910), pp. 72-80.

<sup>22</sup> This conclusion was suggested by B. Keubler, *De M. Valerii Probi Berytii Commentariis Vergilianis* (Berlin, 1881), pp. 39 f., whose study of the discussion of the origin of Bucolic poetry found in P and in the Servian corpus led him to conjecture that these discussions go back to a common source. Funaioli, *Esegesi Virgiliana antica* (Milan, 1930), pp. 240 f., found that in some instances the same note is found in P and in the remains of the work of Junius Philargyrius. His conclusion that the Philargyrian material and the P note both go back to a commentator which the author of the D scholia used is, in so far as P is concerned, the conclusion to which this study has come.



material not used by Donatus or are inserted into and among the P' notes preserved in P.

This thesis resolves all aspects of the problem. It explains the occurrence in both commentaries of the same original note. There are no word-for-word similarities of phraseology to indicate connection, but P notes are shortened from the form of P', which is the link with S and D. Details found in Servian notes, and not in P, are likewise explained. The problem of P notations for which there is nothing similar or comparable is resolved: Donatus did not, of course, include all the views of any of his predecessors; he mentioned them only when he considered them suitable for his own purposes, whether as a possible explanation of the Vergilian passage or for critical review. There are details in P which are not found in the parallel Servian note: we expect the author of a *variorum* commentary making extensive use of the work of previous scholars to abbreviate the expression of their interpretations, often simply to refer to them.

There have been those who, in studying the P commentary, have concluded that there is in it a body of scholia actually going back to Marcus Valerius Probus, published by his students.<sup>23</sup> But whether or not we consider P' the publication of the ideas of that early notable of Vergilian studies, as a source of Donatus, if for no other reason, it and the commentary which today bears his name occupy an important place in the development of Vergilian exegesis.

HILBURN WOMBLE.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>23</sup> Jahn, Ribbeck, Marx, Aistermann, *op. cit.*; also E. K. Rand, "Once More Vergil's Birthplace," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIV (1933), pp. 82 f.

## SOME VIRGILIAN BEATITUDES.

In the works of Virgil we find a fair number of "beatitudes" or *makarismoi*, more or less fixed expressions which ascribe happiness to a person for the possession of some object or quality. Typical formulas are: *felix qui*, *fortunatus qui*, *beati qui*. To an inquiring mind two questions may naturally suggest themselves: first, whence did Virgil derive these beatitude-formulas? Secondly, what can we learn about his personal ideas of happiness from a study of the content of these beatitudes? When he speaks in his own person, as in *Georg.*, II, 490 ff., there is no difficulty about his own sentiments. But when he speaks through the mouth of others, as generally in the *Eclogues* and *Aeneid*, how can we be reasonably sure that these thoughts are his own? Only if we can find other passages and different contexts where these sentiments are often repeated.<sup>1</sup> While a study of these beatitudes may not give us a complete picture of Virgil's ideas of happiness, it will at least help us to divine the direction in which his mind was moving at various periods of his life.

The first question, whence came these beatitude-formulas, is easily answered: Virgil found them in the Greek poets he knew and loved so well.<sup>2</sup> So, for example, his *terque quaterque beati* (*Aen.*, I, 94) is a close imitation of *Odyssey*, V, 306 ff. From time immemorial, it seems, men had often expressed their ideals of happiness in such set phrases: *olbios*, *makar(ios)*, *eudaimon hostis*. So it was in Homer and Hesiod, in Theognis, Pindar, and Euripides, to mention only a few, that Virgil found these formulas.<sup>3</sup> The happiness of which these poets speak is generally earthly felicity, to be achieved in this life. When in time the mystery-religions appeared, they eagerly laid hold of these old

<sup>1</sup> The old *Vitae Vergilianae*, especially that by Donatus, also may give some help. Cf., for example, A. Rostagni, *Suetonio de Poetis* (Turin, repr. 1956), pp. 94-5, notes.

<sup>2</sup> Of course Virgil may have found some of these formulas in the old Latin poets or in common speech. But the main influence, I believe, came from the Greek poets. Cf. Heinze's note to Horace's Epode II, "*Beatus ille*."

<sup>3</sup> For a good list of typical Greek beatitudes, see E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Stuttgart, 4th ed., repr. 1956), p. 100, note.

expressions. But now they acquired a deeper meaning. They became *hieroi logoi*, promises of bliss in the world to come, based on a religious experience in this life.<sup>4</sup>

The three Greek words for "lucky" or "happy" originally had different connotations. *Makar(ios)* suggested that a man was like the blessed gods in his good fortune; *olbios* had its face turned towards material blessings; *eudaimon* once meant a man with a good *daimon* or god who assigned him a good lot; gradually it came to mean simply a man with a good portion in life.<sup>5</sup> But such distinctions are often blurred in the poets and we find Theognis using all three words in a single verse (1013). This may explain why Latin poets like Virgil and Horace use rather indifferently any one of three Latin words for "happy": *felix*, *fortunatus*, *beatus*.

In conclusion, it seems clear that Virgil inherited these old formulas from the Greek poets. Occasionally, for pathetic effect, he uses a conditional form. So Dido, soon to die, exclaims (*Aen.*, IV, 657-8):

felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum  
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae.

For the content of his beatitudes Virgil ranged farther afield. Directly or indirectly he derived his ideas of happiness from the older Greek and Hellenistic moral philosophers who had speculated on this theme. For, to quote Festugière, "le Grec n'a jamais changé quant à l'universalité de cette fin (*eudaimonia*). Il n'a jamais admis que l'homme pût tendre, en définitive, à autre chose qu'à être heureux. C'était la pour lui l'une de ces vérités incontestables, s'imposant à tous, qui, dans l'ordre de la pratique, tiennent le rang de principe premier, de prémisses au syllogisme."<sup>6</sup> Let us briefly review what one influential Greek philosopher thought about happiness. For, as we shall see, his ideas coincide rather closely with those of Virgil.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Norden, *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 100 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For *eudaimon*, cf. A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris, 1950), pp. 269 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 5), p. 276, note.

<sup>7</sup> Virgil was surely acquainted with some of Aristotle's ideas on happiness, at least indirectly from handbooks and from Cicero's works. The latter had used Aristotle's *Protrepticus* for his *Hortensius*, while he cites or refers to the dialogue *On Philosophy* in his *Nat. Deor.*

At the outset of his inquiry into the nature of *eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095a 20), Aristotle says: "both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that the highest good is happiness . . . ; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise."<sup>8</sup> After a long dialectical discussion, he draws his final conclusions in Book X (1177a 10 ff.). The highest happiness for man must consist in the highest activity proper to man. This is *theoria* or contemplation, in which the intellect finds its perfection in the direct knowledge of its proper objects, the realities revealed to man by metaphysics and other studies. Such a life is most like that of the gods and Aristotle praises it with unusual warmth (1177b 30): "We must not, as people counsel, think humanly, being human, nor as mortals, being mortal, but as far as it may be we must put on the life of the Immortals and do all we can to live according to what is best in us."<sup>9</sup> But Aristotle knew that, if all men are in theory called to such a contemplative life, only a few in fact choose it. For man is not pure intellect but a composite being set in the midst of his fellows in the *polis*. Most men find their happiness in the life of virtuous action and this is the best life for man in so far as he is merely human. For this reason he dedicates the first nine books of the *Ethics* to a study of the virtues of man *qua* citizen. And what of those external goods of which the poets had made so much? "Being a man," he says, "one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body must be healthy. . . ."

After Aristotle came the Stoics, whose moral principles (e. g. *vivere secundum naturam*) were drawn not merely from an analysis of man *in se* but from their doctrine of the Cosmos and man's immanent relation to the divine Logos which penetrates all things. For them happiness consisted in a life in conformity with the divine Reason in the world and in man. Stoicism

<sup>8</sup> I have used the English translation of *The Works of Aristotle* (ed. by W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1915). Cf. also H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 287 ff.

<sup>9</sup> At the conclusion of the earlier *Eudemian Ethics* (VIII, 3, 1249b 20), philosophic contemplation is described as *the* means to man's moral perfection. "Everything, whether possession or action, is morally bad and reprehensible if it hinders a man from serving and knowing God."

made a strong impact on many educated Romans thanks to Posidonius and others. For these neo-Stoics humanized the rigid dogmas of early Stoicism and came to terms with much of traditional Roman religious and ethical thought. By Cicero's day a new philosophic *koine* had come into being, drawn from common elements in various systems, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic. So, when Virgil began to ponder the problem of human happiness, he had a wealth of ideas from which to choose. Like the Psalmist, he might well have cried: *Quis ostendet nobis bona?* In a world of chaos and moral disintegration, where could a man find the way to beatitude?

For the world in which he lived was a chaos (*G.*, I, 505 ff.) :

quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem,  
tam multae scelerum facies. . . .  
vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes  
arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe.

In a world of moral relativism, where could he find unchanging principles? In a world of disorder, where could he find order? What he needed to ensure peace of heart was a knowledge of the World and man's place therein, a liberating knowledge that would free him and others through him from gnawing anxiety and fear. So he turned to the Garden of Siro at Naples (*Catalepton*, 5, 8-10) :

nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus,  
magni petentes docta dicta Sironis  
vitamque ab omni vindicabimus cura.

He was impressed by the gospel according to Epicurus (cf. *Ecl.* VI). But Epicurean rationalism and materialism could not satisfy him for good. Lucretius the poet laid a spell on him, but his "scientific" explanation of the *maiestas cognita rerum* left a void that must somehow be filled. For Virgil, as we divine from his poetry, had a soul whose gravitational force carried him beyond sensible phenomena to the Author or Power behind it all.<sup>10</sup> In all his works we see a man of delicate sensibility confronting the deep, dark mystery of life and groping his way to an understanding and love of the order and the *Mens* that

<sup>10</sup> Cf. F. Klingner, *Römische Geisteswelt* (Wiesbaden, 2nd ed., 1952), pp. 208-9.

must be there. We turn to his beatitudes to see where his search for happiness led him.

*Ecl.* I opens with the picture of a happy and an unhappy man: Tityrus, lying at ease, singing and piping; Meliboeus, heartsick, going off to exile. Through question and answer the bucolic mime unfolds before us against a dark background of disorder, injustice, and human suffering. Then, in line 46 (repeated in 51) we meet our first beatitude, spoken by Meliboeus: *Fortunate senex, ergo tua rura manebunt. . . .* "You, Tityrus, are happy because your little home is secured to you with its simple delights; I am a homeless wanderer and can nevermore be happy; *carmina nulla canam.*" We ask ourselves: did then Virgil think that happiness depends on external things, on having a *patria*, a home and enough to live by?

Now Virgil knew as well as his friend Horace that the essence of happiness lay within a man rather than without. Perhaps he recalled the saying of Democritus: "Happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is the dwelling of the *daimon*."<sup>11</sup> But, like Aristotle and others, he well knew that, for most men, happiness does in fact depend on certain externals. So the Jews in exile by the waters of Babylon, when asked for songs by their captors, made answer (*Ps.* 136): "How can we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?" How could a homeless, hungry exile be humanly happy, unless he were of heroic temper, a Socrates or a Stoic sage? In this poem Virgil is voicing the complaints of all those who suffered in those troubled years, but he voices also the feelings of others upon whom, as in Tityrus' case, a ray of hope had shone. It is probable that he also had suffered personal loss. At all events, the theme of the loss of home and the sorrows of exile runs through much of his poetry. The *Aeneid* is full of exiles: Aeneas himself, Dido, Evander, and others. Death, far from home and loved ones, always brings poignant regret. So Aeneas in the storm (*Aen.*, I, 94 ff.) envies the lot of those who fell at Troy *ante ora patrum*.<sup>12</sup> At Carthage (I, 437 ff.), he sees homes arising and sighs: *O fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt.* All through

<sup>11</sup> Democ. 171. For the pre-Socratics I have used H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 7th ed., 1954).

<sup>12</sup> See V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck-Wien, 1950), p. 59.



the first part of the epic Aeneas is a man of memories, racked by homesickness. The other exiles he meets have found a home, but he seems destined to wander forever, seeking *sedes quietas*, a new home and a new happiness.

The events of the years in which Virgil was writing the *Eclogues* (42-39 B. C.) filled many hearts with an unbearable tension. The Roman world was crowded with displaced persons. And it was for these unhappy souls that Virgil spoke out in *Ecl.* I and IX. But, unlike the Horace of *Epode XVI*, he did not despair. Through Tityrus, *fortunatus senex*, he expressed his hopes in the future: *pascite ut ante boves, pueri; summittite tauros.*

The *Georgics* were written (37-30 B. C.), not to give technical advice on farming, but for a deeper purpose. In *G.*, I, 41, Virgil speaks of the farmers as *ignaros viae*. Now what is this "way" of which he speaks? Is it merely the *colendi via* of *G.*, I, 121-2, the proper methods of husbandry which, perhaps, the old countrymen have neglected or the new ones, the veterans, have never known? Here, I believe, the *via* which he will teach the farmer is a way of life, the *hodos* or *bios* of which the Greeks had often spoken.<sup>13</sup> All through the *Georgics*, while he seems to be giving practical advice on farming, he is really intent on teaching men the inner meaning and worth of such a life. And that is the true function of his "digressions." So, in *G.*, I, he stresses *labor inprobus*. But in a myth (121 ff.) he gives the purpose of it all: by Jupiter's will, labor is the means by which man achieves self-perfection and happiness. Thus work has a deeper meaning than in Hesiod. In *G.*, II, he dwells on the brighter, more idyllic side of country-life, especially in the *laudes Italiae* (138 ff.). Work is again stressed (397 ff.), with echoes of Hesiod and old Cato, and stressed also is the worship of the gods. Then, after praising the trees which yield so much at the cost of so little pains, he exclaims (458-9): *O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint, agricolas!* That is the "way," the *via beate vivendi*, that he would teach them. He would give them eyes to see and hearts to feel the true *bona* that are already theirs.

The picture he paints here goes far deeper than that in *Ecl.* I.

<sup>13</sup> For *hodos* as "the way of salvation" see W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 98 ff.

As there, external blessings are lovingly described (469 ff.): *speluncae vivique lacus et frigida tempe/mugitusque boum mollesque sub arbore somni*. But here it is the moral wholesomeness of such a life over which he lingers. *Facilis victus* is theirs, but also peace, far from war's alarms, reverence for old age, religious rites, and a sense of justice.<sup>14</sup> Country-life, says Virgil, keeps men free from the fear, envy, and ambition that rack the city-dweller; it gives what philosophy often promised—peace of soul—but it gives it more simply and naturally. In the country there still remained the old morally wholesome life by which Rome had risen to greatness. Such a life, with its purer teachings, was a living relic of the ideal past of Rome, a simple life lived in a spiritual atmosphere. For the gods were everywhere, ready to aid if man did his part.<sup>15</sup>

We can hardly doubt that these are heartfelt convictions of Virgil. He was a country boy who, after living in large cities, had withdrawn to a retreat at Naples. He seldom visited Rome though he had a house there, preferring the quiet of Campania or Sicily.<sup>16</sup> In *Aen.*, VIII, when he brings Aeneas to the site of later Rome, he dwells on the poverty and happy simplicity of life there: *aude hospes contemnere opes*. In all this, he was of one mind with Augustus and Horace and other thoughtful Romans of his day.<sup>17</sup>

We come now to our last and best known beatitudes. In the midst of his praises of country-life the poet pauses to reveal his own heart's desire (*G.*, II, 475 ff.): "May the Muses give me welcome and a knowledge of heavenly things: *caelique vias et sidera monstrent*. But if my nature be unsuited for this kind of knowledge, may I love the country, its charms and its gods." Then come the beatitudes (490 ff.):

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum

<sup>14</sup> On this subject Klingner, *op. cit.* (note 10), pp. 226 ff., is excellent.

<sup>15</sup> Horace felt much the same about the country. Cf. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 313 and 320.

<sup>16</sup> "Habuitque domum Romae . . . quamquam secessu Campaniae Siciliaeque plurimum uteretur," *Vita Donati* (ed. by C. Hardie, Oxford, 1954), lines 42-3.

<sup>17</sup> The ideals of Horace and Augustus are well described by F. Solmsen, "Horace's First Roman Ode," in *A. J. P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 342 ff.

subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.  
 Fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis,  
 Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores.

In words reminiscent of Lucretius he calls the man *felix* who has attained a knowledge of the causes of things and is thus freed of idle fears of death and an afterlife.<sup>18</sup> Is his ambition, then, merely to write another *De Rerum Natura* in the spirit of Lucretius? The whole spiritual mood of the *Georgics* up to this point militates against such a view.<sup>19</sup> Virgil admires indeed the boldness of Lucretius and the deep earnestness of his work, but not his rationalism. In this passage he is thinking, beyond Lucretius, of other philosopher-poets and especially of Empedocles who once had written the beatitude: "Happy is he who has acquired the riches of divine thoughts, but miserable the man in whose mind dwells an obscure opinion about the gods."<sup>20</sup> Empedocles had been at once a poet, a philosopher, and a mystic whose nature impelled him "to devote himself with understanding and reverence to the world about him and the interplay of its forces."<sup>21</sup> He had written a poem *On Nature* in which he had called on his Muse to give him knowledge and the gift of reverent song (frg. B 3). His doctrine of Love and Strife which alternately rule the world might well appeal to Virgil as he surveyed his own chaotic world.

The hieratic tone of the *felix qui* passage, which Norden traces back, via Lucretius, to Empedocles and the mystery-cults, shows Virgil's intense sincerity and piety.<sup>22</sup> As priest of the Muses he yearns to devote himself to a study of Nature, not in the pragmatic spirit of Epicurus and Lucretius, but in the reverent spirit of Empedocles and of Plato. And, to understand this quasi-mystical yearning of his heart in this context, where he is praising the moral purity of country-life, we must look back and see what religion had come to mean to many cultured

<sup>18</sup> Cf. P. Boyancé, "Le sens cosmique de Virgile," in *R. E. L.*, XXXII (1954), pp. 235 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Klingner has always stressed the religious inspiration of the *Georgics*. Cf. his chapter on Virgil in *L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide* (Entretiens Hardt, Geneva, 1956).

<sup>20</sup> Emped. 132 (Diels-Kranz).

<sup>21</sup> Jaeger, *op. cit.* (note 13), p. 125.

<sup>22</sup> Norden, *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 100 ff.

Romans of Virgil's day. For such an inquiry is closely connected with the quest for happiness.

By Cicero's time, says Festugière, the religion of the Cosmos and the Cosmic God was a pagan dogma, the private religion of most educated Romans.<sup>23</sup> Its gospel, in a sense, was Plato's *Timaeus*, which Shorey has called "a prose poem of science, a hymn of the universe, Plato's *De Rerum Natura*."<sup>24</sup> In that work the visible world, the Cosmos, and the visible gods, the stars, were described as most worthy objects of religious contemplation and worship. Later on the *Epinomis*, Aristotle's dialogue *On Philosophy*, and Stoic doctrines spread these ideas among the educated. For men who found no intellectual satisfaction in the civic worship, true piety and religion now consisted in contemplating the order in the heavens and in bringing a similar harmony into one's own soul. For in this, as Plato had declared in the *Timaeus* (90 A 2 ff.), lay true happiness. And for this the study of physics, especially astronomy, and mathematics was of the highest value. In the Hellenistic Age, because of the great interest in scientific studies, this Cosmic religion broadened into a doctrine of the universal presence of God on earth as in the heavens. And Cicero, in his *De Natura Deorum* and *Somnium Scipionis* as well as by his translation of part of the *Timaeus*, is a witness to the intense interest such ideas awakened in thoughtful Romans.<sup>25</sup> Such in brief was the climate of religious thought in which Virgil lived and moved, and such too is the broad context into which we must fit these beatitudes.

Virgil has just called the farmers happy, *sua si bona norint*.

<sup>23</sup> Père Festugière has given a masterly summary of this Cosmic Religion in *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, II, *Le dieu cosmique* (Paris, 1949).

<sup>24</sup> *C. P.*, XXIII (1928), p. 343.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Festugière, *op. cit.* (note 23), pp. 424-5. In a recent essay, "Posidonius," *J. R. S.*, XLIX (1959), pp. 13 ff., A. D. Nock has urged that "Posidonius was the cause of a new enthusiasm about physical phenomena in general which came to be in the air and to affect people who need not be thought to have opened even an epitome of one of his treatises." His concluding words may well apply to Virgil: "Posidonius did not remake the Stoa, but he greatly enlarged men's concept of the divine in the universe and in their breasts and it may be that, like the author of the Fourth Gospel, he was the cause of mysticism in others without being himself a mystic."

And, as their *vates*, he has tried to reveal these *bona*. But, for himself now (*Me vero*), he feels a longing for a still higher beatitude such as Plato had described so movingly in the *Timaeus*. He yearns for that peace of heart which only a reverent and enlightened study and contemplation of heavenly things could bring: *caelique vias et sidera monstrent*. Let us try to follow the workings of his mind here and see what has given rise to such an aspiration.

The *Georgics* are an act of faith in and love of the *iustissima tellus* and its benevolent forces. But, as early as *G.*, I, 204 ff., the poet's vision widens and he sees the farmer's work in the broad perspective of cosmic order and providential design (353 ff.):

ipse pater statuit quid menstrua luna moneret,  
quo signo caderent Austri, quid saepe videntes  
agricolae propius stabulis armenta tenerent.

Now Virgil was a realist who knew that the farmer's world was not all sunshine and *ver assiduum*. There are sudden storms which ravage the ripening grain; there are pests and plagues which decimate the herds; all about the peasant as he works is *plurima mortis imago*. So there come times when the farmer—and perhaps the farmer's poet—may feel that the world is ruled only by chance and blind mechanical forces rather than by a benign *pater*. Hence in the *Georgics* that variation of tone between joy and sadness, hopefulness and dejection which makes them a “conception dramatique du monde.” One senses that at times the mood of Hesiod and Lucretius cast dark shadows over Virgil's mind. But in the end the brighter mood prevails, the *pondus* of his love for Nature gains the victory over doubt. Already, in *Ecl.* IV and V, he had affirmed his faith and hope in a world that seemed falling to pieces. And in the *Georgics* also, to quote Büchner, there is “ein gläubiges Weltbild, das . . . in dem Drückenden, Schweren und Hässlichen immer wieder Sinn aufweist. Ein Glaube, der nicht nur nicht am Sinn verzweifelt, sondern immer wieder Bestätigung dieses Glaubens in der Welt findet. . . .”<sup>26</sup> And by now this faith in a providential world-order was a *fides quaerens intellectum*. Where could it find better confirmation of order in Nature and the presence of a

<sup>26</sup> P. Vergilius Maro, *der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1957), col. 315.

Mind working for good than in the harmonious movements of the heavenly bodies? So, at a time of grave spiritual crisis, had felt Plato as he wrote the *Timaeus* and *Laws*; so Aristotle in his work *On Philosophy*; so the Stoics, whose ideas had found eloquent expression in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*.

But such a study of the mysterious phenomena in the heavens (*G.*, II, 477-8) and their no less mysterious influence on the earth (479 ff.) and on the microcosm that was man called for great natural aptitude and years of leisure. Virgil hopes and prays—but his hour is not yet come. Meanwhile, he would devote himself to the task at hand for which he felt well fitted. He would sing the praises of the *divini gloria ruris* and the gods of the country. For in that too lay a true happiness, in a life in harmony with the Nature he had always loved: *fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis*. Lucretius had written some lovely lines about the satyrs, nymphs, and Pan of popular belief (*R. N.*, IV, 580 ff.). But his chill science had blown them away into airy nothingness. Virgil felt differently. For him, the omnipresence of the divine power was manifest: in Ceres who ripens the corn, in Bacchus who fills the grape with juice, in bees and birds and every living thing. In Lucretius, man is alone in a world of atomic forces, fighting his battle unaided by the gods; in Virgil, man is surrounded by divine forces, *agrestum praesentia numina*, ready to aid if man does his part, *laborando et orando*. For Virgil Pan, Silvanus, and the Nymphs are symbols of those invisible forces operative in the farmer's world, manifestations, in special spheres and functions, of the Cosmic *Mens* which ruled the world. And they appealed to his imagination as a poet. So, until the time comes and the Muses inspire him with a deeper knowledge of the Cosmos, he will sanctify himself by singing of the country-gods and in that find his happiness.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> For a different interpretation of this passage one may consult W. Richter, *Vergil, Georgica* (Munich, 1957), pp. 254 ff., and Inez Scott Ryberg, "Vergil's Golden Age," in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 123 ff. Richter sees much Virgilian irony here; the prayer to the Muses is not seriously meant but merely expresses Virgil's high esteem for earlier poets who had written *de rerum natura*. In fact, Virgil "opfert das Grosse und ist gewiss, das Grössere zu gewinnen." I still believe the appeal to the Muses comes from the heart. In *Aen.*, I, 742 ff., where parts of this passage are repeated, Iopas may, as Boyancé suggests, be



Such are the beatitudes of Virgil and the insights they give us into the mind and heart of a great poet. In the world of the *Bucolics* there is the *fortunatus senex*, Tityrus, happy because he has a humble home and simple delights. Without some external goods human life is intolerable for most men and happiness a mirage. In the world of the *Georgics* the farmers would be happy, if only they realized their blessedness. For they have not only external goods but also all the means of leading a life of moral virtue and thus attaining a true beatitude. But still higher in the scale of happiness, Virgil saw, was the life dedicated to the philosophic and religious contemplation of celestial things and eternal verities. For therein lay the truest knowledge and the surest joy: *gaudium de veritate*.<sup>28</sup>

FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S. J.

ST. ANDREW-ON-HUDSON,  
POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y.

the type of cosmic poet that Virgil dreamed of becoming. At any rate, both the works of Virgil (*Ecl.*, III, 40 ff.; VI, 31 ff.; *Aen.*, I, 742 ff.) and the Suetonian *Vita* suggest that Virgil was deeply interested in natural philosophy to the end of his life. Cf. Rostagni, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 54 and 143, notes.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *Conf.*, X, 23: "beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate; hoc est enim gaudium de Te qui veritas es. . . ." Posidonius held that man's highest good was "to live contemplating the truth and order of all things and doing one's part in helping to establish that order, without being in any way led by the unreasoning part of the soul." Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, II, 21, 129, and the remarks of Nock, *op. cit.* (note 25), p. 12.

## A POSTSCRIPT ON HORACE, *CARM.*, I, 2.

At the outset I must stress that what follows is a continuation of thoughts suggested by Professor Steele Commager's illuminating article in the *American Journal of Philology* for January, 1959 (LXXX, pp. 37-55). Both the foundation of scholarship (and in particular the remarkably full bibliographical citations) and the broad lines of analysis, for which many must feel grateful to Commager, are here taken as read. My purpose is only to suggest some ways in which, with respect, I believe his analysis can usefully be extended.

Commager argues that this ode, addressed to a triumphant Octavian in 29 B. C., should be read as a warning and a plea for mercy to defeated enemies and for a turning outwards, against outsiders, of the vengeful spirit of civil war. "The ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans" (p. 47).<sup>1</sup> The destructive vengeance of Tiber for the wrongs of Ilia (lines 13 ff.) is to be read, not as a noble example, but as a warning against excess (see especially pp. 41-2). It is well shown (p. 38) how this twin theme of vengeance and excess is pointed up by the words Horace uses: *ultor* and *inultos* repeating at lines 18-44-51, with *scelus* at line 29; *iam satis* (1), *nimum* and *iactat* (17-18) and *nimis* (37), balanced by *minus* (27).

For this interpretation of the ode the phrase *patiens vocari Caesaris ultor* (43-4) is clearly crucial. The gist of the passage in which it stands (29-44) is this: 'To whom will Jupiter give the role of expiating the crime?—to Apollo?—Or Venus?—or Mars?—Or to you, son of gentle Maia (i. e. Mercury), dwelling on earth in human form and allowing yourself to be called Caesar's avenger.' As we have seen, Commager ably argues against the view that this is to be read as an exhortation to Octavian to punish the enemies of Caesar, his adoptive father, a reading on which has been hung the interpretation of the

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, line references throughout are to Horace, *Carm.*, I, 2, and page references to Prof. Steele Commager's article on that ode quoted above. I should like to thank Prof. J. M. T. Charlton of the University College of North Staffordshire, England, for his reading and careful discussion of the article with me. The views expressed remain my sole responsibility.

whole ode as a recantation by the once Republican Horace. Commager recurs to his point several times, rephrasing it in various ways, each of which still leaves a vague sense of difficulty, of a lump in the otherwise smooth texture of the argument. I believe this can be resolved if we see in this phrase an invitation to Octavian to assume *Caesaris ultor* as a quasi-official title which, as is natural with a title enshrining a specific exploit, views that exploit *in retrospect*. I quote from Commager's article: "Horace had come less to praise Caesar than to bury him (p. 38). . . . The coming savior's task is threefold: to save the empire from civil wars, to expiate the Romans' *scelus*"—which, standing where it does, clearly refers to civil war in general (25-9), even if line 44 shows that it includes Caesar's murder (see especially p. 42)—"and, as we infer from line forty-four, to avenge the death of Caesar. . . . The Ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans. . . . The phrase *Caesaris ultor* (44) is by its context rendered almost ironic.<sup>2</sup> Jove himself has disapproved Tiber's punishment of the Romans, whether for Caesar's murder or for a more general *scelus*. To exact vengeance would be to perpetuate the sin of civil war rather than expiate it, to renew the past and not redeem it (p. 47). . . . Horace may now introduce the adjective *almus* . . . thus suggesting the character Mercury, and by extension, Octavian, is to display. . . . If . . . Horace proposes 'the son of gentle Maia' as *Caesaris ultor*, his implication is clear: there is to be no vengeance (p. 49). . . . In dispatching his peace-loving son Jove declares his will: *iam satis*. . . . The *Caesaris ultor* (44) must transmute the type of Tiber's vengeance, *iactat ultorem* (18), into punishment of the Medes" (p. 51).

Undoubtedly the cumulative effect of this reasoning is to overpower the common idea which would attach the ode specifically to the murder of Julius Caesar, and to show that Horace is here,

<sup>2</sup> The word "ironic" to describe the force of *Caesaris ultor* is perhaps the least happy of those used by Commager to try to pin the phrase down, and shows particularly well the need to look at the point again. So, too, on p. 47 after the words "to avenge the death of Caesar" Commager writes: "Horace does not grant to the last the initial importance of the other two." Cf. what is said below about "playing down" the Ides of March.

as so often, concerned to exorcise the spectre of renewed civil strife. But in order to make his point Commager has been forced to play down those passages to which the erroneous interpretation particularly appeals, namely, Jove's portents at the opening of the ode (1-4), the avenging of Ilia (17-18) and, above all, the avenging of Caesar himself (43-4). One feels that if (as I believe) Commager is right about the ode, Horace could have made a clearer appeal to bury the past by avoiding any mention of Julius Caesar, above all in association with the idea of vengeance. Let us therefore look again at these three passages.

First, the portents. (See also footnote 12.) Commager points out that they do not seem to refer to the famous series of prodigies that are supposed to have followed Caesar's death, omitting as they do the most striking items from that passage in the first Georgic (Verg., *G.*, I, 466 ff.) which does refer to that event and which was known to the author and readers of our ode (pp. 40-1). Yet, while accepting that these opening portents do not proclaim a poem on the expiation of the Ides of March, it is hard to think that any talk of portents in 29 B. C. (especially among persons acquainted with the first Georgic) could have failed to *associate* that event, even while an overt reference to it is at this point deliberately avoided. A rough parallel might be if one were to speak of mushroom clouds in the years after the war and not expect that to associate the thought of Hiroshima, and that just after a great poem had recently described the manifestations that followed the first atomic bomb.

Thus the murder of Caesar, as distinct from the spirit of civil strife in general, is indeed present from the beginning of the ode as an undertone. It sounds again, I think (in spite of Commager, pp. 41-2), in the Tiber-Ilia passage. The key word here is *uxorius* (15-16). Surely it is impossible that this word, associated with a figure that threatens Rome in her very Roman-ness as symbolized by Vesta, could have sounded in Roman ears in 29 B. C. without associating Mark Antony. To think that it could seems far more improbable than the interpretation of the passage in which this association involves us. It is that Tiber stands for Antony, and that Ilia has a double reference. Superficially, since she must give point to *uxorius*, she is Cleopatra. But behind the later Antony who would sacrifice Rome to his

"wife" stands the earlier Antony who was, after all, co-partner with Octavian in the avenging of Julius.<sup>3</sup> His career in that role, however, had forsaken the path of true and legitimate vengeance (cf. *vagus*, 18) for an ill-starred course (suggested by *sinistra*, 18) which came to threaten the Roman heritage (symbolized by Vesta, 16, cf. 28) with extinction. Assuredly it remains true that the passage is not giving Octavian a noble model to follow. But perhaps it is not a warning either, but rather the portrait of one career that is of a piece with the portrait of this whole age of portents, to be set in contrast with the coming portrait of a very different career and a very different age.

The murder of Caesar remains in the background during the lines which speak explicitly of general civil war (21-5), especially in the suggestive phrase *acuisse ferrum* and in the word *scelus* (29). Then at last in lines 43-4 it becomes overt, pointed up as it is by the key word *ultor*. The recurrence of this word is not a case of sheer iteration. If we link the three points at which it occurs together, we find a progression whose stages punctuate the ode as a whole. The first *ultor* (17-18) stands fairly in the past: *Vidimus flavum Tiberim . . .*, as does the whole opening section of the ode down to line 20.<sup>4</sup> The second *ultor* (44) stands with a present verb, *imitaris*, while at the close of the poem *inultos* stands with a jussive subjunctive whose reference is future (51). Alongside this temporal progression there is a parallel moral progression. The first carries explicit rejection; the last, hopeful anticipation; and the crucial middle one, with its *patiens vocari*, acceptance. Thus we pass in the

<sup>3</sup>It is tempting to pursue the symbolism of this passage further. Tiber, the river of Rome (*Pater Tiberinus*, etc.) represents Antony, the true Roman; *litus Etruscum* represents what is foreign, and hostile, to Rome, and so its violent influence over the river's waters represents Cleopatra's influence over Antony's life and actions. Turning to the name *Ilia*, it is particularly well suited to carry the double association here suggested. In its primary sense of "the Trojan one" (*Ilium*) it will suggest the East and Cleopatra. In its connexions with the origins of the Roman state and of its first king Romulus, through its assonance with Iulius and the legend of a genealogical link from Aeneas with the Gens Iulia (all of which I hesitate to discount as readily as does Commager) it serves to bring in the association with Caesar.

<sup>4</sup>*Vidimus* is the operative verb, since the tense of *iactat* is due to the peculiar rules applying to *dum*.

ode from a past rejection through a present acceptance to a future hope.

Present acceptance—of what, and by whom? If we are right in our interpretation of the vengeance of Tiber, then clearly we must approach this invitation to “Mercury” Octavian to “suffer himself to be called avenger of Caesar” as standing in implicit contrast with the earlier rejection of Mark Antony in that same role. Antony had arrogated that title to himself (*dum se iactat ultorem*) and had been repudiated in it by Jove; the divine emissary in human form who is acceptable to Jove, on the contrary, “suffers himself” to be called by it. He is acceptable not only to Jove but also to the Roman people—the *populus* of line 25<sup>5</sup>—in answer to whose prayer the saviour is sent. It is by them that he shall suffer himself to be called, to be hailed, by the name “Caesar’s Avenger.” And indeed there is cause for rejoicing for if, and only if, the avenger’s work is done is there hope of peace—a peace which neither god could grant nor man expect while Caesar’s blood cried to heaven.

But if Octavian is acceptable to god and man under this title, the title is to be acceptable above all to Octavian himself. Octavian seemingly liked to cast himself in the role of the “hero” of Greek legend and poetry,<sup>6</sup> which would lay it upon him as a sacred duty to avenge his “father” Julius Caesar. So at Philippi he vowed the temple *pro ultione paterna*. That

<sup>5</sup> The verb *voco* is also used in line 25, but in a different sense, viz. “call to aid,” and with a different construction from that of lines 43-4, where the passive infinitive is copulative in the manner of verbs of naming, becoming, etc.; cf. line 50 and *Carm.*, III, 24, 27-8.

<sup>6</sup> The role which was later symbolized by the head of Alexander on his coins—Alexander, who had cast himself as a second Achilles. With this connexion in mind it seems probable enough that the association would have occurred to the young Octavius, or to others, after the assassination of his adoptive father. To people as conscious of Hellenic parallelism as cultured Romans of this time were, the comparison with the young Alexander after the assassination of Philip, his father, would have seemed natural and significant. “Justice” through family vendetta is, of course, a well-defined institution of the pre-legal stage of Greek society from which the great legends were inherited; it does not seem to be at home in the native Roman tradition, whose legalistic bent is so much stronger than that of Greece. *Ultio Paterna* is not a concept of Roman law or even Roman traditional morality, but a fossil from Archaic Greek society preserved in literature.



is to say, he offered a prayer to be granted victory in the battle, in traditional manner, by promising the divine powers who should grant it an offering of thanksgiving *post eventum*. With Antony's help, through the proscriptions before Philippi and through the victory there, Caesar was indeed avenged—by 29 the last of his assassins had been executed. But Antony's claim to share in that glory has been discredited by his subsequent career. The glory thus remains to Octavian alone, and is to be formally conferred on him through the title *Caesaris Ultor*, whose very conferment is the mark of final completion. If Octavian will only "suffer himself" to be called by it, then the world will know that the bloody chapter of vengeance, and with it of civil strife, is at an end.

Thus the phrase *Caesaris ultor*, so far from being a source of possible uncertainty in Horace's attitude (let alone a partisan trumpet-call), sums up his theme—the theme of salvation and reconciliation—in a titular formula. Horace knew how to use the pregnant technical phraseology characteristic of the genius of Latin to heighten the Roman colouring of his lyric verse.<sup>7</sup> At the close of this ode no less than four such quasi-official titles are suggested by him: *Caesaris Ultor* (44), *Pater and Princeps* (50), and, possibly, *Dux* (52).<sup>8</sup> They are supported by the terms *populo Quirini* (46) and *triumphos* (49),<sup>9</sup> which strike

<sup>7</sup> Cf. e.g. *Carm.*, III, 1, 11 *petitor*; III, 5, 42 *capitis minor*.

<sup>8</sup> It seems likely that *dux* here has a more permanent connotation than that of commander in a particular campaign, so that the phrase *te duce* can be taken as an ablative of "time within which" to mean "during your leadership, viz. reign." Perhaps *princeps* (50) and *dux* (52) are complementary terms, representing the civil and the military head of state respectively, who are to be united in the person of Octavian for the duration of his rule, and that is to be a long one (45-6). Kiessling-Heinze (9th ed., 1958, *ad loc.*) reject any such interpretation of *pater*, *princeps*, and *dux*, but for no stated reason; contrast Wickham (3rd ed., 1896). Kiessling-Heinze (*ad loc.*) also note the increasing sense of presentness that runs through the preceding passage (29 ff.), and it was remarked above that the ode exhibits a particular progression from the tone of past rejection, through present acceptance, to hopeful anticipation. Now of the titles here put forward, *Caesaris Ultor* alone belongs to the phase of present acceptance. The others fall within the hoped-for "shape of things to come," and this may help to reduce any difficulty we might feel at finding these words in Horace's mouth as early as 29.

<sup>9</sup> I venture to resist Commager's suggestion (p. 53) that the *hic* . . .

the same official Roman note. In another passage, which recalls the lines under consideration in form as well as in sentiment (*Carm.*, III, 24, 25-8), Horace appeals to "whosoever would take from us kindred bloodshed and civil madness, if he shall desire to have *Pater Urbium* inscribed beneath his statues. . . ." <sup>10</sup> There is no question of statues in *Carm.*, I, 2, of course.<sup>11</sup> But

*hic* of lines 49-50 is a contrasting doublet, referring to the East and to Rome respectively. It seems more natural to take them as an emphatic doublet, reinforcing one another and the whole context. They mean "on earth," and, above all, "amongst us" where "we" are the Romans. With *populo Quirini* coming so close before it, the first *hic* would naturally suggest Rome, and the word *triumphos* immediately following would, after all, carry its traditional meaning of triumphal celebrations rather than the generalized idea of military successes, as Commager has it. So far from switching attention to the East, line 49 continues the appeal to local national sentiment intoned in line 46. This interpretation of *triumphos* admirably fits Commager's dating of the ode (pp. 52-4 and note 47). Octavian did celebrate triumphs, at Rome, in August of 29 B. C., and if the ode was written either just before or just after his return, these celebrations, whether forthcoming or recent, would naturally be in the mind of the poet and his readers if they were in Rome at the time. Thus *triumphos*, which Horace offers as one of the chief attractions to the disguised god to linger *in terris* (lines 41 ff.), suggest the metropolis' celebrations over her true, foreign, enemies, which, throughout a long reign, shall continue to symbolize Rome's dominion over the world, while at peace within herself.

<sup>10</sup> As in *Carm.*, I, 2, 43-4, so in III, 24, 25-8, Octavian, to whom the appeals must refer, is not named, and perhaps actually gains in stature thereby. It is worth noting that the grammatical construction in these two passages and in I, 2, 50 is parallel, which adds to the impression that *Caesaris Ultor* would ring like a quasi-official title or dedication.

<sup>11</sup> Or is there?—The parallel with III, 24, is provoking. When a Roman talked by name of an Olympian deity, how far was the thought of that God's statue from his mind, so as to confuse in some sense the sign with the thing signified? The question would be academic enough in relation to *Carm.*, I, 2, 25 ff., but for the language Horace uses in speaking of the theophany of the son of gentle Maia in lines 41-3: "Or whether you, son of gentle Maia, changing your (visible) form, do imitate, winged on earth, (the form of) a young man (viz. Octavian)." This does suggest a statue of Octavian, but with wings, to show that it is "really" Mercury. In that case *Caesaris Ultor* would be literally a dedicatory inscription, despite the inappropriateness of Mercury for the role (see pp. 48-9 and note 34 and the literature there cited). Perhaps that is just the point: Horace means to say that, while Octavian has, as he was bound to do, done his duty as agent of divine punishment of

the suggested titles have precisely the same quality as if they were indeed dedicatory inscriptions on a monument, namely, to record and reward an accomplished exploit. Perhaps *Pater* would recall the title *Pater Patriae* conferred, as a novelty, on Cicero to acknowledge him as the saviour of Rome from the civil madness of Catiline. Horace is inviting Octavian to accept a similar kind of formal recognition for a similar, if much greater, achievement. And the first title he offers is *Caesaris Ultor*—first, because it stands for the punishment on which alone, according to the underlying theology, the new order can be built.

Commager writes (p. 38): "The concept of vengeance includes those of crime, punishment, and expiation." This implies or assumes that Horace is here handling a religious concept, and one which, as here analysed, is fundamental to the right understanding of the ode. Theologically, it represents a doctrine of redemption through divine justice or atonement through retribution. I should like in conclusion to trace a further theological strand which Horace seems to have woven into his poem—the role of Jupiter.

The ode falls fairly clearly into two main parts.<sup>12</sup> The first

Caesar's murderers, his true character and role were far different, and would be seen as such.

<sup>12</sup> Some points bearing on the general interpretation of the ode may conveniently be brought together here:

(a) Kiessling-Heinze, in their commentary on the opening stanzas, recall that we have there the old idea of a flood sent by an angry divinity (signalled by the word *dirae* of line 1) to destroy mankind for its sin, and recurring in successive ages (hence *saeculum* in line 6). The picture with which the ode opens is thus one of the storms such as to make men think the time for the next flood is at hand: but this fear brings to man the realization that god is angry, and so the storms have achieved their purpose: man sees his sin (so Kiessling-Heinze interpret *iam satis* in line 1). The next step, however, must be to explain that these weather- and nature-portents symbolize the Roman civil wars; here we have the following consideration:

(b) Kiessling-Heinze go on to explain the connection of thought at line 13 thus: "Men feared the destruction of the world—and well they might—we ourselves saw things that boded as much." Now if the "things we saw" (the Tiber flood) stand for the menace of Antony, as suggested above, then it is logical to take the preceding deluges and so forth as representing civil war in general. This in turn affects the old problem of whether these natural disasters really happened or not: for, if the first readers were meant to understand that all this was symbolic,

five quatrains are concerned with the description and symbolisms of portents, all expressive of divine disapproval. The last six quatrains deal with divine favour expressed through the vehicle of theophany. It is a sort of question-and-answer in the relations between god and man, treating respectively of man's danger and man's salvation through divine intervention. The sixth and seventh quatrains form a transitional link, of which the first half (21-4) is still close to what precedes, and the second (25-8) leads directly up to what follows.

Jupiter is named three times in the ode:<sup>13</sup> as *Pater* in the

it might actually be desirable that none of the meteorology of the opening lines (especially the striking of the Capitol, which alone in the list belongs to the class of official Roman portents) should have been actual historical occurrences. The idea of a sort of moral vicious circle by which civil war is itself the punishment of civil war is familiar enough in Horace (cf. *Carm.*, III, 6).

(c) Horace uses nature symbolism in the same way elsewhere (so *Carm.*, I, 9; II, 9, and, in a political connexion, as here, in I, 14). Nevertheless, the choice of symbol—portents—must retain its own significance. It is still improbable that talk of portents in 29 B.C., especially "on first looking into Virgil's *Georgics*," could fail to echo memories of the supposed historical portents that were being associated specifically with the Ides of March. Moreover, through such an undertone this ode would establish from the outset that connexion with the person of Octavian and, above all, with Octavian as "on the gods' side."

(d) Line 40 is crucial for the relation between the ideas of civil and of foreign war (accepting the reading *Marsi*; see Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.* and cf. besides *Carm.*, II, 20, 18; III, 5, 9, where the Marsian is the type of the Roman, or Italian, legionary in a foreign war). The idea here is surely that Mars is to turn from his "sport" of civil war to his "business" of foreign war. *Hostem* emphasizes this point by specifying "foreign enemy" in contrast to the *cives* of line 21, and probably referring to the Parthians themselves, in view of lines 22 and 51 (cf. *Carm.*, III, 5, 4-6, where we have *hostium* referring to the Parthians under the same name—*graves Persae*—as they have at line 22 here). It may be objected that, since Mars is passed over in favour of Mercury as the divine saviour, Horace does not intend to make this idea part of his vision of the coming "reign" of Octavian. But "Maia's Son" is to combine many attributes, among them *triumphi* and *dux* in a Median war—itself a fitting role for the *ultor* of that Caesar who was on the point of undertaking such a war when he was cut off. Throughout the Odes Horace's advocacy of a punitive war—and that seems to be synonymous with a war of conquest—against Parthia runs parallel to his abjuration of civil war; cf. especially *Carm.*, III, 2, 1-4; 5, 1-4; 6, 5-12.

<sup>13</sup> Horace sometimes likes to revert to the opening of an ode at its

opening sentence (2), and twice more in the body of the poem (19 and 30). Clearly he stands for the supreme moral agency governing the world, however this is to be conceived. The visible evidence of the fact that this agency is outraged by the conduct of man and especially of Rome (cf. *terris* and *Urbem* 1 and 4) forms the ode's point of departure. Later we come to the visible signs of the outraged feelings of another, if minor, deity—Tiber; but he only earns himself the disapproval of the supreme deity by the excesses to which they led him. Both gods, the greater and the lesser, resorted to portents to give vent to their indignation: but while the lesser sought, on doubtful justification (*nimium querenti*), to punish through destruction, the "father" preferred to terrify mankind, and particularly the Romans—to warn them, to bring them to their senses. Thus Jupiter stands both at the opening and the close of this first section of the ode. He stands there so as to moralise the portents, to give the physical events their true moral significance and force. The point of the portents is that they show the supreme deity morally outraged, but unwilling to condemn and destroy.

The transitional lines (21-8) now do two things. First, they bring the reason or source of the divine indignation into men's consciousness by visualizing how future generations will look back on these terrible times. Secondly, they show man responding to this consciousness by visualizing the nation at prayer. Jupiter's purpose through his portents is thus fulfilled: men have taken the warning, have come to their senses.

This brings man face to face with his wickedness—the *scelus*

close. Now this ode opens with Jupiter and closes with Caesar (Octavian). Could it be that Horace means "the Father," i. e. the symbol of moral order, to be taken as standing for Octavian? We know that Julius Caesar was canonized as Jupiter Julius as early as 44, and that occasionally Horace seems to refer to Augustus as Jupiter (L. P. Wilkinson, in *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, pp. 33-4, quotes *Epp.*, I, 19, 43; *Carm.*, II, 7, 17 and, more tentatively, III, 1, 6; 4, 49; to which we may add III, 5, 1-2, translating: "We have believed that Jupiter rules in heaven from his thundering there; Augustus shall be held to be the [same] god on earth when, etc."). Equally Augustus is explicitly contrasted with Jupiter at III, 25, 3-6. But the idea seems inapplicable here. How can Octavian be at once Jupiter himself and the son of Maia whom Jupiter sends? If we feel a need for some link between the opening and close of the ode, perhaps that suggested in note 12(c) above is more plausible.



which now appears for the first time (29), and with his impotence to heal it—hence the prayers. Here the second part of the ode begins, and again Jupiter appears at the opening. He will himself, through a divine emissary, be the ultimate author and giver of salvation. “To whom will Jove give the role of expiating our crime? To Apollo—or Venus—or Mars—or Mercury? Yes, to Mercury, in the form of Octavian.” This third appearance, then, makes it clear that his earlier indignation did not mean that he required man to put things right himself, but only that he should acknowledge his dependence and his guilt. The second entry, rebuking Tiber’s vindictiveness, prepares us for the third. In effect we have some such scheme as this:

1. The supreme deity is angry with man, who is not doing his will;
2. But this does not mean that he wills to destroy man;
3. His will is man’s redemption through a divinity in human form.

For we should note that what we have is a question in form only “to whom will Jupiter give, etc.” and in fact declares “Jupiter will himself provide an expiator. Who will he be?”

We see, then, that Jupiter occupies three key points of the ode. Like other repetitions discussed earlier, this one serves both to point up a dominant theme and to punctuate its progressive stages. His person acts as a focus for the pattern on which the ode as a whole is constructed. Horace has given us a poem in which he has not merely used religious material in details, as he does constantly, but which is built round a dominant theological motif. It may be that in so doing he was using ideas—drawn no doubt from contemporary, especially philosophical, religious thinking—as a kind of allegorical machinery through which to express thoughts which, to him, were not at all, or only vaguely, religious. One wonders how far, in Horace too, conscious indifference and scepticism may cloak, from himself as well as others, deeper subconscious affinities, which could have drawn him to write such a poem on such a theme. At any rate, the presence of theology in this ode is not only unmistakable, but its content, so far from being perfunctory or vague, is unexpectedly clear and profound. Kiessling-Heinze (9th ed.,



1958, p. 11) write: "The accents of religious language in which he (Horace) clothes his political fears and hopes, must have sounded startlingly new in Roman ears." The newness, they explain, lay in the choice and combination of imported Greek and traditional Roman elements, e. g. a combination of *sceleris expiatio* (Roman, line 29, etc.) with Theophany (Greek, lines 30-42, etc.). If this is true, one must wonder why it was in particular to religious ideas that Horace turned for a new vehicle to express his interpretation of the times.

GERALD NUSSBAUM.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE.

## AN EARLY TRACE OF SOCRATIC DIALOGUE.

Although the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* has been the subject of a number of inquiries, the trace of dialogue that appears in this rather perplexing treatise has been almost completely overlooked. W. Kranz apparently is the only one who has noticed this peculiarity.<sup>1</sup> He disposes of it in a few words without any attempt at analysis, since it is for him only one of a number of indications of Socratic influence in this writing.

This brief dialogue occurs in the last half of the first antinomy (1, 12-14).<sup>2</sup> The writer has completed his argument that good and evil are the same, and has just begun a discussion of the antithetical hypothesis that good and evil are different. At this point, instead of proceeding in narrative form as he has been doing, he suddenly changes his method of presentation and plunges into the dialogue in which a vague *τις* (in reality the writer) questions a hypothetical subject who has said that good and evil are the same:

(12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἷ τις [αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· 'εἶπον δὴ μοι, ἤδη τύ τι τοῖ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;' φαίη κα· "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα." 'τὸ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἵπερ τῶντὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶι κακῶι. (13) τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἤδη τι ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας;' "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα." 'τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίεις. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρῶς ἤδη κακὸν ἐποίησας;' "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ <μεγάλα>." 'μέγιστα ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας. (14) ἄγε δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι. ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχῶς οἰκτίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πρᾶσσοντι, αἵπερ τῶντὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν;'

The passage is worth careful consideration. At first reading the similarity between it and Socratean dialogue as Plato presents it is striking. In the first place, it is the question and answer type of investigation in which the questioner is in complete control of the situation.<sup>3</sup> There are points of similarity, too,

<sup>1</sup> Walther Kranz, "Vorsokratisches IV; die sogenannten *Δισσοὶ λόγοι*," *Hermes*, LXXII (1937), pp. 231 f.

<sup>2</sup> The paragraph and sentence numbers here and elsewhere are those of Hermann Diels, rev. Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>6</sup> (Berlin, 1952), II, pp. 405-16.

<sup>3</sup> The device of introducing an imaginary subject is found also in the

between some of the basic vocabulary used here and that of the speeches of the Platonic Socrates. The transitional combination  $\tau\acute{\iota}$   $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  occurs fairly frequently in the Platonic dialogues;<sup>4</sup>  $\alpha\gamma\epsilon$   $\delta\eta$  is also an attention getting device common to this trace of dialogue and the Platonic writings,<sup>5</sup> while an  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron$   $\tau\iota$   $\eta$  is found in both places.<sup>6</sup> The occurrence of these particle groups does not necessarily show any direct connection between this passage and the Platonic writings. I suspect that colloquial speech provided a common source for this vocabulary and that in both cases we have attempts to recapture the atmosphere of informal discussion.

The dialogue in the  $\delta\iota\sigma\sigma\omicron\iota$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$ , then, has an overall appearance of being Socratic. But a closer appraisal of it reveals that in certain respects it is anything but Socratic. In most of Plato's dialogues Socrates attempts to ascertain by a logical succession of questions exactly what the subject being questioned means by a statement he has made or by a stand he has taken, and tries to show the subject through this questioning how his statement is illogical or his position untenable. But the atmosphere in the  $\delta\iota\sigma\sigma\omicron\iota$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$  is entirely different. Because the answer to each question is the same, it becomes repetitious. The writer, obviously, unlike Socrates, has little interest in the answer, and so puts no emphasis on this part of the dialogue. Perhaps we have here the reason for the manuscript omission of the second reply and one half of the third. The answers are all the same, and at the same time are obvious and colorless. For all intents and purposes they may be omitted. In Socratic procedure, even though the question may be a leading one presupposing a certain answer, this answer is important.

The questions put forward in this dialogue are also not like those we find in the Platonic dialogues. In reality, after the first one, they cease to be simple questions at all. For each is made up of an assertion followed by a question, the assertion

*Apology* (28 B), although the passage of the *Apology* does not at all resemble this one.

<sup>4</sup> See F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum* (Leipzig, 1853), I, p. 421.

<sup>5</sup> E. g., *Phaed.*, 116 D; *Phil.*, 33 A, 39 E; *Soph.*, 235 A; *Laws*, X, 893 A; *Ion*, 530 B; *Phaedr.*, 237 A (pl.).

<sup>6</sup> E. g., *Phaed.*, 70 C; *Theaet.*, 154 E; *Repub.*, V, 478 B; *Gorg.*, 470 B, 481 C; *Crat.*, 436 B; *Alcib.*, I, 116 D.

coming as a result of the answer immediately preceding, and the question in turn leading to another similar answer. I think the author's consciousness of parallelism and antithesis, elements of literary style stressed by the sophists, accounts for this un-Socratic element.

The writer fails to produce a dialogue in the Socratic manner for yet another reason. He is too impatient. The lack of interest in the answers and the conclusion-question arrangement of the interrogator's part of the dialogue indicate as much. This impatience is underlined by the fact that the writer cannot even wait for the usual answer to the last question, but breaks the dialogue rather abruptly, and hurries on to another example in narrative form (1, 14 f.).

Why, then, was this dialogue even attempted? I think the writer has brought it in to provide some variety in the presentation of his arguments. In one way, then, this device is a failure, because it is anything but authentic. But, however dull it may be, it does provide a breather from a narrative that is still duller.<sup>7</sup>

This trace of dialogue, then, has both Socratic and sophistic characteristics. But is it a reflection of sophistic dialogue or Socratic dialogue? That the sophists engaged in dialogue of one kind or another we must conclude from the remains of their writings and from the ancient authorities. But in most cases the discussion is not at all similar to the Socratic question-answer investigation. Prodicus' *ῥῆμαι*, for instance, is a debate between Virtue and Vice for the benefit of a hesitant Heracles, and is a far cry from dialectic.<sup>8</sup> There is no reason either to think that Hippias' *Trojan Dialogue* with its legendary setting and heroic participants was any more than a formal debate.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The writing verges on dialogue at two other points. In 2, 28 we have the questions without answers. *φέρε δὴ* occurs from time to time in the Platonic dialogues; e. g., *Prot.*, 330 B; *Gorg.*, 455 A; *Phaed.*, 63 B, 79 B; *Theaet.*, 151 E; *Soph.*, 229 A; *Crat.*, 385 B. Once again this is a colloquial device to gain the attention of the person addressed.

In 3, 2-8 the argument is put forward in a series of questions so that, while it is not a true dialogue because of the lack of answers, it is at least reminiscent of the dialogue form.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph., *Mem.*, II, 1, 21-34. Diels, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 313-16.

<sup>9</sup> Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, I, 11. Plato, *Hipp. Mai.*, 286 A; Diels, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 327, 331.

Regarding Critias' *ὁμιλῖαι* we are unable to pass a sure judgment, but I see no reason for assuming that question-answer dialogue played any part in them.<sup>10</sup>

When we come to Protagoras, however, we find what appears at first sight to be reliable evidence for the use of dialectic. For Socrates early in the *Protagoras* (329B) states that this elderly sophist is one of a very few who can successfully take part in dialectic. If we take the statement by itself, it would appear to point to considerable experience with the Socratic manner of investigation. But the general tone of the rest of the dialogue suggests not only that Protagoras dislikes this method of inquiry, but that he is completely unfamiliar with it as well. It is true that at first he does go along with Socrates and his questions (329D-333E). However, he soon loses patience and ends the exchange with a rather lengthy reply that prompts Socrates to request that he observe the rules for brevity (334D).<sup>11</sup> Protagoras at this point is so far from participating in Socratic dialogue that Socrates is determined to give up the discussion (335B ff.). Finally, after some negotiation, Socrates proposes that Protagoras question him first. But the sophist is unwilling to do even this (338E). We should have expected that if he were a partisan of the question-answer technique where the questioner has the upper hand he would have welcomed the opportunity to show his competence.

Why, then, does Socrates early in the dialogue praise Protagoras' dialectic ability? Taylor has pointed to the fact that Socrates is here being ironic.<sup>12</sup> Certainly this whole passage is crammed with irony. Socrates, as we learn later, is anything but overwhelmed and convinced by Protagoras' opening blast. It is with tongue in cheek that Socrates dissociates Protagoras from those public orators who cannot answer briefly a simple question, for the sophist proves to be one with them in this respect. The irony reaches a climax with the rather preposterous suggestion that this long-winded professor could limit himself

<sup>10</sup> Diels, *op. cit.*, II, p. 395.

<sup>11</sup> Socrates' mention of Protagoras' ability to speak either in a few words or at length on a given subject (334E-335A) is not to be taken as another reference to his dialectic potential.

<sup>12</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, First Series (*Saint Andrews University Publications*, No. IX [Oxford, 1911]), p. 125, n. 1.

to brief questions and answers. In fact, the irony is heightened by the fact that Socrates throws out this observation in the shadow of Protagoras' long involved metaphorical opening monologue.

But what are we to say of Diogenes Laertius' statement that Protagoras originated the Socratic method of discussion?<sup>13</sup> Perhaps we should not take his observation too seriously, since it is highly likely that it is based on this passage in the *Protagoras*.

The only other references to dialectic among the sophists are to be found in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* itself. There are two of these, both of which occur in the last chapter but one (8, 1 and 13).<sup>14</sup> The emphasis on dialectic that is present here no doubt derives from Socratic rather than sophistic influence. Taylor has shown convincingly, I believe, that the writer's point of view in this chapter "... is the same as that expressed by Plato in the demand that philosophers, as the masters of the art of dialectic, shall be kings, and by Xenophon in the claim which he puts into the mouth of Socrates that dialectic makes men 'fit to bear rule.'"<sup>15</sup>

I think we may say, therefore, that this trace of dialogue is Socratically inspired. There remains one question about which we must speculate: How did our sophist become acquainted with this dialogue form? Taylor has shown that the whole treatise

<sup>13</sup> IX, 53. Diels, *op. cit.*, II, p. 254.

<sup>14</sup> Both occurrences of *διαλέγεσθαι* are improvements upon the MSS. The first instance is an emendation of a seemingly corrupt passage, while the second is an addition necessary for the sense.

E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias* (*Bibliothèque scientifique*, 14 [Neuchâtel, 1948]), pp. 190-6, suggests that Hippias' influence is strong in this passage. He also brings in passages from the *Protagoras* (315 C) and the *Hippias Minor* (363 D) to show that Hippias not only used but even invented dialectic. Taylor's observations on this passage seem more to the point. The two passages from Plato's dialogues, moreover, prove nothing about any relationship between Hippias and dialectic such as Socrates uses. For in the *Protagoras* the questioners are seeking information on astronomy and Hippias is answering as an authority. In the *Hippias Minor* Hippias once again is the authority to whom questions may be put. In neither case does the form or feeling resemble the Socratean type of philosophical investigation.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 127.



is heavily under the influence of Socratic thought.<sup>16</sup> Presumably the author met dialectic at the same time he came in contact with the thought of Socrates.

Taylor suggests the "interesting possibility" that the writer may have been influenced by the Platonic dialogues,<sup>17</sup> although he goes along with the generally accepted date for the treatise ("at the latest not long after 404, and possibly before the death of Socrates").<sup>18</sup> The writer, then, may have had access to the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, dialogues which contain the Socratic thought found in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*. There is nothing in the *Protagoras*, he says, to preclude its being written before the death of Socrates and nothing in the *Meno* to prevent us from thinking of it as dating from immediately after 399.

Taylor himself has supplied the objection to the possibility of publication of any of the dialogues before 399 when he says it would be strange for Plato to dramatize the actions of a living Socrates when seemingly "the original motive for the composition of 'discourses of Socrates' by the *virī Socratici* was to preserve the memory of a living presence which they had lost."<sup>19</sup> Taylor may be right, however, when he suggests that the *Protagoras* and *Meno* may have been composed immediately after the death of Socrates. The *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, then, could have been written within two or three years after 399.

But there is another equally plausible solution. Kranz<sup>20</sup> gives it serious consideration, while Taylor, because of the number of times he makes reference to it,<sup>21</sup> seemingly would like to believe it. The writer of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* could have heard Socrates himself. Perhaps we should not go so far as Kranz does who says that the writer was a *Sokratesschüler*,<sup>22</sup> but it would be better, I think, to suppose that this sophist heard the

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 119-21.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 93 f. C. Trieber, "Die ΔΙΑΔΕΞΕΙΣ," *Hermes*, XXVII (1892), pp. 210-22, carries out the most thorough inquiry into the date of this treatise. He concludes that it comes from the years immediately following 404 B. C.

<sup>19</sup> *Plato, The Man and his Work*<sup>6</sup> (New York, 1956), p. 21.

<sup>20</sup> Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 227, mentions the possibility that the writer heard Socrates and was even a fellow student of Plato and Xenophon.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 110, 118.

<sup>22</sup> Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

philosopher conversing a few times. The writer could easily have been a resident of Megara, Sparta,<sup>23</sup> or some other Peloponnesian center, for that matter, who came to Athens with the victorious Lacedaemonians or who was simply in the habit of visiting Athens from time to time. On one or more of these visits Socrates could have caught his ear.

According to this solution, the treatise can be dated immediately after 404/3, as the internal evidence suggests. The instances of Socratic thought and the trace of dialogue could be reflections of this brief or intermittent association. A conversation of Socrates could be the common source for the views on stealing and lying that appear in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* (Chapter 3), the *Memorabilia* (IV, 2, 14-18), and the *Republic* (I, 331).<sup>24</sup> This casual relationship would also account for the sophist's failure to reproduce the Socratic dialogue with accuracy. For if he had only listened to dialogue and had heard it only a few times at the most, carried on by Socrates in his usual informal manner, we should expect the inaccurate presentation that we find in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*.

By now our conclusions may be obvious. This fragment of dialogue is another clear indication of Socratic influence in this treatise. Also, if it dates before the death of Socrates, it becomes important for another reason. For in this case, in spite of its obvious shortcomings, this piece would stand as the earliest extant example of the Socratic type of dialogue.

EDWIN S. RAMAGE.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

<sup>23</sup> Kranz, *ibid.*, p. 224, suggests Sparta as a possible residence for this sophist.

<sup>24</sup> I wonder if there is any significance in the argument of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* being couched in question form at this point (see note 7)? All we can do is speculate, but perhaps these questions are a reflection of an oral discussion carried on by Socrates on which Plato and Xenophon also drew.

# NOTES ON AN ATHENIAN PRYTANY DECREE.

An Athenian decree of 140/39 B. C., passed in Maimakterion in honor of the prytaneis of the preceding month (Pyanopsion), was published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), pp. 17-22. Lines 5-12 contain an enumeration of the sacrifices offered by the former prytaneis, of the tribe Antiochis. Meritt's text of this passage, with the exceptions noted in the *apparatus criticus* below, reads as follows:

- 5 [Εὐ]κτί[μενος Ε]ὐδήμου Εἰτεαῖος εἶπεν· ὑπ[έρ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν  
οἱ πρυτάνεις]  
[τῇ]ς Ἀντ[ιοχ]ίδος ὑπέρ τῶν θυνσιῶν <ῶ>ν ἔθν[ον τὰ πρὸ τῶν  
ἐκκλησιῶν τῷ τε]  
[Ἀπ]όλλωνι τῷ Προστατηρίῳ καὶ τεῖ Ἀρτέμ[ιδι τεῖ Βουλαίαι καὶ  
τοῖς ἄλλοις]  
[θε]οῖς οἷς πάτριον ἦν, ἔθυσαν δὲ καὶ τεῖ Ἀρτέμ[ιδι τεῖ Φωσφόρῳ  
καὶ ἅπαντα τὰ]  
[ἄλ]λα συνετέλεσαν καλῶς καὶ εὐσχημόνως· ἐβ[ουθύτησαν δὲ καὶ  
τὰ Στήνια]  
10 [τ]εῖ Δήμητρι καὶ τεῖ Κόρει ὑπέρ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ το[ῦ δήμου καὶ  
τῶν συμμάχων·]  
[ἐ]θυσαν δὲ καὶ τῷ Θησεῖ καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Π[υθίῳ καὶ τῷ  
Ἀπόλλωνι]  
[τῇ]ν εἰρυσιώνην ἀνέθηκαν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια . . .

9 τὰ Στήνια supplevi; ἐβ[ουθύτησαν δὲ καὶ τὰς θυσίας] Meritt.

11 Π[υθίῳ] supplevi; Π[ατρώῳ, καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι] Meritt.

The formulas in lines 9-10 concern sacrifices to Demeter and Kore. These sacrifices are to be identified as the Stenia, occurring on the 9th day of Pyanopsion,<sup>1</sup> on the analogy of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 674, honoring the prytaneis of Antiochis, 275/4 B. C., lines 6-8, where the Stenia are mentioned together with the Chalkeia. Dow has restored reference to the Stenia in a similar passage in another decree of Pyanopsion dated *ca.* 290-275 B. C., honoring the prytaneis of Akamantis.<sup>2</sup> In view of the absence of both the Chalkeia and the Stenia in a decree of Pyanopsion dated 178/7 B. C., honoring the prytaneis of Hippothontis,<sup>3</sup> Dow

<sup>1</sup> L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 52-3.

<sup>2</sup> S. Dow, *Prytaneis* (= *Hesperia*, Suppl. 1, 1937), p. 38, no. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120, no. 64.

suggested that by this time, these sacrifices were either abandoned by the prytaneis, or simply omitted from mention.<sup>4</sup> The reference to the Stenia of 140/39 in lines 9-10 above would leave the alternatives open.<sup>5</sup>

Lines 11-12 seem to refer to the Theseia and Pyanopsia, occurring, respectively, on the 8th and 7th days of the month.<sup>6</sup> In an otherwise convincing reconstruction, Meritt restored Π[ατρώϊωι] as the epithet for Apollo in line 11, and placed a comma thereafter, thus suggesting that the sacrifices to Theseus and Apollo are to be taken together, as occurring on the same day. In the absence of evidence for sacrifices to Apollo during the Theseia, we have assumed that the sacrifice to Apollo is to be construed with the ceremonial placing of the εἰρεσιώρη at the entrance to the temple of Apollo during the Pyanopsia. The epithet used for Apollo in this connexion appears in the Eleusinian calendar (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1363, dated at the beginning of the 3rd century B. C., line 7): it is not Πατρωῖος but Πύθιος.

It seems possible to retain the view of L. Deubner, that the Pyanopsia were in essence a Fall harvest festival, complementing the Spring Thargelia.<sup>7</sup> Just as the Thargelia assumed a strongly apotropaic character,<sup>8</sup> so in the inscription from Eleusis, we find the Pyanopsia celebrated in honor of the god of purification. The link between the two festivals is confirmed by the fact that the god of the Thargelia was Apollo Pythios.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> The sacrifices may have been temporarily discontinued or only sporadically offered by the prytaneis, perhaps depending upon the religious interests of the prytanizing tribe; or they continued to be offered by the prytaneis, but were not invariably recorded.

<sup>6</sup> Deubner, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-6, 198-201.

<sup>7</sup> The interpretation proposed by H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et Courètes* (Lille, 1939), chap. IV, differs substantially; but see L. Ziehen, *Gnomon*, XVI (1940), p. 439.

<sup>8</sup> Deubner, *op. cit.*, pp. 193 f.

<sup>9</sup> The Suda, s. v. Πύθιον; cf. the conclusions of A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen* (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 485-6; Deubner, *op. cit.*, p. 198; and W. S. Ferguson, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), pp. 30-1, reached on the basis of Isaeus, VII, 15, with G. Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities* (London, 1895), pp. 196-7, and M. P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund, 1951), p. 168. An inscription of 128 B. C., renewing honors to Apollo and regulating the celebration of the Thargelia, specifies that sacrifices are to be offered at the Pythium to Apollo

The reference in lines 11-12 to the Theseia and the Pyanopsia, unique in a prytany decree, may be due less to the vagaries of chance preservation than to the innovation characteristic of decrees in this period. Perhaps the presence of the *εἰρυσιώνη* is to be associated with the intensified interest in the Pythian Apollo signalized by the revival of the Athenian Pythais in 138/7 B.C.<sup>10</sup>

KEITH STANLEY.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

Patroos and to Apollo Alexikakos, as well as to Apollo Pythios, by the priest of Apollo Pythios (W. Peek, *Ath. Mitt.*, LXVI [1941], pp. 181-95, especially p. 187, lines 52-5; cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. ép.*, 1942, no. 30; republished by A. Wilhelm, *Wien. Sitzb.*, Bd. 224, Abh. 4 [1947], pp. 27-53). The usage here in regard to cult, epithet, and priesthood strengthens the case for maintaining a similar emphasis upon Apollo Pythios in the reference to the Pyanopsia in line 11 above.

<sup>10</sup> G. Daux, *Delphes au II<sup>e</sup> et au I<sup>er</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1936), pp. 577-83.

## REVIEWS.

W. V. CLAUSEN, ed. *A. Persi Flacci et D. Iuni Iuvenalis Saturae*.  
Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1959.  
Pp. xiv + 198. \$2.40.

As the first American to edit an Oxford Classical Text, Clausen enters a distinguished company, and deservedly. For many years now, it has been obvious that the text of Juvenal which S. G. Owen produced for the Oxford series in 1903 and slightly revised in 1908 needed drastic changes. Housman's brilliant edition of 1905, ignored by Owen in 1908, exposed the approach of all previous editors as patently inadequate. Since then, the student of Juvenal has rejected Owen and turned first to Housman or to Leo's revision of Jahn-Buecheler (1910), then lately to the truly excellent edition of Knoche (Munich, 1950). For Persius, there was no Housman or Knoche to revolutionize the situation; all editors, from Jahn to Scivoletto (Florence, 1956),<sup>1</sup> continued to practice the same principles, to base their texts blindly on three MSS. As a result, Owen's text seemed no worse than that of Jahn-Buecheler-Leo, Villeneuve, Cartault, or Scivoletto; there might be minor disagreements as to whether P or AB should be preferred, but essentially the same apparatus criticus appeared in all editions. Then, in 1956, Clausen published his text of Persius, and immediately Owen became utterly outdated. A new Housman had appeared to expose the inadequacies of his predecessors, albeit in a more gentle manner; and it was only natural for the Oxford Press to select Clausen to produce the edition which was to supersede, and undoubtedly has superseded, that of Owen.<sup>2</sup>

To begin with Clausen's contributions to the text of Persius, it immediately becomes necessary to discuss the principles announced in the earlier and fuller edition of 1956.<sup>3</sup> Inasmuch as this work has received virtually no attention in American journals, it is worth the effort to emphasize what Clausen has accomplished; for the *praefatio* to his Oxford Classical Text merely suggests the crucial difference between him and other editors.<sup>4</sup> I can do no better than to quote Clausen himself: "The tendency to underestimate the secondary MSS., like the tendency to overestimate P, has made steady progress (i. e., since Jahn's edition of 1868); and now, despite Leo's demur in 1910, the common, if not prevailing, opinion is that the secondary

<sup>1</sup> Clausen reviewed Scivoletto's edition in *C. P.*, LIII (1958), pp. 141-2.

<sup>2</sup> Clausen had already shown his interest in the text of Juvenal: cf. *C. R.*, LXV (1951), pp. 73-4, and *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 52-3 and 57-60.

<sup>3</sup> The edition of 1956 remains basic for all who intend to study Persius' text seriously, for, while our Oxford Classical Text possesses a more useful format and in some cases corrects earlier infelicities, it necessarily compromises upon some of the finer points of detail.

<sup>4</sup> I know of only my own brief review in *C. W.*, LI (1957-8), p. 23, for American journals. More considerable reviews may be found in *C. R.*, LXXI (1957), pp. 226-8, and in *Gnomon*, XXXII (1960), pp. 119-28.



MSS. have so little independent value that wherever they present a true reading not found in *Pa* it most probably results from conjecture. I shall state here, what I hope to prove in the following pages, that this opinion is false. The secondary MSS. are simply less good than *Pa*, but not on that account contemptible or essentially different in character."<sup>5</sup> It is in the subsequent pages of the 1956 edition that Clausen amply demonstrates his thesis, proof which underlies the choice and treatment of the seven *codices deteriores* used for our Oxford Text of 1959: namely, CGLMNRW.

To reach a conclusion that has radically altered the editor's approach to Persius henceforth, Clausen personally collated, according to my reckoning, not merely the three usual MSS plus the Bobbio Fragment, but 41 other MSS, in addition using the full collations of eight more MSS made by others. In so doing, he found that another MS called V deserved to rank with the major three. For the first time, therefore, an editor of Persius has been able to produce a text based on intimate knowledge of the many early and widely scattered MSS in European libraries, refusing to limit his horizons to the traditional triad PAB. To quote Clausen again: "No previous editor of Persius has succeeded in putting together a selective apparatus criticus at once accurate and representative of the textual tradition. I have attempted to do just this. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

The text which Clausen presented in 1956 and now has re-published in substantially the same manner—I shall discuss the differences below—contains no especially startling or important new readings; what it provides is what Clausen designed, namely, "a selective apparatus criticus at once accurate and representative of the textual tradition." For readers who delight in a full apparatus criticus, containing not only the essential readings of the MSS but also the fruits of learning, such as Housman once produced for his admirers and enemies, Clausen's 1956 edition offers much. Even in our Oxford Text of 1959, the riches seem boundless in comparison with what Owen could offer; and one might detect almost a note of irony in that traditional remark annexed to the title: *brevi adnotatione critica instruit*. To bring out the contrast between Owen and prove how utterly Clausen's work has superseded his predecessor's, we might glance at Satire 1. Clausen alters Owen's text about ten times.<sup>7</sup> In every case, we find that Owen chose the reading of P or of PAB, unable correctly to estimate the MS tradition because of his incomplete knowledge of

<sup>5</sup> Clausen (1956), pp. xvi-xvii; cf. the mild statement of his in the O. C. T. Praefatio, p. vii: "Codices autem, qui deteriores habentur, cum aliquid boni, quod non compareat in melioribus, interdum praebeant, omnino negligere non licet." I might add that Villeneuve in 1918, like Leo in 1910, expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation, p. xxiii of his Preface, and hoped for someone like Clausen to bring order out of the chaos of some eighty MSS known to him. O. Seel, reviewing Clausen's work in *Gnomon* and in his article, "Zum Persius-Titel des Codex Pithoeanus," *Hermes*, LXXXVIII (1960), pp. 82 ff., argues that, since Persius' textual tradition was an "open" one, Clausen wrongly retains the concept of "secondary MSS."

<sup>6</sup> Clausen (1956), p. xxvii.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 1, 6, 8 (twice), 9, 12, 17, 23, 46, 129. Clausen (1956), p. xix, discusses several of these, as well as in his apparatus criticus.

other MSS. However, when we compare the two editions as to apparatus criticus, then the radical difference leaps to the eye. We are no longer faced with the simple decision between P and AB, cherishing a prejudice for P; now we realize that other MSS bear directly upon our choice of reading and that the revered trinity PAB rarely present a correct reading alone without the support of the "secondary" MSS.<sup>8</sup> Until other editors begin to follow Clausen's lead, his two editions of Persius alone provide a student the data on which to judge the validity of the text. Whether or not we follow him in his preferences—and inevitably there is, and will be, disagreement—Clausen has at least given us the means of forming a text.

I now come to the differences between the 1956 and 1959 editions of Persius. In his earlier edition, Clausen stated: "I have provided minute collations of PABV Bob., so that their merits and faults may be the more justly estimated, and full collations of CGLMNRW, which however omit some obvious and unimportant aberrations of the individual scribes."<sup>9</sup> Such meticulous detail would have been otiose in an Oxford Classical Text, designed as it is for British schools and university students in all parts of the world. Misspellings, minor alterations in verb tenses or moods, omission of a word in obvious error, and the like can be virtually disregarded. Moreover, where the MSS fall more or less into two classes, Clausen has wisely chosen to ignore unimportant variations and present the two divisions lucidly. He has announced his principles in this respect, admitted his *libertas*, but always made his criterion that of providing an apparatus criticus worthy of the name; few readers, I think, will quarrel with those principles.<sup>10</sup> Those who want to check up on minutiae can always refer to the 1956 edition.

Essentially, Clausen has left his text unchanged. I have noticed a single important alteration: at 5, 59, in response to criticism and after reflection, he has wisely abandoned his earlier choice of *fecerit* and accepted a good Persian metaphor *fregerit*.<sup>11</sup> Besides this change, he has given up a number of awkward spellings: *ecfundat* at 1, 65, *ecfluis* at 3, 20, *cluentis* in 3, 75, *reliquum* in 5, 87, and *Chrusidis* in 5, 165. These can all be considered improvements.

However, there are some major changes in the apparatus criticus, apart from those required by good sense and mentioned above. The most important consists in the new estimate of Vaticanus Palatinus 1710, called x in 1956, and now christened X. As Clausen noted, the MSS was discovered and collated when his 1956 edition was nearly complete.<sup>12</sup> On the basis of a quick judgment, he decided to rank it as "in many respects quite an ordinary MS"; he therefore cited it sparingly in 1956, at perhaps thirty places where it seemed to be

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Clausen (1956), p. xvi: "Whoever turns to the apparatus criticus will find that it is usually not a question of preferring P or α in isolation; their readings are shared by the Σ, by V, by one or several of the secondary MSS. Apart from trivial matters of orthography, P alone preserves a true reading in only six places."

<sup>9</sup> P. xxvii.

<sup>10</sup> Clausen (1959), Praef. pp. xiii-xiv.

<sup>11</sup> Kenney questioned *fecerit* in his review in *C. R.*

<sup>12</sup> Clausen (1956), p. xiii, n. 1.

relevant. Now, he has come to the conclusion that it deserves to take its place beside V as one of the peculiarly good MSS which have been discovered since the Nineteenth Century and demand consideration together with PAB. When we compare the two editions, we quickly observe the importance assigned to X in 1959 as a totally new feature of the apparatus.

Clausen has dropped the *incipits* and *explicitis* as well as the individual *tituli* for the Satires. The latter move I personally regret, because, although Persius did not devise titles, they do appear in the MSS and provide us a means of approaching the medieval conception of the satirist. Also, Clausen has eliminated his lengthier discussions of text and interpretation. The comment in the apparatus at 1, 121 now seems perfectly ordinary, the usual reference to the change of an earlier version because of the allusion to Nero; but Clausen's minute study of the Scholia has altered the usual reference, for he discovered an error of Jahn: the Scholia clearly state that Persius himself, not his editors, made the change in the original. Similarly, at 3, 45 Clausen now cites the Scholia as agreeing with P, whereas in his 1956 edition he quoted them and corrected Jahn. Such modifications, while inevitable, must be regretted, and we can only wait impatiently for the new edition of the Scholia which Clausen has promised.

Two other changes in the apparatus have caught my attention, both improvements. Clausen now makes a number of comparisons with the MS tradition of Juvenal which throw light on the MSS or on his preference for a specific reading.<sup>13</sup> Second, he has now increased the number of *testimonia* which he regards as relevant to the constitution of the text; one especially notices the new respect shown towards Isidore of Seville.<sup>14</sup> I would propose one addition to these *testimonia*: for 5, 130 Horace, *Serm.*, II, 7, 105, which after all Persius quotes verbatim in *qui tu inpunitior*, admirably backs up the rarely cited MSS Paris. 8070 and Bern. 398. In any case, these *testimonia* are the most elaborate that I know of in any edition of Persius and possess great value, helping to constitute the text, but also bearing upon the history of the text and showing how popular Persius continued to be throughout the centuries when for instance Juvenal remained virtually unknown.

Clausen made two important discoveries in working out his edition of 1956. In previous editions, one could never anticipate where one would find the celebrated choliambics, but many editors (Buecheler, Owen, Cartault), devotedly following AB and recognizing that a second hand had placed the lines in P at the beginning, felt certain about assigning them a post after the Satires. Clausen has proved beyond a doubt that the archetype or archetypes of all these MSS contained the choliambics *before* the Satires. However, as Kenney has already remarked, this fact still leaves us in doubt as to the original function of these lines. While Clausen accepts the *titulus* of *Prologus* on the evidence of but two inferior MSS, namely LM, and thus seems to indicate his conception of these fourteen lines as a unit specifically designed as an introduction or Program poem, much

<sup>13</sup> Cf. 1, 8, 17, 74; 3, 34; 5, 150; and 6, 76.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. 1, 32; 2, 16, 37, 45; 3, 56, 84; 4, 2, 9, and 13.

remains to be said. Not everyone will consider the title valid.<sup>15</sup> The second discovery of Clausen affects the *Vita*. In addition to his reasonable reconstruction of Lucan's famous remarks in 23-4, he finally made sense out of the legal discussions concerning Persius' will in 36 ff. Having determined the true meaning of *codicillis*, he has shown that Cornutus does not receive the bulk of Persius' inheritance, but that Persius requested of his mother to give to his beloved tutor a portion of what he, Persius, has willed entirely into her control and that of his sister.<sup>16</sup>

I now turn to orthography. As we shall see later, Housman and Knoche made Clausen's job easy by formulating clear principles of orthography for reconstructing the text of Juvenal. No such study has ever been attempted for Persius, and Clausen himself leaves most of his principles implicit. It is possible, however, to deduce much from the fuller apparatus of the 1956 edition, and I list for the reader, who may be troubled by some of Clausen's methods in the present edition, such criteria as may be gathered. I find one relevant statement in his 1956 Preface: "I usually adopt the unassimilated prefix when it occurs in the MSS."<sup>17</sup> Thus, for example, with Owen at 5, 31 he accepts *subcinctis* from P alone. All other orthographical data come from the apparatus of the earlier edition. Clausen states that he accepts *tum* rather than *tunc* before a gutteral;<sup>18</sup> he informs us that Persius used *nec* rather than *neque* in the thesis of the second, third, and fourth feet;<sup>19</sup> at 1, 74 in both editions he suggests the possibility that Persius used the archaic *quom* for *cum*; at 4, 41 he justified his spelling of *filix* as the older one.<sup>20</sup>

Now we come to certain principles which could bear further investigation. Clausen often accepts the more formal ending *-is* for the accusative plural of the third declension, in fact, wherever a decent MS provides evidence therefor.<sup>21</sup> In so doing, he leaves himself open to certain obvious inconsistencies, of which I note but two here. For 1, 20 overwhelming authority supports the reading *ingentis*, and he uses it; for 6, 47 overwhelming authority supports *ingentes* in the same accusative plural, and he employs it. For a man who notor-

<sup>15</sup> It seems likely that V, mutilated at the beginning, once contained the choliambics there; about X, we now know from the 1959 edition that it preserves the original tradition by placing the lines at the beginning. However, Clausen has not given us the MS evidence in respect to the title of *Prologus*; if X is as good as he implies, it could be decisive. Seel, *Hermes*, LXXXVIII (1960), pp. 92 ff. has proposed an intriguing solution of the mystery presented by the title in P, namely, THEBAIDORUM PERSI SATURA. If he is right, the title demonstrates that the ultimate parent of P once contained the choliambics at the start; further evidence to support Clausen's thesis.

<sup>16</sup> For a fuller discussion, cf. Clausen (1956), pp. xxv-xxvi.

<sup>17</sup> P. xxvii.

<sup>18</sup> At 1, 9; he then compares 3, 12; 4, 37; 5, 60—there seems to be some error here—and 5, 186.

<sup>19</sup> At 1, 19.

<sup>20</sup> The remarks in the apparatus of our O. C. T. at 2, 5 on the confusion of *b* and *v* appear much more fully in Clausen (1956), p. xx, where he discusses 3, 93 and 5, 97.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. 1, 20, 65, 106, 113; 2, 45, 60, 61; 3, 17, 64.

iously chose his words so carefully, it seems hard to believe that Persius would have been indifferent about the spelling of the same word in the same gender and case in two different Satires. Even more patently disturbing is the use of *strigiles* in 5, 126 and *strigilis* five lines later in 5, 131; both words are accusative plurals, both in precisely the same position in the line, and 5, 131 patently refers back to 126. It does not seem to me that the meticulous Persius would have been so inconsistent, regardless of the MSS. I do not prescribe the policy to be adopted in all cases where the MSS sometimes provide an older spelling and sometimes the current one of everyday speech; but in instances like the above it might be better to be bold and assume that Persius knew what he was doing, even though the MSS do not.

I also miss some remarks on archaism in Persius. Clausen knowingly allows himself to be inconsistent on *cludere/cludere*, yet I am not sure that he is justified. At 1, 93 he accepts the evidence of ABX for *cludere*, adding that Persius' editor, Caesius Bassus, regularly used this form in his treatise on meter, citing also Quintilian, *Inst.*, IX, 4, 65; but at 5, 11, despite the possible evidence of Bern. 648 for *cluso*, Clausen prefers *clauso*. When he can find MS authority, he likes the archaic *vo-* instead of *vu-*. On the sole evidence of P, he therefore reads *volpem* in 5, 117, *volgi* in 6, 12, and *volvae* in 6, 73; and on the sole evidence of V, he accepts *volnera* in 5, 4 and *voltum* in 5, 40. Here again we find Persius implicitly convicted of inconsistency: *vulvas* in 4, 36, *vulnus* in 4, 44. Knoche leaves the question open as to whether similar inconsistencies in the tradition of Juvenal should be attributed to the satirist or the scribes, and it would be interesting to have Clausen's opinion. It seems to me, however, that the slow writing habits of Persius, which involved such a manneristic search for the economic, concrete word and which after all covered so short a period of years, would negate the charge of inconsistency, whereas it might be maintained for the rather facile Juvenal who had such a long career. I suggest also that not only Caesius Bassus, but even more Cornutus' treatise on orthography should be adduced as relevant evidence for certain spellings.<sup>22</sup>

In short, Clausen has given us a highly important edition of Persius. The very fact that he has made additions to his earlier edition while refining the apparatus proves how valuable this present Oxford Classical Text can be. Above all, the fact that we can discuss at such great length his methods bears ample testimony to the success of his designs: he has in fact produced the first authentic apparatus criticus of Persius, so that at last a critic may spend his time positively, not just haggling with the editor over his preference for P or for AB on a particular reading.

<sup>22</sup> I have already noted that Clausen changed his mind about spellings at 1, 65; 3, 20, 75; 5, 87 and 165. These changes would have pleased Cornutus, to judge from the fragments of his treatise. I note here other idiosyncrasies. Earlier, at 1, 97 Clausen expressed hesitation about *vegrandi*; now in 1959 he seems confident. In Persius 3, 92 and 6, 17 he spells *lagoena* the same word that throughout Juvenal he writes as *lagona* (cf. Juv. 5, 29); this latter agrees with Knoche's spelling. In Persius and Juvenal Clausen writes *obsceus* in contrast to Knoche's *obscaenus*.



We now proceed to Juvenal. As I have already stated, shortly after it appeared Owen's edition was outdated by the revolutionary work of Housman.<sup>23</sup> Housman had found the same situation prevailing among Juvenal's editors as Clausen has in the case of Persius, and his critical acumen together with his brilliant polemic stimulated an entirely new approach to the MSS. However, in 1905 the seven secondary MSS which Housman selected to counteract the dominance of P were not adequately collated, and Housman committed some unintentional oversights by ignoring relevant readings. Furthermore, since 1905 have been discovered R (1909), the Ambrosian Fragments (1909), the Antinoe Fragment (1935), and the sheets from the Orleans MS (1938). When Housman republished his text in 1931, instead of changing his apparatus to accommodate the important readings of R and Ambr., he added a second preface, containing mention of these two as well as further polemic congenial to his nature.<sup>24</sup> It was obviously necessary, therefore, for someone to assume the task of assessing Housman's important edition, bringing into the apparatus criticus the relevant readings of the MSS and fragments found after 1905, correcting as well as expanding Housman's report of his seven secondary MSS, and selecting some additional ones of value. That man was Ulrich Knoche.

When Knoche began to work on Juvenal, he challenged not only Owen, but even Housman. His monumental *Handschriftliche Grundlagen des Juvenaltextes*,<sup>25</sup> followed after the war by his epoch-making edition of Juvenal (Munich, 1950), must be taken into consideration as we assess Clausen's work on Juvenal. At the beginning of Knoche's edition, the reader goes through twenty pages of detailed *Handschriftenverzeichnis*, an amazing work in itself. Then, he plunges into the text and discovers that Knoche uses over forty MSS as relevant, classifies them into five principal families, and represents these families or portions of them with a bewildering code of Greek letters. From the *Grundlagen*, we can gather the fruits of many years of Knoche's researches on these MSS and their affinities: there is one vastly superior family represented by PSRWQ;<sup>26</sup> next, two families which belong to the Vulgate tradition but have been profitably contaminated with the superior family, one of which is represented by GU, the other by FZLO; finally, two groups which stand very close to the Vulgate but have here and there, in different respects, come into contact with the better tradition: fifteen MSS in Knoche, in Clausen represented only by H. It will be observed that I have not mentioned three of Clausen's MSS, namely AKT. Knoche

<sup>23</sup> Housman had already contemptuously dismissed Owen's edition in *C. R.*, XVII (1903), pp. 389 ff. One of the clearest statements of his thesis about the MSS in his Preface (1905), p. x, demonstrates, by its similarity to a passage quoted above from Clausen, how similar were the situations of Juvenal and Persius before these two editors began their studies.

<sup>24</sup> I refer the reader to Knoche's balanced review in *Gnomon*, IX (1933), pp. 242 ff.

<sup>25</sup> *Philologus*, Suppl. XXXIII, 1 (1940).

<sup>26</sup> Knoche used the sign W for Vind. 107 (V in Clausen); he used V for Arov.



estimates these as contaminated, crossing lines between families in such a way as to render exact classification impossible.<sup>27</sup>

Knoche's elaborate and meticulous edition, though admirable in many respects, leaves something to be desired as far as the average reader is concerned: its complicated presentation of minute affiliations defeats attempts to derive a quick and clear impression of the textual data, and its affection for the fifteen MSS forming the two families close to the Vulgate rarely contributes much but unacceptable readings. One approaches Clausen's text, therefore, with some relief, free from the necessity of learning a complicated code of reference, able once more to concentrate on a limited number of valuable "secondary" MSS. Clausen has chosen the seven MSS which Housman recognized as important (AFGLOTU), added K that Housman suspected as useful, and HZ that Housman intermittently used. He has personally collated GHLOTZ and relied on Knoche's copious edition for the readings of AFKU.<sup>28</sup> I draw this comparison with Housman immediately, because it soon becomes clear that Clausen has patterned his approach more on that of Housman than on that of Knoche.

A number of problems, all envisaged by Housman, face the editor of Juvenal and make his task much more difficult than that of Persius' editor. First, there is the question of the relation between PSQR (or PSRARov.) and the "secondary" MSS.<sup>29</sup> Housman inclined towards the view that most of the interpolations had crept into the secondary MSS in Carolingian times and that consequently it was impossible to determine strictly separated families among them.<sup>30</sup> Knoche disagrees vigorously with this position and has devoted his best years to proving that interpolations proceeded consistently in the Vulgate from the Fourth Century, that on the basis of these it is possible to determine separate affiliations for the inferior MSS. We have already summarized his conclusions about the five principal families. Now, Clausen has taken a position close to Housman's. He does not argue, of course, as Housman and others did, from an incorrectly dated Bobbio Fragment; it belongs to the Sixth Century, not the Fourth. But while he agrees that P and the Vulgate derive from a pair of archetypes created at the end of the Fourth Century, he pointedly denies Knoche's arguments for affiliations.<sup>31</sup> Here, then, we grasp the reason for his grouping of "secondary" MSS in a single mass rather than in the separate families of Knoche. I cannot see that the text suffers much from such a theory, since in effect Clausen's selection of MSS involves ignoring the two inferior families of Knoche. However, it remains a point of considerable

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Grundl.*, pp. 160, 189, 195, 206, and 261 ff.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Praef.* p. xi. Clausen also announced, p. viii, that he personally went to Montpellier to collate P.

<sup>29</sup> Vind. 107 (W or V) occupies an intermediate position.

<sup>30</sup> Housman (1931), *Pref.* pp. xxiv and xli.

<sup>31</sup> Clausen, p. xii: "Codices ab emendatis exemplaribus deducti, eos dico quorum consensum  $\phi$  littera notavi, ut saepius inter se, ita non semper consentiunt; sed eorum adfinitates, ut ita dicam, tam variae sunt ac mutabiles, ut nullo in stemmate, sit licet vel implicatissimum, designari possint."

importance, one which I am in no position to arbitrate here, whether Clausen's assumption of simplicity or Knoche's theory of complexity in the tradition should be accepted; whether indeed one should talk of "secondary MSS" of Juvenal.

Since Knoche and Clausen both agree, though to different extents, with Housman's insistence on the value of other MSS besides P, and since no important new MSS have been discovered since R (known to Housman for his second edition), it is fairly obvious that neither editor can differ radically from Housman in reporting the various readings—only in so far as Housman possessed inadequate collations—but, on the other hand, they can and will disagree on the relative value of P and other MSS in specific cases. Housman demanded of the editor the exercise of critical judgment, inevitably stimulating his successors to disagree with him and espouse new variants. For the benefit of the future, he listed most of the cases where he preferred the united tradition of his seven secondary MSS to that of P, a total of 26 places.<sup>32</sup> It is significant that his judgment seemed so convincing against that of Owen and Buecheler as to win almost total acceptance: of these 26, Knoche prefers to follow P on 7, 78; 13, 65; and 15, 93, while Clausen follows P on 7, 78 and 9, 132. A second list arranged by Housman reveals his preferences for readings of one or two MSS against all others.<sup>33</sup> While it is clear that he possessed inadequate collations of the MSS when assembling his data,<sup>34</sup> I find it indicative that Clausen and Knoche prefer P against the MSS of Housman at 6, 120; 10, 313 and 359, but that Knoche goes on alone to reject Housman at 1, 145; 2, 45; 4, 148; 6, 29 and 561; 7, 88; 10, 21; 11, 26; 14, 165; and 15, 98. In short, Housman's judgment wins general support from both Knoche and Clausen, but Knoche goes against him and his "secondary" MSS sixteen times in contrast to the six of Clausen. There are a good number of other instances which Housman would class as indeterminate, where no definite clue but personal preference would lead to deciding for P or the other MSS. I have counted eighteen of these in which Clausen has not agreed with Housman, whether as in 3, 78 or 9, 25 Housman followed P too conservatively, rejected it too freely as in 14, 45 and 66, or whether as in 3, 311 he depended upon an incorrect collation; in all but 4, 41 and 6, 585 Knoche and Clausen agree.

Apart from matters of deletion, emendation, punctuation, and orthography, which I shall discuss later, I have calculated that Clausen disagrees with Knoche in some seventy cases. In roughly half these instances, each appeals to P and rejects a reading of the inferior MSS.<sup>35</sup> From these statistics, it might appear that a reader may feel pretty free to make his own choice between these two dis-

<sup>32</sup> Housman (1905), p. xviii.

<sup>33</sup> P. xxii.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. his edition at 3, 259; 5, 121; 6, 120; 8, 133; 11, 85; 14, 217; 16, 48.

<sup>35</sup> In several cases, P is utterly wrong, and the editor must choose among alternate readings offered by the other MSS; thus, Knoche and Clausen choose differently at 6, 329, 561, 660; 10, 344; 12, 14; and 15, 104.

tinguished editors and their preferences, and I certainly do not feel prepared to argue my personal prejudices with confidence. However, as one examines these seventy points in the text, one should be aware of Housman's ghost. Suppose we analyze Book I. At 1, 44, 114, 126; 2, 45, 111; 3, 19, 288, 322; and 5, 116 Clausen follows P, while Knoche chooses the secondary MSS; at 1, 145; 2, 106, 150; 3, 157; 4, 4, 41, and 148 it is Knoche who follows P and Clausen who accepts the secondary MSS or Liutprand. A fairly even division, a good indication that our editors are practicing judgment on P. But if one glances through Housman, one will find that he and Knoche agree only at 4, 41, where, in my opinion, both are wrong and Clausen right.<sup>36</sup> Substantially the same figures hold for the other books.<sup>37</sup> In other words, when Clausen and Knoche disagree, the presence of a third critic must be assumed; and in most instances, Clausen has accepted the acute judgment of Housman, not broken a new path. The more we study this text, the clearer it becomes that Clausen has made it his primary purpose to assert once again the merits of Housman's edition.

Before Housman, editors like Buecheler, Friedlaender, and Owen had decided that no spurious verses existed in the MSS. Housman revived the more intelligent approach of Jahn, who deleted some seventy lines, and argued effectively for the removal of over twenty lines, mostly those suspected by distinguished predecessors. The discovery of the Oxford Fragment in 1899 undermined the position of Buecheler and cohorts, whether they accepted or rejected it; for in either case, these lines pointed to a disturbed condition in the MSS. Leo found in the Oxford Fragment the inspiration for his famous theory of a double recension; he assumed that Juvenal revised his text in exile and somehow the revisions and the original became incorporated one after the other, to produce a series of doublets.<sup>38</sup> Housman and Knoche entertained doubts about Leo's theory,<sup>39</sup> and then in 1943 Jachmann developed the idea of a double recension into a more plausible form.<sup>40</sup> Instead of attributing to Juvenal the "revision," usually of no great merit, we should recognize the alien

<sup>36</sup> *neque enim* is paralleled by 1, 89; 7, 59; 11, 30; and 14, 127; Knoche accepts all these but the last. On the above list from Book I, Housman suggests an inclination towards Knoche's position in his apparatus at 1, 114 and 2, 45.

<sup>37</sup> Book II: Clausen and Knoche differ in 18 cases; Housman sides with Knoche against Clausen at 6, 308 and 585 and hesitates about 660; all three disagree at 6, 117 and 329. With our MSS we cannot prove Clausen wrong in these five cases; he certainly deals with 6, 117 better than Housman. Book III: of the 13 disagreements between Knoche and Clausen, Housman stands behind Clausen in every case but 9, 118 (where he has his own conjecture) and 9, 132 (where he agrees with Knoche, but the reading of P, with its future tense, seems more pointed and Juvenalian). Book IV: Housman supports Clausen in all 15 divergences from Knoche. Book V: of 16 variations, Housman backs Clausen except in 13, 44, where Clausen has accepted the conjecture of Schurzfleisch, based on the Scholia.

<sup>38</sup> "Doppelfassungen bei Juvenal," *Hermes*, XLIV (1909), pp. 600-17.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Housman (1931) and Knoche's approving comments in *Gnomon*, IX (1933), p. 244.

<sup>40</sup> "Studien zu Juvenal," *Gött. Nachr.* (1943), pp. 187-266.

work of a mediocre editor before the end of the Fourth Century. Both Knoche and Clausen express respect for Jachmann's ideas<sup>41</sup> and follow him in connection with 6, 614 abc; 8, 6-8; 9, 5 and 120-3, ignoring him on 6, 125 and 624-6. Going far beyond Housman, Knoche deleted a total of more than 90 lines. Even in this bold action he has failed to satisfy some critics, of whom W. C. Helmbold has been the most eloquent advocate, in his discussions of Satires 1 and 12.<sup>42</sup> When Housman began this present trend, he remarked that he was steering a middle course, between the total oblivion of Owen, that is, and the then audacious manner of Jahn in athetizing 70 lines. To steer a middle course nowadays, which is what Clausen does, means following Housman in all his deletions, Jachmann in most of his, and backing away from many of Knoche's freer methods. I estimate that Clausen deletes just over fifty lines, generally on the authority of others.<sup>43</sup> He remarks besides that he has noted in the apparatus criticus certain verses which seem suspect to him, but not certainly to be condemned.<sup>44</sup> From this, I was expecting comments like those of Housman at 5, 104 and 7, 50-1, or even brief statements like those of Knoche at 6, 156, 589; 8, 140, and elsewhere;<sup>45</sup> apparently, though, the reader must infer Clausen's suspicions from references to others' deletions, for he risks no direct statement of his attitude.

On the Oxford Fragment, Clausen finds himself in good company when accepting it, particularly that of Housman. He cites a selective bibliography of those who have contributed most to the question, including both Knoche and Axelson (who have denied the genuineness of the lines). While I myself do not find the Fragment worthy of Juvenal, Housman and Colin have succeeded in making sense of it, and no scholar can at present be criticized for inclining either way in this matter. We do not possess adequate criteria for reaching a decisive judgment, and each editor must weigh the arguments of those who have accepted or rejected the lines, then follow his own conscience.

After deletions and the Oxford Fragment, inasmuch as the text is now admittedly corrupt, comes the problem of emendations. First, the editor must determine the passages where corruption exists, then attempt to deal with it. Following the lead of Jahn, who had detected

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Knoche, p. vii (Preface to his edition), and Clausen, p. xiii. There have also been some recent attempts to revive Leo's theory of author-variants. Cf. J. G. Griffith, "Author-variants in Juvenal: a Reconsideration," *Festschr. Snell* (Munich, 1956), pp. 101-11, and F. Jacoby, "Zwei Doppelfassungen im Juvenaltext," *Hermes*, LXXXVII (1959), pp. 449-62.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. "The Structure of Juvenal I," *U. of Calif. Publ. Class. Philol.*, XIV (1951), pp. 47-60, and "Juvenal's Twelfth Satire," *C. P.*, LI (1956), pp. 14-23.

<sup>43</sup> His authority for 8, 134, 223; 13, 153; and 14, 119 is Housman; but Housman did not actually delete these lines, rather calling them into suspicion in his apparatus.

<sup>44</sup> P. xiii.

<sup>45</sup> E. g., "versus fort. delendus est" (5, 148); "fortasse delenda sunt" (6, 156-7); "versus nondum explicatus melius abesset" (6, 589); "fortasse damnandi" (8, 140-1).

a lacuna after 16, 2, Housman defined one type of corruption by marking a series of lacunae, namely, at 1, 131, 156; 2, 169; 6, 585; and 14, 229. Knoche adopts all but that at 14, 229; he also places lacunae at 5, 64; 6, 557; 7, 205; and 9, 134.<sup>46</sup> Clausen admits only Jahn's lacuna at 16, 2 and regards only Housman's ideas at 1, 131 and 156 as deserving mention. A second type of corruption emerges within a line, whether of meter or words, and modern editors of Juvenal owe it once more to Housman that these corruptions now receive serious consideration.<sup>47</sup> No editor goes so far as Housman, particularly in inserting conjectural emendations in the text. Knoche assumes corruptions at 3, 109; 4, 116; 6, Ox. 9, 11; 7, 149; 8, 105, 241; 10, 197, 295, 313 (accepting Rigaltius' emendation); 12, 13; 13, 49; 14, 269; and 15, 90; but he solves some of the problems noted by Housman by deleting 4, 8; 5, 104; the troublesome part of 6, 195; 7, 15; 8, 7, 202; 10, 326; the offending portion of 11, 148; a different part of 11, 168; and 15, 98. He accepts none of Housman's conjectures, but admits Collins' emendation for 16, 25, as did Housman in 1931. As we might expect, Clausen draws closer to Housman on this point: he marks corruptions at 2, 168; 3, 109; 5, 104; accepts Housman's transposition of the half-lines 6, 64-5; transposes 6, 117 in a slightly different manner from Housman but in accordance with an earlier proposal of Hermann; reverses 6, 307 and 308 as suggested by Madvig and approved by Housman; assumes corruptions at Ox. 9, 11, and 18; 6, 415; 7, 149; accepts Richards' conjecture (with Housman) for 8, 27; obelizes 8, 105, 241; 9, 118; 10, 197, 295, 313, and 326; accepts Housman's emendations for 12, 14; 13, 49; and 15, 90 (the latter, to some extent, supported by a MS written in Italy in 1441); and marks corruption at 14, 269; and he deletes others called into suspicion by Housman.<sup>48</sup> Finally, he follows the new punctuation proposed by Housman in 1, 50; 2, 37; 4, 116; 5, 31; 6, 455; 8, 142, and adopted from earlier editors by Housman for 7, 36, 124; 11, 114; 13, 188; and 15, 52. Knoche shares only 1, 50; 2, 37; and 13, 188 with them.

Housman devoted a long and important footnote to the principles of orthography which he adopted in 1905.<sup>49</sup> To correct some of Housman's errors and to analyze the situation more fully, Knoche produced a meticulous chapter in his *Grundlagen*.<sup>50</sup> I shall not repeat the many details which he introduces. Suffice it to say that he recognizes the unhappy state in which we live, with our MSS giving us a uniform spelling at one point and dividing elsewhere, the preferable set seeming to give us the special poetic, archaic, or vulgar spelling

<sup>46</sup> Since 1950, Knoche has felt some doubts about the lacuna at 5, 64: cf. his self-corrections in *Die römische Satire* (Berlin, 1957<sup>2</sup>), p. 122.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Housman (1905), p. xxx. In his text he signalized corruptions explicitly or implicitly (by emending the MSS reading) at 2, 49, 168; 3, 109, 218; 4, 8, 79, 128; 5, 104; 6, 50, 55, 64, 117, 158, 167, 195; Ox. 9, 11, 18, 329, 415, 461; 7, 15, 204; 8, 7, 105, 159, 202, 241; 9, 60, 118; 10, 197, 295, 313, 326; 11, 23, 57, 148, 168; 12, 14, 78; 13, 49, 179; 14, 23, 71, 269; 15, 90, 98; 16, 18.

<sup>48</sup> Clausen adopts the same deletions as listed above for Knoche, with the exception of 5, 104 and 10, 326.

<sup>49</sup> P. xxi, n. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Pp. 322 ff.



which has more often been removed by the regularizing tendency of the scribes. He tries to formulate principles for dealing with the rare instances when an attractive spelling appears in a few MSS, often in sound disagreement with Housman. There may be a certain boldness in following Harl. 3872 or Oen. 992, as for example at 2, 17; 5, 16; 8, 2; and 10, 289, but they do use orthography which, when present in other MSS, Housman and Clausen adopt. Although it may be impossible and undesirable to produce complete uniformity of spelling, I tend to think that Juvenal might have used the archaic form as often as Knoche adopts it from the inferior MSS, if not more so; in any case, we can hardly imagine that Juvenal wrote *voltu* in 10, 189 and *vultum* two lines later in 191, regardless of the MSS tradition. With these prefatory remarks, I give a list of places where I find Clausen's orthography questionable: *clausus* in 1, 124; 3, 185, 242; and 10, 170 despite the testimony of other MSS for *clusus* and despite the fact that he accepts *cluso* at 4, 21 and *cludo* at 3, 19 and 131 on the authority of P and others; *coloephia* in 2, 53; *menses* in 5, 16 and *quales* in 10, 194 despite certain MSS and the common use of *-is* in the accusative plural of the third declension (cf. 11, 155); *parvolus* in 5, 138 on the authority of PSR (but not the MSS of Vergil), *parvulus* elsewhere in 6, 89; 10, 340; and 15, 127 despite GU; *convolsa* at 1, 12 on the sole authority of U, but not *servolus* at 14, 67 on the sole authority of U; *pulcher* consistently despite the testimony for *pulcer* in P at 7, 190 and in good MSS at 1, 128, 137, and elsewhere; *puxide* at 13, 25 despite *pyxide* at 2, 141; *Tentura* at 15, 35 and 76; *vulnus* at 15, 34 despite a suggestive reading in U and the acceptance of the archaic *volnere* at 15, 54 and 156; the archaic *voltum* at 15, 170 on the basis of P, but not at 8, 2 or 9, 3 on the authority of other MSS. The only remarks in the apparatus criticus relevant to orthography concern the spelling of *lagona* (5, 29 and elsewhere) and the archaic *quom* which Ribbeck proposed for 3, 37 and elsewhere, which Knoche adopts, but neither Housman nor Clausen will enter in the text.<sup>51</sup>

To conclude, Clausen has not really attempted to break new ground in his text of Juvenal; rather, he seems to have restored Housman to his rightful place of eminence by modernizing the great edition of 1905. In marking out the lines for Juvenal's editors, Housman had inevitably overstated his case in spots, in other places unavoidably lacked the necessary evidence, as he knew only too well, because of inadequate collations of the "secondary" MSS. Moreover, his love of conjecture often led him to discern corruption where none existed. Despite it all, Housman's judgment drove right to the heart of many crucial problems and, as we have said, rendered Owen's text ridiculous almost before it had reached the public. To bring Housman up to date is no mean undertaking nor, considering the importance of Housman's editorial work as well as the special character of Knoche's edition, should it be regarded as supererogatory. I find it ironic indeed that what has replaced Owen is a text after the pattern of Owen's most severe critic and bitter enemy, but it is also singularly

<sup>51</sup> Except for the spellings *coloephia* and *pulcher*, indeed, Clausen seems to have followed Housman in most of the cases where I would question him.



appropriate that Clausen, the man who applied Housman's healthy principles to the problem of editing Persius, should be selected to vindicate Housman as editor of the new Oxford Classical Text of Juvenal. In a sense, this is the most significant, though unplanned, commemoration of the centenary of Housman's birth.

It is almost unnecessary to add that the Oxford Press has produced its usual handsome volume at the usual attractive price. No library that now possesses Owen's text should hesitate to buy this and relegate Owen to the place where scholarly curiosities and sad examples usually end. In addition to the two errors that were caught at the last minute, I have detected two others: in Juvenal 10, 107, instead of *praeceps*, read *praeceps*; in 11, 56 for *pucherrima* read *pulcherrima*. I regret that the editor has seen fit to sacrifice the Testimonia which Owen printed, but of course they do not relate to the text.<sup>52</sup> Clausen does introduce a useful substitute in the form of a pair of *indices nominum*, one for each satirist. I have glanced through that for Juvenal and found it accurate. The reader may be surprised to see that the *Caesar* and *dux* of 7, 1-35 should probably—Clausen leaves it a question—be interpreted as Trajan. Apart from that single detail, the index arouses no disagreement and forms a worthy conclusion to an Oxford Classical Text which every student may use with respect.

WILLIAM S. ANDERSON.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

ALBERT BATES LORD. *The Singer of Tales*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xvi + 310. \$6.75. (*Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature*, No. 24.)

At his lamentably early death in 1935, Milman Parry left behind him the first few pages of the draft of a book, to be called *The Singer of Tales*, in which he hoped to discuss the results of his expeditions to Yugoslavia (the notes and recordings from which are now among the more envied possessions of Harvard University). Dr. A. B. Lord, who had been one of Parry's pupils and companions and has become one of the principal heirs of Parry's work, published the surviving pages in the course of an article on "Homer, Parry and Huso" (*A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 34-44). So much indeed has Lord become identified with Parry's work that a reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London, September 19, 1958) has written of "the Serbo-Croatian ballads collected by Milman Lord"; and though workers in Lord's own field may well find the assurance superfluous, it seems desirable that this account of Lord's book should begin by stating explicitly that it really is Lord's work, and should not on any account be regarded as "the book which Milman Parry might have written had he lived." This observation is not meant in

<sup>52</sup> Clausen also gives us a *Vita Iuvenalis* after his text; it involves no changes from that usually printed, as for instance in the Scholia edited by Wessner.

any way to belittle Parry's contribution; like Wolf's Homer, he began the weaving of the web (and indeed spun most of the yarn for it as well)—and if we are now, as I believe we are, in a position to proclaim that the main problem involved in the "Homeric question" has been solved, we owe the decisive step towards that solution to Parry's initiative, as developed by Lord and others (among whom J. A. Notopoulos of Trinity College, Hartford, deserves special mention).

After a preface by Professor Harry Levin, a former Chairman of the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard (pp. xiii-xv), the main argument of the book is divided into two parts: "The Theory" (six chapters, pp. 1-38) and "The Application" (three chapters, pp. 139-221). Six appendices are devoted to Serbo-Croatian heroic songs, mostly in summary (special mention should be accorded perhaps to the full text and translation of M. Vojičić's song in honour of Milman Parry in Appendix VI); notes to the ten chapters of the book follow the appendices, and there is an index, mainly of proper names.

The first chapter of Part I (pp. 1-12) is a general introduction, stating the approach of students of Comparative Literature (later called "comparatists"—*uerbum horrendum, informe . . . cui lumen ademptum*) to the problems of oral narrative poetry, and especially to the sort of information which can be derived from a comparison of the technique of the improvising singers of Yugoslavia, as they were thirty years or so ago, with that of the Homeric poems. The main difficulty about this, as Lord admits, is that the term "epic" is ambiguous; and I for one am inclined to think that its use should be severely limited—above all, one should steer clear of such expressions (much used by Lord) as "oral epic," which seem to beg the whole question (I should prefer to speak, as Lord sometimes does, of "oral narrative"). In this chapter Lord seems to me to be tilting at windmills, when he complains of the belittling attitude of scholars to "oral" and "folk" literature; it might have been hoped that by now Comparative Literature was adult enough as a discipline not to play favourites between "oral" and "written" literature. Indeed, his whole account of the development of Homeric scholarship since the seventeenth century seems to me prejudicial and unfair; its quality may perhaps be judged by Lord's final assertion (p. 12) that "Homeric scholarship has chosen to disdain oral epic and to move into the more abstruse kinds of literary criticism" (from this condemnation, for which no references are given, a note explicitly excepts C. H. Whitman and Rhys Carpenter). At this point, the serious student of Homer (if he has got so far) will have been tempted to lay the book aside; such persons, if they have not yet begun to read the book, are hereby advised to begin at Chapter II.

This deals with "Singers: Performance and Training," and makes fascinating and highly instructive use of data from the Parry Collection and from Lord's own experience, to show how Serbo-Croat singers come by their material, and how they learn to use it. One of the odd things which emerges from this account is the attitude of such people to accuracy of reproduction: S. Makić, for example, is quoted (p. 27) as claiming that he would sing a song that he had heard from another "just as I heard it. . . . It isn't good to change

or add" and yet all the evidence assembled by Lord and others shows that no two performances, even by the same singer, will be exactly alike. This is not, *pace* Lord, an essential characteristic of oral narrative song; one may contrast with it the more rigid principle of the Gilbertese narrator, as recorded by Sir Arthur Grimble (*A Pattern of Islands* [London 1952], pp. 42, 157), and it may be that here as elsewhere Lord is in danger of treating argument from analogy as if it were equivalent to demonstration; it does not follow that, because many of the conditions of literature in pre-Homeric Greece seem to have been analogous to those in Yugoslavia in the twentieth century, all the conditions in both places and periods must have been identical. Chapters III ("The Formula," pp. 30-67) and IV ("The Theme," pp. 68-98) deal in illuminating detail with the handling by Yugoslav singers of traditional phrases and scenes in the composition of new songs, whether on traditional subjects or on new and topical ones; it becomes evident here that catalogues are freely transferable from one story to another, without regard for time or space, and this may have some relevance for the student of Homeric catalogues. Chapter V ("Songs and the Song," pp. 99-123) considers the relation of particular performances of a story ("songs") to the story as it has been handed down ("the song"), and emphasizes that it is not possible, by collation of particular "songs," to produce an archetypal text of "the song" itself: the elements of the several "songs" may be the same, but each version is a phenomenon in its own right. This principle, which is summed up in Chapter VI ("Writing and Oral Tradition," pp. 124-38) as "stability of essential story" (p. 138), is of course entirely different from that "stability of text" (*ibid.*) which is the goal, not only of written literature (as Lord says) but also of such "oral" narrators as Grimble's Nei Tearia and (one must suppose) the Demodocus of *Od.*, VIII, 261-366. Like the preceding chapters, this is fascinatingly interesting as long as it deals with the Yugoslavs, but is less satisfactory when it comes to lay down general principles; for example, Lord's confident assertion that "It is conceivable that a man might be an oral poet in his younger years and a written poet later in life, but it is not possible that he be *both* [his italics] an oral and a written poet at any given time in his career" (p. 129). This is simply undemonstrable for Homer and his contemporaries; but even among literate moderns it will not agree with the experience of a University teacher who divides his time between oral composition (or does not Lord ever improvise his lectures?) and the writing of books, articles, and reviews. Lord does not seem to me to have thought out very clearly the real problems involved by the revival of literacy in eighth-century Greece (cf. R. Harder, *Das Neue Bild der Antike* [Leipzig, 1942] I, pp. 91-108; *Die Antike*, XIX [1943], pp. 86-108 [both now in his *Kleine Schriften* (Munich, 1960), pp. 57-97]).

In Part II, we jump straight from the Yugoslav heroic songs to "Homer" (Chapter VII, pp. 141-57); and in this chapter Lord answers "the question as to whether the author of the Homeric poems was an 'oral poet,' and whether the poems themselves are 'oral poems.'" The answer is that Homer was indeed an oral poet, and that the first written texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were taken

down from dictation; Lord pours scorn on the suggestion (though if it was ever made, I do not know who can have made it) that the texts can have been taken down at an actual performance before an audience. Having accepted Lord's original argument (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIV [1953], pp. 124-34) as soon as it appeared (cf. *C. R.*, N. S. VI [1956], p. 206), I find no difficulty in this, provided it is recognized that the man who dictated that version of "The Wrath of Achilles" which, following Herodotus, we call the *Iliad* has the best claim to be called "Homer." It is with this version (and with the corresponding version of "The Return of Odysseus," whether dictated by the singer of our *Iliad* or by another) that we have now to deal; and I am not at all clear after reading Lord's Chapters VIII ("The Odyssey," pp. 156-85) and IX ("The Iliad," pp. 186-197) that he has fully appreciated either the relation of the two poems to one another or the gap which divides them from their forerunners, the improvised oral *klea andrôn*, known to us from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and the *oimai*, which appear only in the *Odyssey* and are there the monopoly of the professional *aoidoi*. (It may be noted in passing that Lord never discusses in any detail the very considerable amount of evidence which the Homeric poems provide about the literary profession in heroic times—and this is odd, because the analogies with his Yugoslav singers are often striking.) Chapter X (pp. 198-221) is devoted to "Some Notes on Medieval Epic," and extends the method of enquiry to *Beowulf*, the *Chanson de Roland*, and *Digenis Akritas*. Of the last two, I can only observe that the widely differing versions in which the poems are preserved puts them in a different category from poems with stabilized texts—like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; of *Beowulf* I think that it ought to have been said that distinguished students of Anglo-Saxon literature (it will suffice to name Dr. Florence Harmer) would hesitate to classify *Beowulf* as an epic at all.

The announcement that this book was to be published gave rise to high hopes among those who have followed Lord's work; but it must be frankly confessed that the book itself, for all the interesting and valuable material which it contains (especially in Chapters II-V and the appendices), is a bitter disappointment. The first sight of the volume, with the pitiable photograph on the dust-jacket, was depressing; and the gloom with which I at once began to regard the book deepened as I saw the arty-crafty binding and the execrable Greek type, and observed that whoever was responsible for the *Foreword* (pp. vii-ix) believed that Sir Maurice Bowra's first baptismal name is "Cedric" (the *Foreword* is initialled by Lord, but this part at least cannot be by him, since p. 6 shows that he knows that Bowra was christened "Cecil"). All these are externals, and perhaps should not be allowed to weigh too heavily; but the ungenerous snobberies of the *Preface*, which I was at first willing to disregard as demonstrating merely the truth of Crabbe's dictum, that "Presumption and meanness are both too often the only articles to be found in a Preface," proved far too soon to be in harmony with the tone of the book which Professor Levin was seeking to commend. The root of the trouble appears to be that the circles in which Lord now moves have somehow come to regard Parry's doctrine as the exclusive property of a small and highly "illuminated" sect (it is

noteworthy that so distinguished a student of oral literature as Notopoulos rates only one entry in the index—and that refers to a quotation from Whitman [p. 154]); and this sect contemplates with scorn and ruthless misrepresentation the efforts of those enquirers to whom the true *gnosis* has not been communicated. At first, I was inclined to put Lord's misrepresentations down to inadequate acquaintance with the very extensive (and not always rewarding) literature of the Homeric question; but as I read, I found my mental gauge reading first "Snob" and then "Très Snob"—and the needle turned firmly to "Cad" at pp. 128-9, with the words: "Diplomatic Homerists<sup>7</sup> would like to find refuge in a transitional poet who is both an oral poet—they cannot disprove the evidence of his style—and a written poet—they cannot, on the other hand, tolerate the unwashed illiterate." Wondering what on earth a "diplomatic Homerist" (apart from Robert Wood) might be, I looked up the note and found (p. 289): "7. Led by C. M. Bowra. See his *Heroic Poetry* (London 1952)"—which leaves me none the wiser. Passing over the question of washing, Lord's reference to which is an irrelevant *captatio malevolentiae* in the worst tradition of the sort of scholarship which he professes to despise, and coming to the merits of the case, I can only say that those who believe, like Bowra and (if I may put myself forward) Davison, that the author of the *Iliad* (whether he was himself literate or not) composed his poem orally and had it taken down by an amanuensis, do so, not because they care whether Homer washed or not or because they think that an illiterate is necessarily less well educated than a so-called literate whose only reading is tabloids and digests, but because the evidence, including that from Comparative Literature, seems to point unmistakably in this direction. In any case, as I have already hinted, it is idle to gird at Homeric scholars nowadays for neglect of oral literature: one has only to think of what has been written over the last thirty years by Homeric scholars of the calibre of E. R. Dodds, Hermann Fränkel, Dorothea Gray, M. P. Nilsson, and D. L. Page to realize how ill-founded are Lord's complaints. It cannot be too firmly pointed out that what Parry discovered, though an essential part of the jigsaw puzzle which we call the Homeric question, was only a part; and that Lord and the rest of those who are in danger of being called by the world "Comparrytists" may find that they have compromised the real services of Parry to scholarship by trying to make out that they, as his heirs, have in this matter a monopoly of absolute truth.

O spare your idol! think him human still;  
 Virtues he has, but he has frailties too—  
 Dote not too much, nor spoil what ye admire (COWPER).



JACQUES PERRET. Horace. Paris, Hatier, 1959. Pp. 254. (*Connaissance des Lettres*, no. 53.)

This is the second contribution to a notable series by a distinguished professor of the Classics at the Sorbonne. It is to be hoped that other volumes on ancient authors may follow his *Virgile* and *Horace*.

*Horace* is not a popular work in the sense that the charming and brilliantly conceived little volume of Pierre Grimal (*Horace* [1958]) is a popular work. M. Perret has excluded almost entirely illustrative quotations, translations, and summaries. His is not a book for the undergraduate in a hurried search for substitutes for knowledge. Perret addresses himself to a "general reader" of a very high order, one who knows his "great books" not only in the original but also *ad litteram*, but desires to compare his impressions with those of a scholar for reassurance, verification, and correction. All, however, who profess to be scholars, teachers, or students of the ancient literatures will find it profitable, stimulating, and enjoyable to compare notes with Perret. For this book does not merely present once more a standard Horace but the results of a fresh examination by a deep and enthusiastic interpreter of the poet. Perret is sound but not dull; he is alert and imaginative yet not venturesome to the point of disquieting the general reader, who after all desires counsel rather than controversy. The academic reader would probably have welcomed more documentation, but any attempt to cope with the now enormous Horace bibliography would have expanded the volume far beyond the norm of the "*Connaissance des lettres*." A select bibliography with helpful annotations makes up a little for the absence of notes.

"La jeunesse d'un poète" (Ch. I, pp. 5-44) is a refreshing treatment of familiar material with an eye to recovering the "psychological climate" of Horace's world. *Satires* and *Epodes* are considered in Chapter II (pp. 45-87). There is little consideration of the individual satires as works of art; Perret is more interested in drawing a portrait of Horace against the background of the literary quarrels of his time. As already remarked, none of this is perfunctory. The most interesting part of this chapter is a discussion of Horace's relation to both formal and popular philosophy. Emphasizing Horace's independence in philosophy, Perret finds him more Stoic than Epicurean. His derisive treatment of the popular preachers is not to be taken as a condemnation of the doctrines from which these itinerant characters drew their material; Horace dislikes them for their association with the *profanum vulgus*. An interesting paragraph traces Horatian irony to Plato himself and the delicate balance that he maintains between the comic and the serious.

Perret regards Catullus as Horace's inspiration in the *Epodes* rather than Archilochus. There is no detailed consideration of any of the *Epodes*, most of them being dismissed briefly with comments of a word or two. Epode II is essentially a "Tibullan elegy." In V the poet endeavors "to scare us a little." Epode XIII "est la plus belle." And so on.

The third chapter (pp. 88-128) is a discussion of the first three books of the *Odes*. This is divided into "Problèmes formals," "*La composition des livres*," and "Thèmes d'inspiration." The first and



third sections might well have been one, since both are concerned with the nature of Horace's poetry, whereas the second section is a renewal of the venerable controversy over the arrangement of the books of the *Odes*. Under "problèmes formals" Perret considers at some length Horace's reasons for abandoning the satire, his search for a new genre, and his reasons for selecting Sappho and Alcaeus as models rather than Pindar. A page or two are devoted to the qualities of Sapphic and Alcaic rhythm but there is no consideration of the types of structure of Horatian odes. More notice is taken of individual poems in the paragraphs on "les thèmes d'inspiration," but even there Perret refrains from anything like detailed critiques. Horace's lyric poetry derives from the era of civil wars (some two pages are devoted to Epode 16 as foreshadowing the *Odes*). Perret feels one might summarize the spirit of the "Roman Odes" as a plea: "Comment faire pour qu'il n'y ait jamais plus de guerres civiles?" Perret follows the growth of the panegyric of Augustus, Horace's concept of the hero, Horatian melancholy (which definitely separates him from Epicurus), puzzling questions of Horace's religion, and the charge sometimes brought against him of egotism. Perret selects the phrase *carpe diem* as a fundamental Horatian attitude: "un des aspects les plus essentiels de la personnalité morale d'Horace . . . cueillir les roses de la vie." This is not the place to quarrel over this familiar interpretation of Horace. Like the Bible, Horace says different things to different readers. Even III, 29, to my mind about the best expression of the mature Horace's "philosophy," is by some regarded as Epicurean, despite its stoicizing conclusion.

The debate over the arrangement of the books of the *Odes* remains *sub iudice*. It would be fair to say that students of Horace in general, being concerned with the interpretation of individual poems and attaching no particular importance to the corpus itself, have been content to note the few obvious formal features of the books (the position of dedicatory poems, metrical diversity or symmetry, etc.). A few scholars (including Perret) have attempted to find something like an architectural scheme or some principle to account for the magical art that, while avoiding or obscuring recognizable patterns of arrangement, has insured every poem's having an appropriate context. The pitfall in the way of the investigator of symmetry is the temptation to force or distort the interpretation of individual poems to make them conform to a plan. Perret has been cautious and there can be no question that his results are interesting. He finds the plainest indications of Horace's having intended a schematic arrangement of poems in Book II and especially in the first half of Book II. This part numbers 288 lines of verse. The even-numbered poems are in Sapphics and the odd in Alcaics. Every theme is treated twice (i. e. in two successive poems). These couples correspond to each other in a neat scheme: 2-3 moral counsel; 4-5 love; 6-7 friendship; 8-9 love; 10-11 moral counsel. Perret admits that part II of Book II (the rest of the book) neither metrically nor topically presents as neat a pattern as part I. He analyses, however, as follows: 13-14 death of the poet; 15 "contre le luxe des jardins"; 16 *otium*; 17 friendship; 18 avarice and luxury; 19-20 "le poète se sent immortel." All Perret's captions (some of which I have for

convenience's sake abbreviated) could be debated, for it is never easy to pigeonhole odes of Horace. I am particularly disquieted by part II. Space will not permit detailed questioning of Perret's results. I would simply note that poem 13 (usually recalled for the "tree"!) concerns the poetry of Sappho and Alcaeus as much as it does the poet's miraculous *escape* from death. Perret's preoccupation with his own design would seem to have led him to overlook a feature of the external form of poems 13-14-15 that might be described as "bien visible." All three are in the *Alcaïe strophe*. It is not usual for Horace idly to set three poems together in the same metre. I am not positive about the unifying element in these three poems. One might note, however, that they touch (with increasing emphasis) aspects of the growing blight of luxury-tree culture in Italy (that began with the planting of a single evil tree in poem 13?). Incidentally, poem 14 concerns the death of Postumus, does it not, rather than of the poet?

The pursuit of the Horatian design along the lines of Perret's analysis may eventually succeed, in spite of the treacherous nature of the quarry. To most readers of Horace, the quest is of little importance. The *Odes* are like a harmoniously organized pinacotheca: no matter where one enters, the eye will fall upon a satisfying picture and be guided by gentle transitions to others. But was it a matter of indifference to Horace, at what point one entered his gallery? Was the reader that began at the beginning expected to have no different experience from the casual gatherer of flowers? Again, this question can hardly be pursued to a conclusion in a review. Having given the question a great deal of thought, however, for a very long time, I have come to believe that Horace expected the reader of the complete *Odes* to become aware of a design distinct from an "architectural symmetry" such as has been discussed,—something not measurable or readily tabulated but none the less real. I believe the reader was expected to become aware of a continuity, a progression, a forward movement on several levels, reaching a climax in book III. There is the obvious historical progression, the growth of the Augustan panegyric, but chiefly the growth of the poet's mind as he witnesses the world's struggle between good and evil. And may there not be an underlying philosophical scheme? For while *carpe diem* is perhaps the watchword of Book I, Book II has a Cynic-Stoic program that ends in the discovery of wisdom and poetry as the only good; and there is no materialism and nothing Epicurean in the *Odes* after that.

A disproportionate amount of space has been given to "la composition des livres des *Odes*" (with consequent injustice to the excellent chapters on the *Epistles* and the later lyrics, as well as "la fortune d'Horace." But I felt that readers of Horace should be urged to look not merely for the static architectural symmetry of Horace's edifice but for the soaring lines of movement, an effect at once cohesive and progressive.

EDMUND T. SILK.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

MARTA SORDI. *I rapporti romano-caeriti e l'origine della civitas sine suffragio*. Rome, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1960. Pp. vi + 188.

The thesis of this book would, if accepted, revolutionize interpretations of Roman and Western Mediterranean history in the thirty years following the Gallic catastrophe. The thesis is that citizenship without the vote, which the Caerites were the first people to receive, was awarded not, as generally believed, shortly after 353 but in 386, and that the status was then equivalent to the *hospitium publicum* which Livy (V, 50, 3) says was granted to the Caerites in recognition of their aid in the Gallic invasion; that the arrangement was bilateral between Rome and Caere and was similar to provisions in the second treaty between Rome and Carthage and in the Tyrrhenian-Carthaginian agreements mentioned by Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 1280a; that in the next thirty years Rome and the Etruscans, led by Caere, made common cause against the alliance formed in 386 between the Gauls and Dionysius of Syracuse (Justin, XX, 5, 4-6); that in this period Rome was pursuing a "Mediterranean" policy, indicated by a treaty with Marseilles (Justin, XLIII, 5), the establishment of a colony in Sardinia (Diodorus, XV, 27, 4), and an abortive expedition with twenty-five ships to found a settlement in Corsica (Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.*, V, 8, 2); that at this time Rome was at variance with the Latins, and particularly with two of the chief cities, Tibur and Praeneste, which were aiding the Gauls. The effects of the alliance with Caere are, the author holds, reflected in internal politics; Rome was "etruscanized" under the potent influence of Licinii of Etruscan origin, who brought in *ludi scaenici* and perhaps introduced the curule aedileship from Etruria. There is even the suggestion that the admission of plebeians to the consulship may reflect democratic movements in Etruscan cities. The temporary return to two patrician consuls in 355, the subsequent outbreak of war with Etruria, and the resumption of relations with the Latins came, Sordi notes, close upon the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse in 356. The second treaty with Carthage in 348 is explained as a renunciation of a "Mediterranean" policy; like the first treaty, dating from the first year of the Republic, it marks the end of a period of collaboration with Etruria.

Citizenship without the vote, the author goes on, was no longer bilateral but was still a reward in 338 when it was granted to the Formiani, the Fundani, and the *equites Campani*; but later, by 306, it had come to mean incorporation with inferior status in Roman domain. The Caerites, as punishment for activity against Rome, were, in the view of Sordi, thus incorporated in the early third century.

The author may well be right in holding that the award of *civitas sine suffragio* was made to Caere soon after the Gallic catastrophe and that it was then not a penalty but a recognition of Caere's service to Rome. Sordi strengthens her arguments by a brilliant analysis of the non-annalistic tradition, perhaps of Caeritan origin, which, contrasting Caeritan energy with Roman weakness, gave not to Camillus but to the army of Caere the credit for recovering the Gallic ransom. But the unilateral character which Sordi assigns to the awards of citizenship without the vote in 338 indicates an inferior status, which

may not have been fully realized by Italian peoples for some time. Since the names of the Caerites headed the census list of *cives sine suffragio*, it seems likely that the incorporation of Caere dates before 338. The most probable time is soon after 353 when Caerites were said to have participated in raids of the Tarquinienses on Roman territory.

The evidence cited for Rome's "Mediterranean" policy after the Gallic invasion is slim. The many mistakes in proper names in the text of Diodorus provide a basis for questioning the report of a colony in Sardinia. Theophrastus' account of an attempt to colonize Corsica was written toward the end of the fourth century, but the period to which he refers is uncertain, and he may be confusing Romans and Etruscans. Even if Rome could avail herself of Caeritan ships for such overseas expeditions, the abandonment of an essentially agrarian policy soon after the annexation of Veii's extensive territory would have been strange. (The suggestion of E. S. Staveley, *Historia*, VIII [1959], pp. 410-33, that Appius Claudius Caecus attempted a similar shift of policy in his censorship of 312 is of interest here.)

As for the "Etruscanization" of Rome, there can be no doubt that Etruscan influence was strong in the fourth century. An illuminating discussion of the archaeological evidence is now available in the second chapter of Axel Boethius' important book, *The Golden House of Nero* (Ann Arbor, 1960). But the rise of a "nuova classe dirigente, etrusca o etruschizzata" in Rome in the first half of the fourth century (p. 86) is doubtful. The leaders of the class, according to Sordi, were the plebeian Licinii, whose Etruscan origin is regarded as established (p. 76), and the patrician Fabii and Manlii, with whom the Licinii had intermarried. But the Etruscan origin of the Licinii, suggested by Friedrich Münzer and others (s. v. "Licinius," *R.-E.*, col. 214), is by no means certain. The adjective *licinus* from which the *nomen* is derived is apparently Indo-European. See Walde-Hofmann, *Lat. etymol. Wörterb.*, and, on the *nomen*, W. Schulze, *Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*, *Gött. Abh.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., V, no. 5 (1904), p. 191, n. 1; cf. pp. 107 f., 142. A member of the house was military tribune with consular power in 400 and 396, and there were more doubtful reports of Licinii among the earliest tribunes of the plebs. It is true that the name in the Etruscan forms *lecne*, *licni*, *lecnies* occurs in various Etruscan towns, but there are many Italic names in Etruscan inscriptions. In Latin inscriptions Licinii are common all over Italy as well as in Etruria. Nor is there any evidence that the Licinius who was consul in 364 had a role in the introduction of *ludi scaenici* from Etruria. Democratic movements like that represented by the Licinian-Sextian laws are unattested in Etruria in this period.

But whatever the objections to particular points, Sordi has made an important contribution to the interpretation of non-annalistic traditions for the first half of the fourth century. The discussion includes a valuable analysis of the tradition on the conquest of Veii and interesting suggestions for a possible use by Vergil of an Etruscan source for the Mezentius story. The book is fresh and original, and the reviewer predicts that the careful reader will find it stimulating and thought-provoking.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

JEAN POUILLOUX. *Choix d'inscriptions grecques: Textes, traductions et notes.* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1960. Pp. 195. N. F. 10. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon*, IV.)

Fifty-three interesting Greek inscriptions, constituting one man's choice of good documents for beginners to read, are collected in a convenient, well printed, inexpensive volume with an excellent index, translations, brief commentary and clear texts which preserve the arrangement by lines. Only thirteen of these are found in Dittenberger, *S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, only six in Tod, only four in both. No. 53 is the Greek text of the bilingual inscription of Asoka at Kandahar; No. 32 is the Athenian law of 337/6 against tyranny; No. 30 is the letter of Antiochus III for the cult of Laodice; No. 29 is a long decree of the Acarnanians concerning the sanctuary of Apollo at Actium, an inscription first published in 1957. There are no ephebic or prytany decrees, but honorary decrees of historical interest, also documents concerning Attalid donations at Delphi, physicians, soldiers, foreign judges and religious embassies, international relations, etc. For each inscription the editor gives no more than two items of bibliography, often only one. Misprints in the Greek text are rare, but there are other things to be corrected as Klaffenbach points out (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, LXXXII [1961], cols. 511-16).

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

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